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Democracy and Diversity: Political Theories, Liberalisms and Modi Vivendi 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis explores the role of democracy, i.e. electoral and deliberative democracy, in 
pluralist societies.  I begin by hypothesising that democracy may function as a ‘political 
theory’ (‘political’ in the sense used by Rawls in Political Liberalism) and ask whether 
adherents of different comprehensive worldviews could endorse democracy on that basis.  
I consider the discomfort that liberals, adherents of one particular worldview, have with 
democracy.  I note that Berlin’s account of value pluralism may offer an understanding 
that allows liberals to value democracy.  I consider justifications for electoral democracy 
(procedural and instrumental) and for deliberative democracy.  I claim that procedural 
justifications for electoral democracy fail arguing that, in valuing democracy because of 
the alleged freedom given to individuals to influence political decision-making, 
procedural justifications misrepresent democracy.  Rather electoral democracy is about 
different collective endeavours (i.e. the attempts to elect different candidates).  Individual 
involvement is in the form of the opportunity to contribute to those collective endeavours 
but such opportunities are not of equal value and, thus, are not morally significant.  I 
argue that deliberative democracy cannot function as a political theory.  However, there 
are weighty arguments for electoral democracy on account of its instrumental value.  The 
relationship, though, between an instrumentalist electoral democracy and comprehensive 
worldviews is necessarily problematic.  Given the contingent nature of democratic 
outcomes, these will clash with the imperatives of comprehensive doctrines.  For that 
reason and others, liberals and holders of other comprehensive doctrines do not relate to 
democracy as a political theory.  I turn to an account of political settlements as modi 
vivendi.  I argue that democracy is best understood as a component of modi vivendi.  
Liberals will still have difficulties with democracy but liberals have problems with any 
non-liberal outcome unless they accept a broadly Berlinian approach. 
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Introduction 
Democracy & Pluralism 
Two features of post-cold war politics stand out.  The first is the ubiquity of cultural, 
ethnic and religious diversity and conflict within states.  The second is the hegemonic 
status of ‘democracy’ in popular political discourse about proper government.  The 
simple polarity of the free world versus international communism, which emerged in the 
wake of the Second World War, has proved transient.  With the passing of this polarity, 
old divisions have resurfaced across the globe, sometimes leading to civil war but more 
commonly fuelling terrorist campaigns of variable ferocity.  New clashes of religion and 
culture involving Islamists and other aggrieved groups within the Muslim world (and 
sometimes between such) have been especially apparent to the West.  In parallel with this 
marked pluralism, since 1989 and the failure of communist states, democracy has widely 
come to be seen as the only acceptable form of government. 
 
John Gray offers a powerful criticism of much recent political philosophy on account of 
its failure to engage with the realities of this reassertion of national and religious 
identity.
1
  A not dissimilar criticism can be made in respect of democracy.  While the idea 
of democracy may be pervasive in popular discourse about politics and political change, 
many political theorists, particularly those exploring liberal theory, have paid scant 
attention to democracy.  Thus, the place of democracy in political theory remains unclear 
and confused.  It is not simply that the place of democracy in political theory is open to 
being contested; rather, some notable political theories do not seem to provide much in 
                                           
1
 See John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake (London: Routledge, 1995) esp. ch.2. 
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the way of a coherent account of democracy or to provide any place for democracy in that 
theory’s preferred account of things. 
 
Against the backdrop of the pervasive ethnic and cultural pluralism of the modern state, I 
revisit democratic theory.  I aim to arrive at an account of democracy that is both 
defensible and able to respond appropriately to the pervasive pluralism of our times.  The 
second concern is likely, of course, to have some considerable bearing on the first:  we 
may reasonably question the credibility of an account of democracy which is ill-fitted to 
conditions in modern diverse states.  It is hoped that as we become more confident that 
democracy has been understood correctly, we will be better placed to see the role that 
democracy plays, or could play, in pluralist societies.  We may also hope to become more 
aware of democracy’s fragilities in conditions of marked pluralism and may be better 
able to adjudge whether democracy warrants the hegemony it currently enjoys. 
 
Democratically speaking, states across the globe are hugely diverse.  A very broad 
distinction can be drawn between those states where democracy is, in some sense, 
established and others, where any kind of democracy is wholly lacking.
2
  In exploring the 
nature and the validity of democracy, this thesis seeks to facilitate (i), in respect of non-
democratic states, an appropriate understanding of the role that democracy could or 
should play and (ii), in respect of already democratic states, appropriate understandings 
of why democracy is valued, of the role it plays in democratic states and of attitudes 
                                           
2
 Some writers would be uneasy about such an observation.  A considerable number suggest that 
democracy represents an ideal and that no state can ever rightly claim to be consistently democratic.  
Rather, there should be, in all states, an ongoing process of democratisation.  Unease is reciprocated:  a 
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towards democratic outcomes (i.e. what value and legitimacy should be ascribed to 
particular democratic outcomes). 
 
I define democracy as the notion that political power should ultimately reside in or be 
derived from the settled adult population3 of a state and that political decisions should 
ultimately be made by reference to the opinions and preferences of all (or almost all) of the 
settled adult population of a state.  Definitions of democracy are themselves highly 
contestable.  I prefer to avoid the idea of power resting with ‘the people’ as this idea suggests 
that the adult population constitutes some kind of corporate person/entity whose interests 
and behaviour (as a single entity) can be discussed and analysed.   It seems to me to be self-
evident that there is no such person.  Popular political discourse might be clearer if political 
commentators refrained from language which suggested as much:  ‘the “people” have 
decided;’  ‘the “people” have turned against Obama.’  Such assertions are nonsensical.  The 
only legitimate (albeit loose) use of the idea of power resting with the people is as a way of 
asserting that power does not rest with a monarch or oligarchs.  ‘Reference to’ in this 
definition must be understood loosely.  Democracy only rarely involves a simple aggregation 
of opinions – that is a one-dimensional totalling of some single quantity.   The only kind of 
democratic process that would strictly count as a simple aggregation would be voting in a 
one question (Yes/No) referendum, with Yes votes counting +1 and No votes –1.  A 
                                                                                                                             
democratic ideal – perhaps that power should rest with ‘the people’ – may provide little assistance in 
reaching conclusions about the democratic validity of particular institutions and procedures. 
3
 I have avoided the notion of ‘citizen’ in this definition.  Notoriously, ‘citizen’ can be defined so as to 
exclude large sections of the population.  Given that no state will allow all adults living in the state to vote, 
I prefer the idea of the ‘settled adult population’.  Such a concept emphasises where distinctions can be 
legitimately drawn.  Temporary residents may be excluded from voting without compromising democratic 
principles.  In practice, enfranchisement should predominantly depend upon permanence of residence, and 
for those coming from abroad, the extent to which they demonstrate a settled commitment to the state in 
which they now reside.  [There may be other legitimate exclusions.  In the UK, there is currently (i.e. early 
2011) a vociferous debate about the legitimacy of the denial of the vote to prisoners.] 
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democratic procedure is one whereby an outcome is arrived at in a fashion that involves 
noticing the opinions of all.  Later in this thesis, I will describe methods of arriving at an 
electoral outcome as involving, for want of better terms, the ‘aggregation’ or ‘amalgamation’ 
of votes.  It should be borne in mind, though, that many procedures for arriving at an 
outcome involve recognising an opinion but not necessarily counting it towards the eventual outcome 
(i.e. when the vote is for a losing candidate).  Some definitions include reference to equality 
or ‘equal political rights’.  I have deliberately avoided including reference to equality for 
reasons that I hope will become clear.   
 
My definition of democracy is  broad enough to include representative, direct and 
deliberative accounts of democracy.  Democracy thus understood does not include the 
concept of liberal democracy.  Liberal democracy I take to be a name for the political and 
legal principles and practices of certain states – generally states of the West.  The term 
democracy is often used as a shorthand for liberal democracy and is used to indicate such 
things as the rule of law and the existence of liberal freedoms as much as, if not more so 
than, the concept of ultimate decision-making power residing with the citizenry.  I shall 
not use democracy in that sense in this thesis.  In the modern context, I understand direct 
democracy to involve the use of referendums and plebiscites.
4
  I use ‘electoral 
democracy’, again for want of a better term, to include both representative democracy 
and referendums and plebiscites. 
 
The recognition of the pervasive pluralism of modern societies is the foundation of my 
study of democracy.  I now go on to make some scene-setting observations about 
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political theory in general in the context of pervasive pluralism which will explain my 
subsequent approach to theorising about democracy.   
 
Pluralism, Political Theory and ‘Political Theories’ 
The populations of states are rarely homogeneous.  The effects of colonialism, war and 
the migration made possible by cheap travel mean that the populations of states are 
commonly ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse.  John Rawls correctly pointed 
out that, at least in the case of liberal democratic states, populations are likely to be 
‘profoundly divided by … incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines’.5  
Rawls maintains that these different, incompatible, yet reasonable worldviews are 
resilient in liberal democracies; indeed, ‘the free institutions of a constitutional 
democratic regime’ foster this diversity of reasonable views.  We cannot expect, he 
maintains, that a single comprehensive doctrine will triumph over all others.
6
  There is 
good reason to assume that non-liberal democratic states have populations that are 
similarly divided – although, of course, those divisions may be less immediately obvious 
in states where dissenting voices are silenced by persecution.  The failed experiment in 
statist communism demonstrated that cultural and ethnic particularisms were rarely 
extinguished;  they were simply latent.  We may reasonably judge theories of governance 
and of the political (including a theories of democracy) to be credible to the extent that 
they address this pervasive ethnic, religious and cultural pluralism. 
 
                                                                                                                             
4
 It is possible to imagine new forms of direct democracy that take advantage of modern technologies. 
5
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) p.xviii. 
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While we might be desirous of theories that are properly cognisant of diversity, we 
should not be blind to the fact that this is a troubling demand for theoreticians in so far as 
we expect a normative account.  Any distinct normative account is, in one sense, monist.  
It is a particular account of what is politically good or politically right which, either 
explicitly or implicitly, necessarily offers an account of why all other accounts are, at 
least in some respects, wrong, incomplete or inadequate.  Each distinct normative account 
necessarily constitutes a claim that it is the only right account and that all other accounts 
are deficient.  A normative account may be very broad and tolerant of certain kinds of 
diversity but there is no escaping from its monism.  It may seek, for example, to subsume 
other accounts but, then, its distinctiveness will be its breadth;  it cannot be the same as 
the accounts it subsumes.  Thus, any broadly acceptable theory of governance seems to 
involve the loss of diversity it was supposed to cope with:  in being broadly acceptable 
those who formerly held diverse worldviews must have come to accept a similar account 
which will diverge, at least in some respects, from their original worldview.  There seems 
to be something contradictory here or at least a tension.  No normative account can fully 
accept the pervasive diversity of worldviews;  it must challenge some of that diversity.  
We should not lose sight of this.  It is a matter which I allude to below when I comment 
on the concept of a modus vivendi and the extent of its normative aspect in chapter 7. 
 
While it is far from clear that Rawls recognises this contradiction or tension when it 
comes to normative theorising in conditions of pervasive diversity, credit should be given 
where credit is due.  Rawls recognises the fundamental importance of accommodating the 
                                                                                                                             
6
 Ibid. p.xvi.  In this passage, Rawls seems to suggest that, in the open and free conditions of a liberal-
democratic society, human reason will lead different people and groups to different reasonable conclusions 
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pervasiveness and resilience of the diversity of cultural, moral and religious views in an 
acceptable political theory.  It is reasonable, therefore, to use the framework he offers for 
thinking about theories of governance and of the political – as long as that approach 
remains coherent and useful. 
 
Rawls suggested that theories can be distinguished according to whether they are 
‘comprehensive’ or ‘political’.  This distinction between comprehensive and ‘political’ 
theories may be useful if the two types of theory are clearly demarcated.
7
  Here, 
‘political’ is being used in a narrow and particular sense.8  Not all theories that address 
the political domain of human goings-on only are ‘political’ in that particular sense.  [It is 
somewhat unfortunate that this usage leaves us with two meanings of political.  In the 
next paragraph political is used in both senses.  I had contemplated identifying ‘political’ 
in the narrow and particular sense by placing each reference in inverted commas but that 
seems oppressive and usage should be clear from context.  I drop the inverted commas 
after the next paragraph.] 
 
                                                                                                                             
about life, human flourishing and religion. 
7
 My demarcation may not be precisely identical to Rawls’s but my aim here is to elucidate the idea of a 
political theory as a generic concept.  Rawls, of course, is especially concerned about the relation between 
his political liberalism and worldviews existing in a liberal democracy. 
8
 William Galston expands the term political theory to ‘freestanding political theory’ – see William 
Galston, Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge:  CUP, 2002) p.8.  A political theory must be freestanding in the 
sense that its credibility is not dependent upon the wholesale acceptance of the intellectual resources of any 
particular comprehensive account.  If a political theory is simply that part of a comprehensive account that 
addresses the political domain, it is probably unlikely that that theory would be able to command the assent 
of those holding other worldviews.  Such a theory would probably provide reasons (explicitly or implicitly) 
why those committed to other worldviews should abandon those views and endorse the comprehensive 
theory that has spawned the political theory.  However, there is no reason in principle why a political 
theory might not be derived from some of the insights of a comprehensive doctrine.  There may be many 
reasons to doubt the validity of Rawlsian political liberalism but the fact that it owes a significant amount 
to Rawls’s earlier comprehensive account does not necessarily render it invalid. 
10 
 
There are two foundational characteristics of a ‘political’ theory:  first, such a theory 
purports to offer an account of and prescriptions for the political domain only, but  
secondly, a ‘political’ theory is cognisant, and takes due account, of the reality of 
‘incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines’ (what might also be called 
‘incompatible worldviews’).  Its prescriptions are intended to offer understandings and 
mechanisms which allow for peaceful cohabitation in a state with a diverse citizenry who 
continue to hold incompatible worldviews.
9
  These worldviews have a broader scope.  
They are not simply concerned with the political.  As Rawls puts it, these worldviews 
will apply to a greater range of subjects and the content of the worldview will be wider 
because of the need to address this wider range of subjects.
10
  Many such worldviews will 
be comprehensive in that the worldview purports to address all moral issues (personal 
and collective) and specify all human values and virtues.  Some worldviews may be only 
‘partially comprehensive’.11  A worldview may be incomplete or in some respects 
incoherent.  Henceforth, where I refer to comprehensive worldviews this is to be read as 
including partially comprehensive worldviews.  A ‘political’ theory allows citizens to 
continue to hold their own comprehensive worldview but also, in parallel and without 
inconsistency, subscribe to the ‘political’ theory.12  It should be noted, then, that a 
comprehensive theory is not the converse of a ‘political’ theory.  The domain of a theory 
                                           
9
 Chandran Kukathas offers a political liberalism which does not presuppose existing state borders with 
their defined populations:  Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago (Oxford: OUP, 2003).   He claims 
that a truly liberal society is an open society [ibid. p.4].    He boldly claims that one of his reasons for 
rejecting the assumption that societies are closed is that this is ‘an abstraction which takes us (conceptually) 
too far away from actual societies’ [ibid. p.7]:  borders are sometimes porous, there is migration, the world 
is full of international and transnational bodies.  Some might take a different view:  that a political theory 
that fails to recognize the essentially and predominantly fixed geopolitical realities of our world is likely to 
be too abstract to be credible. 
10
 Political Liberalism p.13. 
11
 Ibid. 
11 
 
may be limited to those things that constitute the political and thus not be comprehensive 
but it may not recognise or accept the resilience of a plurality of worldviews and, so, 
would not amount to a ‘political’ theory.  Anarchism is an example of this kind of non-
‘political’ theory.  While anarchist theories are generally not theories that speak 
comprehensively to all moral aspects of life, they urge the destruction of the state rather 
than offering mechanisms for the proper functioning of the state that might be acceptable 
to those holding to a wide variety of worldviews.  Fascism, also, is too demanding to 
constitute a ‘political’ theory.  The fascist agenda is not aimed at accommodating 
different worldviews and its account of the state is probably not consistent with a great 
many comprehensive doctrines.  Indeed, arguably, fascism, by its deifying of the state, 
comes close to being a comprehensive doctrine.  It might also be noted that adherents to a 
theory or worldview that is only concerned with the political domain (i.e. is not 
comprehensive) but is not, itself, a ‘political’ theory will not be able to endorse a 
‘political’ theory.  Such a theory offers its own account of the proper regulation of the 
political domain.  Such adherents could only accept a ‘political’ theory by resiling from 
their existing beliefs. 
 
A further distinction is sometimes drawn between political theories (in the Rawlsian 
sense) and ‘ethical’ theories.13  This distinction may be less clear.  It is not that political 
theories are amoral but rather that the breadth of their ethical reach is restricted.  This is 
the case not so much in terms of the domain of the theory (i.e. just the political) but rather 
in so far as certain matters of ethical investigation and insight are likely to be precluded 
                                                                                                                             
12
 A comprehensive account may, of course, acknowledge the diversity of worldviews in some way and 
factor that in to its own ethical beliefs and prescriptions. 
12 
 
from inclusion in the political theory in order to improve the chances of its acceptability 
to a wide diversity of incompatible worldviews.
14
  Charles Larmore who offers his own 
version of political liberalism suggests that a political theory is based on a ‘minimal 
moral conception’.15  We might compare the ethical liberalisms of Kant and J.S. Mill 
which rely upon the goods of autonomy and individuality, of, more recently, Joseph Raz 
who builds his account from the value of autonomy and individual well-being
16
 and, 
indeed, of the earlier Rawls of A Theory of Justice
17
 with the political liberalism of the 
later Rawls which aims to be agnostic about the good, in particular autonomy, beyond a 
narrow political conception thereof.
18
 
 
Two features of political theories should be noted:  (i) their range (i.e. the range of 
comprehensive worldviews to which a political theory is acceptable), and (ii) the nature 
of the relationship between the political theory and comprehensive theories.  Rawls 
makes it clear that the range of his political liberalism is limited:  it only aims for 
endorsement as a political theory by those who hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines, 
                                                                                                                             
13
 Rawls uses this terminology.  See Political Liberalism n.1 (p.135). 
14
 Galston caricaturises philosophers endorsing political theories as ‘argu[ing] that it is theoretically 
improper and practically imprudent to link political principles to other parts of philosophy, even ethics or 
value theory’ [Liberal Pluralism, p.8].  I am not convinced that that is precisely what is happening.  Rather 
certain types of moral argument are being foresworn. 
15
 Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: CUP, 1996) p.123. 
16
 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
17
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1971).  Interestingly, Rawls seems to be left without any 
detailed comprehensive doctrine of his own.  He might, conceivably, have propounded his form of political 
liberalism as a variation of his comprehensive account that left his comprehensive account intact.  
However, he clearly presents his political liberalism as an answer to admitted weaknesses of his account in 
A Theory of Justice.  [‘The ambiguity of Theory is now removed and justice as fairness is presented from 
the outset [my emphasis] as a political conception of justice’ [Political Liberalism p.xvii].  It follows that 
Rawls was left without any apparent comprehensive moral account.  Away from the political domain, one 
wonders to what extent Rawls’s ‘political turn’ put him back in the position he described himself as being 
in prior to his writing of A Theory of Justice: ‘[without] a workable and systematic moral conception that 
could successfully oppose [utilitarianism …] we were often forced to choose between utilitarianism and 
13 
 
that is, people who accept the ‘essentials of a democratic regime’.19  Larmore states that 
‘a common life’ is necessary for the political ‘liberal project’.20  This common life need 
not be constituted by shared substantive beliefs about the good.  If it did, there would be 
no need for a specifically political theory.  This common life amounts to some kind of 
‘social unity’, the fundamental component of which ‘is a common historical experience, 
including the memory of past conflicts, even civil war, that were sparked by opposing 
ideals of the good life but are now seen as having given way to a shared practice of equal 
respect.’21  A little later, Larmore forcefully underlines the point again: 
The common life on which a [politically] liberal order depends must involve, 
therefore, an allegiance to the past that is more reflective than just a sense of 
continuity.  It must be the life of a people united by what they have learned 
together from the things that once came to divide them.
22
 
 
These are remarkable assertions which must severely undermine the applicability of 
Larmore’s approach.  Many pluralist states are going to fall outside the parameters he 
sets.  Apparently, for instance, his political liberalism will not be workable in states 
where the cultural diversity is a relatively recent phenomenon arising from mass 
immigration. 
 
Both Rawls’s and Larmore’s comments about the range of groups that might be brought 
under the umbrella of their political liberalisms suggest that the applicability of their 
                                                                                                                             
rational intuitionism and were likely to settle for a variant of the principle of utility circumscribed and 
restricted by seemingly ad hoc intuitionistic constraints.’ [Ibid. p.xv.] 
18
 Ibid. pp.77-78.  Also see Larmore pp.148-9. 
19
 Political Liberalism p.xviii.  Also see John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’, University of 
Chicago Law Review Vol.64 No.3 (Summer 1997) pp.765-807 at p.766. 
20
 Op. cit. p.143. 
21
 Ibid.  This comment suggests a strongly americo-centric focus. 
22
 Ibid. p.144.  In defending his account of political liberalism, Larmore considers its acceptability to 
liberals and communitarians.  While his investigation is interesting, one wonders whether it would have 
14 
 
accounts may be more limited than they might hope.  It does not follow, though, that each 
and every political theory would have such a limited range.  The range of a political 
theory will depend upon the substance of that theory.  However, a political theory does 
involve agreement and it is hard to imagine any political theory having a range that 
includes certain militaristic or fundamentalist worldviews.
23
 
 
As for the nature of the relationship between a political theory and various 
comprehensive doctrines, Larmore asserts that endorsement of a political theory must be 
something more than a strategic calculation.
24
  For Rawls it must be something more than 
a modus vivendi – more than simply an arrangement based upon a ‘convergence of 
interests’.25  Both point out, rightly, that if those holding particular comprehensive 
worldviews only endorse the political theory for non-moral, merely strategic, reasons, the 
balance of interests for them may shift so that it becomes no longer expedient for them to 
accept the political theory.  A further question should be clarified.  While the aim and 
expectation is that those holding reasonable comprehensive views will endorse the 
political theory, are the reasons for endorsement the same or can adherents of different 
worldviews each have their own moral reasons for endorsement?  Bruce Ackerman puts 
it like this: 
                                                                                                                             
been more useful to consider the applicability of his theory to non-liberal groups more numerous than the 
communitarians of the academy. 
23
 For instance, when considering the range of democracy as a political theory, it is noted that certain 
fundamentalist Islamic groups argue that ‘Muslims Don’t Vote’.  Of course, Jehovah’s Witnesses similarly 
eschew voting but their quietism amounts to tacit consent to the existing political order. 
24
 Op. cit. pp.132-133. 
25
 Political Liberalism p.147.  Rawls refers to an ‘overlapping consensus’ but I find that a troublesome 
term.  It seems to be tautologous:  a consensus must necessarily involve an overlap.  Presumably, if 
anything overlapped it would be the comprehensive doctrines but that would suggest that each 
comprehensive doctrine has the political theory within it – a political theory in common with every other 
15 
 
[Political liberalism] seeks to explain to holders of different comprehensive views 
why it makes sense for each to adopt liberal principles. Obviously, the reasons 
most compelling to a neo-Kantian will be different from (and sometimes 
inconsistent with) those which attract a liberal Catholic.  But if political liberalism 
can be justified from religious as well as secular perspectives, if it can appeal to 
anti- as well as neo-Kantians, why alienate potential supporters unnecessarily?  
We should, instead, work hard at building all possible bridges to the liberal state.  
While each bridge may look very different, each provides a different group of 
fellow travellers with compelling reasons for engaging in a common project of 
political cooperation.
26
 
 
While one might have some sympathy with Ackerman’s motivations and his realism, his 
observations are too simplistic.  It must be recognised that the tenets of the theory are 
similarly endorsed by all and, further, what is being endorsed is not just a set of rules but 
a moral theory.  All agree to and share the same political morality.  A political theory 
should be acceptable, in its entirety, to all those who hold to comprehensive doctrines that 
are to be brought under the umbrella of the political theory. This is likely to impose quite 
a significant restriction on the diversity of reasons for endorsing the political theory.  
Perhaps, ‘immediate reasons’ and ‘higher-order reasons’ can be distinguished.  While 
immediate reasons must be shared, higher-order reasons may diverge.  For example, 
some aspect of a political theory might be accepted because all similarly recognise it as 
just.  However, adherents of different comprehensive worldviews believe in justice for 
different reasons:  some hold to a Kantian view; others see justice as a divine imperative. 
 
Whatever the axioms of a political theory, it is inevitable that a political settlement 
instantiating that theory will produce some political outcomes that are viewed as bad, 
                                                                                                                             
reasonable comprehensive theory.  But that is hardly Rawls’s position.  The political theory is constructed 
in the expectation that it will be consistent with reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
26
 Bruce Ackerman, ‘Political Liberalisms’, Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 134 (1994) p.365 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/134> [accessed 14 March 2011].  Rawls makes a similar 
but less forceful point – Political Liberalism pp.145 & 147-148. 
16 
 
wrong or repugnant by adherents of some of the comprehensive doctrines that accept the 
political theory.  Further, it is almost impossible to imagine a workable political 
settlement that would determine the outcome of all potentially contentious matters ab 
initio.  Political decisions have to be made in the light of events and other political 
developments.  Some of those political decisions will offend some.  Rawls recognises this 
in his account of political liberalism.
27
  In endorsing the political theory, adherents to 
different comprehensive worldviews accept that the clashes that are likely to occur must 
be resolved in favour of the political outcome arising from the agreed political settlement. 
 
A political theory, then, has considerable justificatory hurdles to jump.  It must provide a 
credible and coherent justification for its account of how it proposes to regulate the 
political domain and, as Rawls points out, the proposed political economy must be 
stable.
28
  In Political Liberalism, Rawls states that his account of liberalism addresses this 
question:  ‘How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of 
free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines?’29  Stability over time will hinge on the acceptability 
of the political theory to those holding incompatible worldviews.  It would be unrealistic 
to demand of a political theory that all worldviews could be reconciled to it.  As already 
                                           
27
Rawls offers the example of abortion.  Apparently, a comprehensive doctrine that holds that abortion 
should be banned can form part of the politically-liberal consensus.  Presumably, then, adherents of that 
comprehensive doctrine are expected to continue to endorse the politically-liberal settlement even though 
abortion is legalised.  See Political Liberalism p.243-244 n.32.  [This note is intriguing for other reasons:  
we find out that a comprehensive doctrine that holds that abortion should be banned is ‘to that extent 
unreasonable’.  That would suggest that such an unreasonable comprehensive doctrine fell outside of 
Rawls’s consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  However, Rawls goes on to state that there is 
some margin of unreasonableness.  A comprehensive doctrine is not as such unreasonable because it leads 
to an unreasonable conclusion in one or even several cases’.]  
28
 Ibid. p.xix. 
29
 Ibid. p.xviii.   
17 
 
noted, some worldviews are likely to be beyond the pale, offering a view of the world 
that is so aggressive, intolerant or simply nonsensical that a political theory could not 
conceivably be acceptable to its proponents.  However, a political theory must be 
consistent with enough worldviews so that it could provide a feasible underpinning for a 
state to operate. 
 
I have noted that the idea of a political theory in the Rawlsian sense is a response to the 
pervasive pluralism that is the explicit backdrop to this investigation of democracy.  I 
have gone on to explicate the concept of a political theory so that I am in a position to 
explore the possibility that democracy can be best understood as a political theory.  I now 
make some introductory observations about that endeavour. 
  
Democracy as a Political Theory 
It is reasonable to explore the hypothesis that democracy is best understood as a political 
theory.  Democracy is concerned with the political domain.
30
  While historically, 
democracy was seen as sectarian (Aristotle’s critique31) and liable to promote a 
destructive factionalism (the Madisonian worry
32
), it is now thought to be an inclusive 
political system which offers the possibility of resolving disputes peacefully. Democracy 
seems to accept difference and diversity and to offer a means of managing that diversity.  
                                           
30
 A typically liberal worry is that democracy justifies the encroachment of the political into those areas of 
human conduct that should fall outside of the political. 
31
 See for instance Politics 1281a11. 
32
 The Federalist No.10 [Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist ed. Terence 
Ball (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) pp.40-46]. 
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Politicians commonly seem to view democracy in some fashion akin to a political 
theory.
33
 
 
It should be noted that, at first sight, democracy would function as a political theory in a 
markedly different fashion to Rawls’s political theory.  In the course of his political 
liberalism, Rawls delineates a detailed set of constitutional arrangements and basic laws 
which he invites holders of comprehensive worldviews to accept as the permanent 
expression of his political theory.  In many respects, then, it is fairly clear what is being 
signed up to.  Although some on-going political outcomes will almost certainly be 
offensive to holders of some comprehensive doctrines, a great deal has been settled from 
the outset.  Democracy as a political theory would function quite differently.  Democracy 
is a process which leads to unspecified outcomes.  Those holding different worldviews 
would be asked to endorse a process without knowing in advance how amenable 
outcomes of that process would be to their comprehensive worldviews.  As noted above, 
any political theory is likely to give rise to outcomes that would offend against 
comprehensive beliefs.  In the case of democracy, though, that problem is starker.  This 
challenge to the possibility of a democratic political theory will be different for different 
types of putative democratic political theory.  For a procedural theory of electoral 
democracy, the account will have to be powerful enough so that the fairness of the 
election of representatives or fairness of the decision of a plebiscite will be so 
demonstrable that democracy as a political theory will be attractive notwithstanding the 
                                           
33
 For example, part of the so-called ‘Bush doctrine’ was the encouragement of democracy around the 
globe.  The attempted creation of democratic government in Afghanistan and Iraq was in states with 
populations exhibiting a high degree of ethnic and religious diversity (and lacking a large western-liberal 
citizenry). 
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potential conflict with comprehensive views.  If, though, electoral democracy is 
supported on some kind of instrumental basis, it might be necessary to show that, in the 
face of conflict with comprehensive views, the broad benefits from democracy are likely 
to have such overriding instrumental benefit in the eyes of all relevant comprehensive 
doctrines that they are likely to outweigh particular outcomes that offend against those 
comprehensive doctrines. 
 
So to judge the validity of the claim that democracy can amount to a political theory, we 
need to consider both its justification as the regulator of the political domain and the 
extent to which it is compatible, or likely to be compatible, with prevalent comprehensive 
worldviews.  It will not be possible to hold democracy up against a large number of 
worldviews.  I propose to adjudge whether democracy is compatible with various 
accounts of liberalism.  There are three reasons for concentrating on liberalism.  First, 
liberalism is the pre-eminent secular worldview existing in western states today.  Surely, 
liberalism must be compatible with democracy if democracy is to function as a political 
theory.  Secondly, the strong modern association of liberalism with democracy might 
suggest that liberals had satisfied themselves of the compatibility of liberalism with 
democracy and that may shed light on how other comprehensive doctrines could be 
reconciled to democracy.  Thirdly, as noted above, the imperatives of all comprehensive 
theories are likely to clash with democratic outcomes in a democratic polity from time to 
time.  Liberalism’s relationship with democracy will shed as much light, or more light, on 
this problem as would the relationship between another comprehensive doctrine and 
democracy.  This is because liberalisms of whatever ilk are particularly concerned with 
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the political domain.  They tend to offer clear imperatives and prescriptions for political 
structures and policy.  There is every reason to think that the potential clashes with 
democracy may be substantial and significant.  If liberalism can cope with these clashes, 
the means by which it does may suggest how other worldviews can accept democracy as 
a political theory.  Thus, it is hoped that an exploration of the relationship between 
liberalism and democracy will likely shed light on the relationship between democracy 
and other comprehensive worldviews. 
 
An investigation of democracy as the regulator of the political domain and of its 
consistency with liberalism is complicated by the diversity of democratic theories and the 
diversity of liberalisms.  It may be that, in the process of exploring democracy’s validity 
as a regulator of the political domain, only certain formulations of democracy can 
properly fulfil that role.  Of course, any acceptable form of democracy must function both 
as a credible regulator of the political domain and must be likely to be consistent with 
prevalent worldviews.  Thus, democracy will have failed as a political theory if the 
particular form or forms of democracy that operate as credible regulators of the political 
domain are not consistent with prevalent worldviews, albeit that other forms of 
democracy are consistent. 
 
Before assessing democracy as a distinct political theory, we should consider one other 
way in which democracy might properly fit within the landscape of political philosophy.  
Conceivably, there is a place for democracy within Rawls’s own account of political 
liberalism.   
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A Detour:  Democracy and Rawls’s Political Liberalism 
If the place of democracy within Rawls’s account is substantial and is coherent with his 
overall theory of political liberalism, it is conceivable that democracy would be explained 
and justified as part of Rawls’s political theory.  All would then hinge upon whether 
Rawls’s political liberalism could itself be justified, – i.e. does Rawls’s theory work as a 
regulator of the political domain and is it consistent with prevalent worldviews? 
 
How, then, does democracy fit into Rawls’s political theory?  If democracy is treated in 
Political Liberalism as a feature of reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines, then we 
might expect political liberalism to be indifferent towards democracy as Rawls’s political 
liberalism claims to be impartial as between reasonable comprehensive moral theories:  
‘[i]t does not attack or criticize any reasonable view.’34  Rawls states that ‘[p]olitical 
liberalism also presupposes that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the 
essentials of a democratic regime.’35  That comment, though, is somewhat ambiguous.  It 
is not entirely clear whether Rawls means that a commitment to democracy is already a 
constituent part of each comprehensive doctrine that can endorse the political theory or 
that each reasonable comprehensive doctrine must be able to endorse democracy as part 
of its endorsement of Rawls’s political liberalism.  In other words, is a commitment to 
democracy something each reasonable comprehensive doctrine brings with it to the 
liberal political settlement or is democracy a part of that settlement?  If the former, 
political liberalism is a political theory for democrats only and political liberalism might 
                                           
34
 Political Liberalism p.xix. 
35
 Ibid. p.xvi.  While, it should be noted that for Rawls, the term ‘democratic regime’ is presumably a 
contraction of liberal-democratic regime and while Rawls does not specify what are the essentials of such a 
regime, such regimes presumably include some form of democracy as I have defined it. 
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have little to say about democracy.  Political liberalism would not need to justify 
democracy.  Rather political liberalism would be acceptable only to those who already 
accept the concept of democracy and already have their own reasons for so doing.  If 
Rawls should be understood in this way, his Political Liberalism provides no justification 
for democracy and democratic decision-making and democracy would clearly not be 
functioning as a part of his political theory. 
 
If, on the other hand, democracy is not treated as a part of comprehensive moral doctrines 
but something that all comprehensive doctrines must accept as a part of political 
liberalism, then democracy might form a part of or an adjunct to Rawls’s political 
account of liberalism.
36
  There is, perhaps, some justification for interpreting Rawls in 
this way.  In a section of Political Liberalism where he rehearses how his politically-
liberal state would be secured, he envisages a two-stage process:  holders of different 
comprehensive worldviews initially arrive at a shallow ‘constitutional settlement’ to 
avoid ‘endless and destructive civil strife’ and later come to endorse full-blown political 
liberalism.  ‘Democratic electoral procedures’ are part of that initial constitutional 
settlement and thus appear to be something born out of the exigencies of the then existing 
political situation (albeit something that can be readily accepted) rather than a tenet of the 
                                           
36
 If this is what Rawls has in mind, it is not clear why supporters of any reasonable comprehensive moral 
doctrine (i.e. potential supporters of Rawlsian political liberalism) in a society that has not yet achieved 
political liberalism should support purely democratic means for promoting political liberalism.  [If Rawls is 
right, those that adhere to reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines will presumably see the force of his 
arguments and wish to work towards a politically-liberal state.]  While being a democrat is, according to 
Rawls, a sine qua non of being a part of the overlapping consensus of a politically-liberal society, nothing 
in Rawls’s theory seems to prevent the political liberal in a pre-politically-liberal society from pursuing the 
politically-liberal society by non-democratic means if such means are likely to be efficacious.  [The tenets 
of a person’s comprehensive moral doctrine might provide constraints on what devices are used to foment 
political liberalism.] 
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comprehensive worldviews.
37
  Assuming that democracy is an adjunct to Rawls’s 
political theory (rather than part of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endorse 
the theory), such a conception of democracy would not be used or needed as the primary 
mechanism for arbitrating politically between groups holding different comprehensive 
moral theories;  political liberalism does that – permanently.  Democracy would clearly 
be subservient to the demands and imperatives of political liberalism.  The non-
democratic (or pre-democratic) part of political liberalism prescribes both the ‘basic 
structure’ for society and a set of ‘basic liberties’: 
The basic structure is understood as the way in which the major social institutions 
fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties 
and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation.  Thus 
the political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property, and the 
organization of the economy, and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic 
structure.
38
 
 
All these potential areas of conflict between comprehensive doctrines are settled 
constitutionally by political liberalism, resolving what might otherwise be on-going 
conflicts between conflicting comprehensive moral accounts.  Democracy is obliged to 
keep its nose out until Rawls’s political liberalism has constitutionally settled this rather 
extensive list of rights and duties.  It is noted that even the ‘organization of the economy’ 
is something that is to be settled at a pre-democratic level.  Thus, John Gray’s description 
of the Rawlsian project as ‘abolishing, or sterilizing, politics and of replacing politics 
with law,’ may not be an exaggeration.39  Lest anyone be in any doubt, Rawls makes it 
                                           
37
 Political Liberalism pp.158-159.  Rawls’s position with regard to democracy is probably less than clear 
because he pays such scant attention to democracy. 
38
 Ibid. p.258. 
39
 Enlightenment’s Wake p.78.  See also Glen Newey, After Politics: The Rejection of Politics in 
Contemporary Liberal Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).  One of the main claims of Newey’s 
book is that liberal political philosophers aim to supersede politics. 
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clear himself that democracy plays a subservient role in his scheme.  Consider these 
observations: 
It is enough that the general form and content of the basic liberties can be outlined 
and the grounds of their priority understood.  The further specification of the 
liberties is left to the constitutional, legislative, and judicial stages.  But in 
outlining this general form and content we must indicate the special role and 
central range of application of the basic liberties sufficiently clearly to guide the 
process of further specification at later stages [my emphasis].
40
 
 
Thus, while Rawls concedes some role for democratic deliberation and decision-making 
(as a part of the ‘constitutional, legislative and judicial stages’) in the shaping of society, 
the scope of democratic decision-making is limited by an extensive constitutional 
settlement.  The decision of legislatures (and the courts) must be guided by politically-
liberal theoretical considerations. 
 
If Rawls is to be understood in this way – as offering democracy as a part of political 
liberalism – he has offered little, if any, justification for democracy.  Rawls provides 
almost no account of the role democracy would play.  At one point, he states that 
‘democratic electoral procedures … moderat[e] political rivalry within society’41 but 
Rawls does not explain how democracy fulfils this role and, more importantly, he is 
describing a role democracy fulfils in the pre-politically-liberal ‘constitutional settlement’ 
not a role in a politically-liberal state.  One suspects that Rawls imagined that there would 
be little on-going political rivalry in a politically-liberal state as rivalries would have been 
resolved by the constitutional settlement.  If rivalries do subsist in the politically-liberal 
state, Rawls has not explained why some other system (such as a wholly juridical 
political system to which he would surely be well-disposed) would not be a more 
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successful moderator of such rivalries.  Thus it is unclear why democracy forms any part 
of the politically-liberal state and Rawls fails to provide the kind of justification for 
democracy that its hegemonic status seems to call for.  Democracy is not to be 
appropriately understood as an adjunct to Rawlsian political liberalism.  My initial task, 
then, is to explore the question of whether democracy can be properly understood as a 
free-standing political theory.  Before beginning that task in chapter 1, I need to explain 
how, in so doing, I will deal with the different accounts of democracy on offer and I need 
to set out the overall structure of this thesis. 
 
Electoral and Deliberative Democracy 
Electoral and deliberative democracy will need to be distinguished.  It is conceivable that 
one form of democracy, but not the other, will amount to a political theory.  It is 
appropriate, at this stage, to say something about how I intend to handle deliberative 
democracy.  A ready definition of deliberative democracy is not easy to come by given 
the diversity of accounts offered by its apologists.  At this point, it will be sufficient to 
observe that the emphasis of deliberative democrats is on participation in a process of 
discussion and deliberation and that democratic legitimacy is a function of that 
deliberation.  Consequently, the focus of much writing in this area is upon the 
accessibility of the deliberation and the nature of the deliberation.  This approach can be 
distinguished from electoral democracy.  Deliberative democracy is not about 
competition for or aggregation of votes.
42
  The primary, but not exclusive, focus of this 
                                                                                                                             
40
 Political Liberalism p.298. 
41
 Ibid. p.158. 
42
 Or about the aggregation of interests and preferences as is held by social choice accounts of democracy – 
see below in chapter 1.  
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thesis will be on electoral democracy and there seem to me to be particularly good 
reasons for this focus.  Electoral democracy is the form of democracy which 
demonstrably exists in the West and some other parts of the globe.  It is this form of 
democracy that is the subject of popular political thought and discussion.  It is the 
practice of this form of democracy that dominates the global media of the twenty-first 
century.  Nevertheless, deliberative democracy is a highly fashionable area of academic 
investigation and cannot be wholly ignored.  Deliberative democracy comes into play in 
two ways in my investigation.  First, deliberative democracy might conceivably offer 
some understanding of how electoral democracy could operate as a political theory – if 
electoral democracy is justified by a persuasive deliberatively democratic account.  
Secondly, deliberative democracy could itself be a form of democracy that successfully 
operates as a political theory. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
I begin by exploring the stability of electoral democracy as a political theory:  is it 
acceptable to different comprehensive worldviews?  Specifically, I ask if democracy 
could be consistent with a comprehensive liberalism.  Electoral democracy has been 
particularly troubling for liberalism.  If electoral democracy cannot be accommodated by 
comprehensive liberalisms, it fails at the first hurdle as a political theory.  Conversely, if 
comprehensive liberalisms can coherently accept electoral democracy, notwithstanding 
all the well-known areas of tension, that may give us some confidence that electoral 
democracy will be consistent with a broad range of worldviews and thus offer the 
stability of a political theory. 
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Liberalism and, commonly, electoral democracy are presented as non-perfectionist 
theories (i.e. theories of the right rather than the good) but quite different non-
perfectionist theories.
43
  Both may be theories about freedom but, if Isaiah Berlin is to be 
believed, quite different sorts of freedom.  Sometimes the clash is between a non-
perfectionist liberalism and a perfectionist democratic theory (i.e. democracy which is 
justified because it produces good outcomes).  In either case, whether democracy is 
viewed as perfectionist or non-perfectionist, liberalism and electoral democracy are each 
thought to offer distinct legitimations of state action in so far as the state is liberal or 
democratic.  The history of suspicion with which liberals have viewed democracy right 
up to the twentieth century is well known.  It is only in the twentieth century that a ready 
cohabitation seemed possible and the term ‘liberal democracy’ became a commonplace.  
Even then, as John Dryzek notes, ‘liberal democracy remained only a rough compromise 
between two different sets of principles.  Political theorists still have trouble deducing a 
set of liberal democratic principles from a common set of premises’.44  On the other hand, 
there can seem to be something quasi-liberal about electoral democracy in so far as it, 
normatively, gives adults within democratic states the freedom or right to vote.
45
  In 
chapter 1, then, I consider how electoral democracy sits with different forms of liberal 
                                           
43
 Larmore argues, persuasively, that all ethical theories (including those whose ethics are reserved to the 
political domain) contain elements of the right and the good.  [See op. cit. Ch.1. p.19.]  It appears that 
Larmore does not accept Rawls’s assessment of which moral theories prioritise the good – see Political 
Liberalism p134-5.  Bernard Williams also had some interesting things to say about the relationship 
between conceptions of human good and theories of the right in Rawls’s work in ‘Pluralism, Community 
and Left Wittgensteinianism,’ in Bernard Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005) Ch.3. 
44
 John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford: OUP, 2000) pp.9-10.   Of course, attempts 
have been made and continue to be made to explicate a coherent theory of liberal democracy – see, for 
instance Richard Vernon’s in Richard Vernon, Political Morality: A Theory of Liberal Democracy 
(London: Continuum, 2001). 
45
 Thomas Christiano claims to offer a congruent account of liberalism and democracy based upon the 
realisation of an essential equality of persons in Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality (Oxford: 
OUP, 2008).  In the light of what follows, I think his scheme fails to deliver.  
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theory.  It appears that, typically, liberal theories offer little prospect of compatibility 
with electoral democracy in a fashion that is coherent, either ignoring or side-stepping or 
neutering democracy.  Berlin stands out as a liberal whose account of liberalism appears 
to offer conceptual space for a political theory of democracy. 
 
In chapter 2, I begin my analysis of electoral democracy.  Electoral democracy will have 
to be properly understood so that a judgment can be reached about its validity as a 
political theory:  can democracy be justified as the regulator of the political domain and 
does it offer stability, i.e. (i) does it work and/or is it fair and (ii) is it consistent with 
comprehensive worldviews, particularly liberalism?  Given that Berlin offers the 
possibility of some kind of cohabitation of liberalism and democracy and that his account 
seems to explain why democracy holds the place it does in public discourse and culture, I 
begin my investigation into justifications for democracy with Berlin’s identification of 
democracy with ‘positive liberty’.  I argue that the negative liberty/positive liberty 
distinction is not valid and so cannot assist in the task of understanding democracy.  To 
continue the task of analysing democracy, it is necessary to consider more clearly what 
kind of freedom, if any, democracy offers to citizens.  In chapter 3, I argue that electoral 
democracy is primarily about collective, rather than individual, activity and so any 
freedom offered by democracy is a freedom to contribute to collective activities – the 
election of a particular candidate or the acceptance or rejection of a referendum question.  
I conclude that if this is the case then any defence of democracy on the basis that it offers 
the freedom of individual choice in political decision-making is flawed.  I maintain that 
the freedom to contribute to collective activities that democracy offers is not 
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disseminated fairly and, for that reason, I conclude that electoral democracy cannot be 
justified procedurally (as a theory of the right).  In chapter 4, I conclude that deliberative 
accounts also fail to offer a credible account of, and value for, electoral democracy.  
Thus, by a process of elimination, if electoral democracy is to function as a political 
theory, it must be because of its instrumental value. 
 
For the sake of completeness, Chapter 5 considers deliberative democracy more fully.  I 
seek to show that there are a number of reasons why deliberative democracy cannot itself 
be a viable political theory.  Deliberative democracy is neither fair nor likely to generate 
outcomes which could be consistently endorsed by holders of different comprehensive 
doctrines.  Accordingly, the only remaining possibility for a political theory of 
democracy is an instrumentalist one.  In chapter 6, I ask how, then, electoral democracy 
as an instrumental political theory measures up to the two requirements of a political 
theory:  (i) that it is valid itself and (ii) that it can be consistent with different 
comprehensive moral theories.  I outline a number of ways in which democracy generates 
good outcomes and thus provide a basis for an instrumentalist defence of democracy.  
However, I conclude that the commitment of holders of comprehensive worldviews to an 
instrumentalist theory of democracy would be fragile and that there would, in effect, be 
no single outcome theory but, rather, different outcome theories held by holders of 
different comprehensive doctrines.  For those reasons, and others, I conclude that an 
instrumentalist account of democracy cannot work as a political theory. 
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Where, then, does that leave things?  If electoral democracy is justified on instrumentalist 
grounds that will vary in strength for those holding different worldviews (and which may 
not be accepted at all by some groups), how can we best understand the role that 
democracy can or should play? 
 
In chapter 7, I explicate the concept of a modus vivendi and, in chapter 8, I argue that if 
the only justification for a putative democratic political theory was instrumental, then, 
rather than a political theory, what we end up with is a recognition of the importance of 
democracy as a key component of modi vivendi.  I note the strengths and weaknesses of 
democratic modi vivendi.  My concluding observations are set out in chapter 9.  I note 
that, in the course of my investigation into democracy, the clash between liberalism and 
democracy has not been resolved.  I offer the observation that, while Berlin’s association 
of democracy with positive freedom and liberalism with negative freedom cannot be 
sustained, his core account of value pluralism offers the possibility that liberals can 
consistently endorse a democratic modus vivendi, recognising that democracy is valuable 
for reasons other than as a facilitator of positive freedom.
46
 
 
 
                                           
46
 Berlin’s value pluralist approach undermines a straight-forward account of state legitimacy, be that 
liberal or democratic.  When acting democratically, a state may be acting so illiberally that it may be 
delegitimised liberally-speaking; when acting liberally, a state may be delegitimised democratically 
because it foregoes critical values that democracy would foster and protect.  If a value pluralist model of 
political imperatives is adopted, it will be difficult to identify the boundary a state must cross to be 
delegitimised.  It may be easier to think in terms of the legitimacy of particular state actions and, even then, 
it may only be possible to think in terms of balancing reasons for the legitimacy of state action against 
reasons delegitimitising that state action.  There are further difficulties for the concept of legitimacy when 
moving beyond the perspective of a single worldview (e.g. beyond the perspective of a Berlinian liberal 
who also accepts democracy).  I comment on legitimacy again in chapter 7. 
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I turn, then, to the question of the stability of democracy as a political theory and 
specifically to its somewhat opaque relationship with liberalism. 
 
 32 
Chapter 1 
Liberals and Democracy 
I am seeking an understanding of democracy that is coherent and which justifies and 
makes sense of democracy in conditions of pervasive cultural, ethnic and religious 
pluralism.  In the Introduction, I suggested that it was reasonable to venture the 
hypothesis that democracy operated as a political theory in the Rawlsian sense.  Now, 
to function as a political theory, democracy must be stable:  that is, it must be 
acceptable to a sufficiently broad range of people holding the diverse worldviews 
found in the modern state.  Before embarking on an analytical investigation of 
justifications for democracy, I consider the question of stability.  In particular, I 
consider the relationship between democracy and liberalism, i.e. the extent to which 
liberals can coherently endorse democracy and democratic outcomes.  We may 
reasonably dismiss the idea of democracy as a political theory if liberals cannot 
clearly endorse democracy for credible reasons.  In the course of that consideration of 
liberal attitudes to democracy, a way of beginning the detailed analysis of democracy 
will be suggested.  In this fashion, the task of investigating democracy stays grounded 
in the reality of the pervasive pluralism of our times. 
 
While liberalism and democracy are generally regarded as being theoretically distinct, 
there does appear to be a strong historical association between them.  Those states we 
think of as democratic, generally advocate liberal freedoms.  It is hard to imagine 
democracy operating meaningfully in the absence of liberal freedoms such as the 
freedom of speech and association.  Further, there is a tendency to think of the right to 
vote as a liberal freedom or a human right, which, in this context, comes to much the 
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same thing.
1
  Consider this typical observation by the liberal Will Kymlicka in 
Multicultural Citizenship: 
[Human rights doctrines] often give no answer at all [to questions involving 
cultural minorities].  The right to free speech does not tell us what an 
appropriate language policy is; the right to vote does not tell us how political 
boundaries should be drawn, […]; the right to mobility does not tell us what 
an appropriate immigration and naturalization policy is.
2
 
 
For current purposes, I am not interested in the particular argument Kymlicka is 
making but in the way he implicitly categorises democracy, the right to vote, as just 
another liberal freedom or right.
3
  By means of this approach, which amounts to a 
kind of annexation of democracy, liberals obscure (albeit not necessarily deliberately) 
democracy’s offence.  Its offence is the possibility that properly democratic decisions 
will be illiberal.  Democracy is seen as one more type of individual freedom, rather 
than a mechanism for reaching political decisions, which may or may not be 
consistently liberal. 
 
Democracy, as I have defined it, places no limits on the nature of the decisions that 
can be derived from the opinions and preferences of the citizens of a state, save 
presumably that such decisions must be consistent with democratic imperatives:  a 
‘democratic’ decision to curtail the franchise would clearly lack democratic validity 
because democracy itself would be destroyed.  Many accounts of democracy assume 
or propose that the opinions and preferences of citizens should be registered in 
                                           
1
 Much the same thing because the existence of liberal freedoms depends upon the failure/refusal of the 
state to impose constraints and, in this context, the existence of human rights depends upon the 
fulfilment of a duty by the state not to impose illiberal constraints. 
2
 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) p.5.   
3
 In a BBC interview by Jeremy Paxman, Eric Hobsbawm said ‘I think [that] voting worries me less 
than the absence of freedom of opinion, particularly a free press.’  Hobsbawm erred if he placed 
freedom of opinion in the same category as the freedom to vote (i.e. classifying the right to vote as a 
liberal freedom) but it is revealing that he seemed uncertain about the value of voting as a liberal 
freedom.  {Jeremy Paxman, ‘Interview – Eric Hobsbawm’,  Newsnight BBC2, November 2004.  
Transcript available at  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/archive/2297215.stm.> 
[accessed 14 March 2011].} 
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circumstances where citizens have information about the matters in hand.  On this 
view, dialogue between citizens is permitted, information is open to being tested, and 
proponents of different views can proselytise for their opinions and engage in 
dialogue with those holding different opinions and preferences.  That being so, the 
protection of certain liberal freedoms is prescribed by democratic theory.  Such 
freedoms could not be democratically removed.  It should be noted, though, that not 
all freedoms that might be supported by liberals flow from democracy.  Democracy 
only demands certain freedoms of expression (or freedoms required to facilitate 
freedom of expression) not what might be called freedoms of practice.  Democracy 
seems to demand freedom of speech (although not perhaps total freedom of 
expression), a free media, freedom of association and probably, within the state, 
freedom of movement.  Religious freedoms, sexual freedoms and a woman’s right to 
choose, for example, need not be prescribed by democracy.  In what follows, I seek to 
show that, with the exception of the account of Berlin, liberalisms are, indeed, 
apparently inconsistent with electoral democracy.
4
 
 
Liberalisms come in various shapes and sizes.  In the Introduction, I noted a possible 
distinction between ‘political’ theories and ‘ethical’ theories and thus between 
political liberalisms and ethical liberalisms.  We might also usefully distinguish 
perfectionist liberalisms, which accept that the state can act in line with the moral 
prescriptions of that particular liberal worldview, from those that propose state 
                                           
4
 While the main goal of this thesis is to arrive at a clearer understanding of democracy and the role it 
plays, my conclusions might inform an obverse investigation:  if democracy is better understood, what 
can this tell us about liberalism?  If democracy can be properly justified, will a liberalism that cannot 
sit well with democracy bear scrutiny?  If democracy is the proper mechanism for reaching political 
decision-making (and thus, necessarily, the proper mechanism for deciding who makes political 
decisions), any credible liberal theory should be able to justify the position of democracy.  If such an 
assumption is correct, a theory that does not provide a justification for democracy should be judged 
deficient and, at the very least, in need of refinement. 
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neutrality with regard to different conceptions of the good – recognising that this 
dichotomy is not quite the same as the political/ethical distinction.
5
  The neutral 
account of liberalism, by definition, has it that there is a significant area of human life 
and happenings that the state should not regulate – but, note, it is the state that must 
act neutrally.  This neutrality should not be confused with anarchy.  The commitment 
to state neutrality imposes a positive obligation on the state to promote and ensure 
neutrality.
6
  It is not necessarily the case that, when proposing neutrality, liberal 
justifications must rely upon a limited morality of the kind proposed by political 
liberalisms.  A particular justification for neutrality may be part of a rich theory that 
offers all sorts of moral imperatives but which does not propose that the state should 
act on the basis of all those imperatives.  Neutrality can be part of a fairly 
comprehensive liberalism – the neutrality being justified on the basis of controversial 
and particular moral commitments.
7
 
 
It appears that those who defend neutrality view it as a strong guiding principle.  That 
being so, liberalism cannot tolerate a legislative process (i.e. democratic decision-
making) that may undermine neutrality.  While neutrality might not be an absolute 
constraint on any government action – in extremis other exigencies might properly be 
                                           
5
 Political liberalisms seem to propose neutrality, although I doubt that neutrality is a necessary 
component of a political liberalism. 
6
 Many criticisms have been levelled at this idea of neutrality.  For instance, even when acting to 
maintain neutrality, the state appears to act non-neutrally.  A neutral state will necessarily have to 
prevent encroachments by proponents of particular worldviews.  If a worldview has its own account of 
the proper actions of a state and that account conflicts with neutrality, then proponents of that 
worldview must be prevented from acting on the non-neutral imperatives of their worldview.  
However, other more quietist worldviews will not trouble the neutral state.  In this respect, then, there 
seems to be a failure of neutrality. 
7
 For example, see John Rawls, A Theory and Ronald Dworkin, Equal Freedom (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1995). 
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taken into account – it is hard to see how anything like a neutral state could tolerate 
anything more than a heavily-constrained form of democracy.
8
 
 
Theoretically, then, there appears to be a fundamental clash between the demands of 
democracy and the demands of various liberalisms.  I go on to see whether that is 
borne out in accounts of democracy offered by a range of liberal theorists.  I cannot 
carry out an exhaustive survey of liberal accounts of democracy.  As exemplars of 
ethical and perfectionist liberalisms, I consider Mill and the more recently acclaimed 
offering of Raz.  After Rawls, whose account of democracy (or lack of it) I explored 
in my introductory chapter, Ronald Dworkin is perhaps the best known modern 
exponent of a neutral liberalism.  I comment, briefly, on the place of democracy in his 
theory.  I move on to libertarian and right-wing accounts of liberalism.  The 
democratic scepticism of Robert Nozick, Friedrich Hayek and James Buchanan is 
noted.  I note the strong association between neo-liberalism and social choice theory.  
William Riker was a leading figure, if not the leading figure, within the social choice 
school.  His claim to have offered a liberal account of democracy warrants more 
detailed investigation.  I need to consider whether he succeeds in reconciling the 
apparent clash between liberalism and democracy.  Finally, having concluded that 
Riker’s attempt is fundamentally flawed, I turn to Berlin.  I claim that Berlin’s 
                                           
8
 Steven Wall and George Klosko’s account of neutrality is particularly clear and helpful – see Steven 
Wall & George Klosko, ‘Introduction’,  in Perfectionism and Neutrality eds. Steven Wall & George 
Klosko (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) pp.1-27 esp. pp.2-13.  Wall and Klosko make the 
point that one kind of liberal neutrality may demand neutrality over all actions of the state while 
another liberalism simply demands neutrality over the constitution and basic structure of the state [ibid. 
pp.6-7].  They add, though, that the narrower form of neutrality is likely to be argued for on the basis 
that ‘the constitutional structure of society has an enormous impact on the ability of persons to pursue 
their conception of the good’.  In effect, if the constitutional fundamentals of a state are neutral, 
legislative action can have limited effect on that neutrality.  That being so, I am not convinced that the 
distinction is significant for my purposes.  All accounts of liberal neutrality must, necessarily, assert the 
importance of neutrality.  Whether that can be secured at the constitutional stage (which would, 
presumably, entrench that neutrality and readily allow for judicial review of legislation) or is secured 
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account of freedom and value pluralism may offer the basis for a theoretically 
coherent cohabitation of liberalism and democracy.  That being so, I submit that 
Berlin offers understandings of liberalism and democracy that might justify viewing 
democracy as a putative political theory given that such an account of democracy 
might be stable (i.e. acceptable to a sufficiently broad-range of worldviews);  it would 
at least be acceptable to liberals – a key grouping in western states.    
 
Liberals of Various Hues and Democracy 
Mill is an ethical liberal, justifying his liberalism on explicitly moral grounds.  Mill’s 
liberalism, as defended in On Liberty, is not simply a matter of the action of 
government.  It is also concerned with the morality of individual action and collective 
non-state action.
9
  Famously, Mill states that the principle which should govern the 
legitimacy of the compulsion and control of the individual, commonly known as the 
Harm Principle, ‘is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-
protection [my emphasis].’10  Mill’s theory is comprehensive rather than political and 
he offers an archetypal ethical and perfectionist liberalism. 
 
Mill’s liberalism is based upon a utilitarian understanding of the good.11  His 
liberalism flows from his own version of utilitarianism with his nuanced account of 
what constitutes happiness and well-being.  Well-being is achieved as individuals 
                                                                                                                         
by an ongoing process by which all state actions comply with the neutrality imperative, the scope of 
democratic decisions is severely restricted. 
9
 Mill is concerned about the potentially censorious action of the wider public:  the ‘moral coercion of 
public opinion’ [J.S. Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin, 1974) p.68]. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 ‘It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the 
abstract right as a thing independent of utility.  I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical 
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carry on the activities which are particular to the individual and chosen by the 
individual.  To interfere with the pursuits chosen by individuals is to undermine 
happiness and well-being.  Further, it is clear that Mill puts forward this conception of 
liberalism as providing the guiding principle for the best ordering of society.
12 
 How, 
then, can democracy fit with the pre-eminence of his ethical liberalism?  Mill is 
notable, amongst other reasons, because, unlike most liberals, he actually puts 
forward an account of democracy in his Considerations on Representative 
Government
13
.  In that work, it is clear, he regards his account of democracy as being 
of secondary importance.  We may infer the likely tone of that work from these 
comments in On Liberty:  
The majority have not yet learned to feel the power of government [to be] their 
power, or its opinions their opinions.  When they do so, individual liberty will 
probably be as much exposed to invasion from government as it already is 
from public opinion.
14
 
 
Here we see a deep suspicion of the democratic ideal, of the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’15.  If government is based on public opinion (i.e. the views of the masses), it 
may be oppressive and morally repugnant.  Mill states that democracies have a 
tendency to ‘class government’ where the most numerous class in a state uses its 
numerical majority to pursue its own class interests to the detriment of all other 
classes.  Democracy must operate in a constitutional framework such that ‘the 
depositaries of power […] can not misemploy [that power]’.16  Mill continues: 
Democracy is not the ideally best form of government unless this weak side of 
it can be strengthened; unless it can be so organized that no class, not even the 
most numerous, shall be able to reduce all but itself to political insignificance, 
                                                                                                                         
questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being’ [ibid. p.69-70]. 
12
 ‘The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, …  as entitled to govern absolutely 
the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control …’ [ibid. p.68]. 
13
 J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1991). 
14
 On Liberty p.67. 
15
 Ibid. p.62. 
16
 Considerations p.170. 
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and direct the course of legislation and administration by its exclusive 
interest.
17
 
 
What then does Mill practically propose?  First, he would exclude certain people from 
the suffrage:  the illiterate and those unable to afford a poll tax (or at least those who 
rely on parish relief under the Poor Laws).  Intelligence and a financial interest should 
be prerequisites of involvement in the democratic process.  Secondly, and perhaps 
more striking still, is Mill’s contention that participation in the democratic process 
should be weighted.  Some voters, he argues, should be afforded more than one vote 
(perhaps considerably more than one vote) while other voters are left with only a 
single vote.  Mill’s argument takes the following form:  in a private matter involving 
two people with a common interest, when a decision is called for, the less intelligent 
party should defer to the more intelligent thereby insuring that the best decision is 
made.  National affairs are analogous.  Although the less intelligent need not defer 
entirely those who are brighter (those with low intelligence still retain one vote), the 
opinion of brighter individuals should carry more weight and so the more intelligent 
are given extra votes. 
 
Mill nevertheless declines to proffer any hard and fast rule about the number of extra 
votes that people of higher intelligence should be awarded.  He considers that the 
matter ‘is not in itself very material, provided the distinctions and gradations are not 
made arbitrarily, but are such as can be understood and accepted by the general 
                                           
17
 Ibid.  Mill’s concern is, of course, Aristotle’s: that any majoritarian system will allow for the partial 
and partisan rule of the numerous poor.  Mill’s concern that democracy will produce class government 
is the converse of Marx and Engels’s desire that democracy will, indeed, produce class government:  In 
the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels call for the winning of the ‘battle of democracy’ as the 
first step to wresting all capital from the bourgeoisie.  {Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of 
the Communist Party (1848) <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-
manifesto/index.htm> [accessed 14 March 2011] - see p.26.}  See also interesting observations in 
Luciano Canfora, Democracy in Europe trans. Simon Jones (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) pp. 71-75.   
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conscience and understanding’.18  He does, though, state that ‘[t]he plurality of votes 
must on no account be carried so far that those who are privileged by it, or the class 
(if any) to which they mainly belong, shall outweigh by means of it all the rest of the 
community’.19  Mill’s prescription is both peculiarly bizarre and ill-defined.20  It 
suggests that his commitment to democracy is only a commitment as long as 
democracy is likely to produce good outcomes, by which he means liberal outcomes.  
Mill is clearly a liberal first and a democrat (if such an appellation is warranted) 
                                           
18
 Considerations p.184. 
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Consider the matter of how many additional votes should be given to the more intelligent members 
of society.  What will inform this question?  There is no objective relationship between, for example, 
the level of educational achievement and the number of additional votes afforded or between IQ and 
the number of extra votes; it is consequently hard to see how the decision could be anything other than 
arbitrary. 
However, in setting out his proposal for the weighting of votes, Mill apparently gives no regard to the 
fact that any opinion (and thus any vote) may be formulated on the basis of perceived self-interest or on 
the basis of some moral code which is not self-regarding.  Mill is concerned about the common good 
and clearly wants political opinions to be moral rather than based on self-interest.  Is it not at the very 
least arguable, then, that the opinion of the virtuous but dull voter is not to be more highly prized than 
that of the intelligent but vicious voter?  Mill’s proposal is that intelligence should be the arbiter of the 
number of votes each individual is given.  {Mill’s failure to address this question is strange given that 
earlier in the chapter, in the course of building his argument, he comments on the importance of virtue 
in reaching decisions in private or business matters: 
If with equal virtue, one is superior to the other in knowledge and intelligence – or if with 
equal intelligence, one excels the other in virtue – the opinion, the judgment of the higher 
moral or intellectual being is worth more than that of the inferior;  [Ibid. p.180]} 
But why should the less regarded opinion be given any weight at all?  Mill is not very clear about this.  
Part of the answer is simply one of expedience:  the political pressure for universal suffrage is 
unstoppable.  He seems to be arguing that even the dullest can be given one vote because such votes 
can be overwhelmed by the votes of those who have a plurality of votes. 
Mill’s account reads as something of a pretence.  Those that should not really be enfranchised are 
nominally enfranchised but, in truth, their vote counts for little.  If Mill does not mean his proposals to 
be a pretence and real power is being offered to the hoi polloi, his proposal seems incoherent.  It should 
be recalled that Mill wants democracy to achieve the best outcome measured in terms of the common 
good.  On that basis, would not the best system of government ensure that the dull defer to the 
intelligent on every occasion?  Mill’s proposed system of vote weighting seems to posit a situation 
where option A is supported by lots and lots of less intelligent people and option B is supported by a 
few, more intelligent, people.  However, biased the weighting, can sheer numbers generally be a guide 
to correctness?  Should we regard the position held by the (dull) masses as more likely to be right if the 
ratio of the supporters (dull people) to detractors (bright people) is 100:1 rather than if it was 50:1?  
Mill’s concern that classes should be balanced suggests a careful census of voters in different classes 
and groups must be undertaken so that, when possible vote multipliers are applied, no class is left with 
majority voting power.  The problems and complications imposed by such an approach are too 
numerous to specify.  Any attempt to define rules for the giving of extra votes would become a wholly 
extra-democratic exercise in apportioning relative political power.  Even if the giving of extra votes 
was done so as to avoid the apparent creation of any voting majority, it would still increase the power 
of one group or class relative to others.  It would make it easier for one group to build a coalition to 
achieve a majority and harder for another class or group to build majorities in partnership with other 
 41 
second.  He is, however, consistent.  His defence of democracy is limited and 
contingent.  He maintains that any democratic system can only be justified if it 
produces or is likely to produce liberal outcomes.  Democracy should be constructed 
and engineered so that it serves the liberal good or its worth is questionable. 
 
Raz is a contemporary perfectionist liberal whose version of liberalism is set out in his 
The Morality of Freedom.
21
  He argues that typical liberal freedoms should be 
protected neither as part and parcel of a neutral state nor because they constitute 
inviolable rights.  Raz maintains that individual freedoms undoubtedly contribute to 
individual well-being in situations where an individual wishes to use that freedom for 
some endeavour that contributes to his or her well-being.  That provides a reason to 
protect those freedoms but that reason is not, according to Raz, of overriding weight.  
A reason of this kind does not of itself justify the protection of liberal freedoms.  
Individual freedoms only offer the best possibility of promoting individual well-being 
when they operate against the back-drop of a rich, probably diverse, communal life 
fostered by an appropriate public culture.  Raz offers the example of religious 
freedom.  While religious freedom may have been generally perceived as an 
individual freedom, what made that freedom valuable was the fact that there were 
religious communities allowed to pursue their communal life, a communal life in 
which the individual could take part.  The importance of protecting an appropriate 
public culture is a much stronger ground for protecting liberal freedoms.  As Raz puts 
it, liberal freedoms should be protected because they promote and protect a public 
culture which is ‘valued for its contribution to the well-being of members of the 
                                                                                                                         
interests.  It is hard not to view Mill’s idea as creating conditions conducive to the subversion of 
democracy. 
21
 Op. cit. 
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community generally, and not only of the rights-holders’.22  This liberal public culture 
is particularly conducive to individuals autonomously pursuing their own favoured 
endeavours, the success of which constitutes, to a considerable extent, a major 
determinant of personal well-being.
23
 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Raz concludes that liberal freedoms should be protected by 
the state from infringement by democratic decisions.  While clearly envisaging 
constitutional entrenchment of those freedoms in many cases, he goes on to make the 
point that constitutional entrenchment might not be necessary or the best way of 
securing liberal freedoms in all states.  A sufficiently robust common law system with 
an independent judiciary might offer a similar level of protection as constitutional 
entrenchment.  Be that as it may, Raz is clear:  liberal freedoms should be protected 
from democratic assault.  The precise mechanics of that protection is a matter of 
judgment.
24
 
 
Dworkin offers a very different liberalism to that of either Mill or Raz.  Dworkin is a 
vigorous proponent of the neutrality of the liberal state.  In his 1978 paper 
‘Liberalism’, Dworkin goes so far as to define a liberal as a person who ‘supposes that 
government must be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life’.25  
While that assertion overlooks the existence of modern liberal perfectionists such as 
Raz, it is probably true that modern liberal accounts are, as Glen Newey asserts, 
                                           
22
 Ibid. p.256. 
23
 Ibid. p.297.  Raz’s account has the advantage over many forms of liberalism in that he recognises the 
situatedness of individuals.  The richness of collective life is vital to the well-being of individuals in so 
far as it improves the chances of individuals successfully pursuing appropriate endeavours – that is, of 
exercising a valuable autonomy.  Thus, individual well-being remains at the heart of Raz’s theory.  
24
 Ibid. p.261. 
25
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberalism’, in Public and Private Morality ed. Stuart Hampshire (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1978) pp.127-8.   
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predominantly accounts of liberal neutrality.
26
  Dworkin states that ‘[d]emocracy is 
justified because it enforces the right of each person to respect and concern as an 
individual’27 but he immediately recognises that a majority may violate a liberal 
conception of the individual’s rights.  The state must recognise a set of civil rights 
(i.e. liberal freedoms) and these must be entrenched by constitutional protections.  
These liberal freedoms are more extensive than many lists of liberal freedoms, 
including all matters of sexual conduct.  Further, Dworkin holds that individuals must 
be protected against the imposition of ‘preferences [other] people have about what 
others shall do or have’28.  Dworkin calls these ‘external preferences’.29  He asserts 
that political decisions that are likely to involve the imposition of external preferences 
must be removed from majoritarian political institutions altogether.
30
  For Dworkin, 
the Bill of Rights of the US Constitution does not go far enough in limiting the scope 
of democratic decision-making.  
 
While Raz and Dworkin present very different versions of liberalism, their legal and 
political prescriptions are similar in significant respects:  constitutional limitations 
should be placed on democratic, majoritarian, power.  These constitutional limitations 
are in the form of rights.  Richard Bellamy calls such accounts ‘legal 
constitutionalism’.31 
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 Op. cit. p.37. 
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 ‘Liberalism’ pp.133-4. 
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 Ibid. p.134. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) esp. pp.6-7.  Bellamy 
juxtaposes ‘legal constitutionalism’ with ‘political constitutionalism’ – a defence of constitutions 
limited in scope to the determination of proper democratic processes.  
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From a radically different political perspective, Nozick offers a distinct liberalism.  
Nozick’s book, Anarchy State and Utopia,32 sets out his libertarian liberalism.  While 
Nozick’s brand of laissez-faire capitalism is associated with the right, it is clearly 
liberal rather than conservative.  It can be read as a precursor to the so-called New 
Right which developed through the 1980s and which had more in common with 19
th
 
century liberalism than traditional conservatism.  Of course, Nozick’s account has 
been widely criticised.
33
  Nozick, himself, later admitted that the account he offered in 
Anarchy ‘seems to me seriously inadequate’,34 although, shortly before his death, he 
seems to have recanted from the recantation.
35
 
 
Beginning from a commitment to individual property rights, Nozick elucidates his 
justification for a minimal state.  Infringements of property rights (and other basic 
liberties) are only allowed in limited circumstances.  A state that goes beyond 
Nozick’s minimal role is illegitimate: 
a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, 
theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified;  that any more 
extensive state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced to do certain things 
and is unjustified;
36
 
 
It hardly needs to be said that democracy has a small role to play in such a libertarian 
state.  Indeed, Nozick makes no mention of democracy in Anarchy.  The tasks of the 
minimal state are clear and defined.  There is no need for legislation.  Some sort of 
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 Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). 
33
 For example, the argument that Nozick fails to provide a justification for the state at all and in 
particular, provides no justification for the taxation necessary for his minimal state to function (even 
minimally) – see John Gray, Liberalism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1986) p.77. 
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 Robert Nozick, The Examined Life (New York: Touchstone, 1989) pp.286-287. 
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 Robert Nozick, Invariances (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2001) pp.280-282.  Here, Nozick once more 
maintains that state interference is only justified in relation to what he calls the ‘first layer of ethics’ i.e. 
in the enforcement of respect for individuals’ life and autonomy.  In The Examined Life, Nozick had 
clearly envisaged a role for the state going beyond ensuring respect for life and autonomy.  Whatever 
role Nozick envisaged, it must have been something beyond the role of the minimal state.  And it is 
hard to imagine what that role could be if it did not include the real threat of the use of prescriptive 
force. 
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democratic process could be used to choose public officials, but their legitimacy 
would presumably depend upon their ability to fulfil their roles, not upon their 
democratic election.  Such a libertarian system of government might properly use a 
non-democratic means of appointing officials (e.g. applications and appointments 
committee) if this produces the officials best able to fulfil the functions of the minimal 
state.  For Nozick’s minimal state, then, democracy is almost an irrelevance. 
 
As we might expect, while not going as far as Nozick, other laissez-faire liberals are 
distrustful of democracy, albeit they envisage an on-going role for a constrained 
democracy.  Gray, who was himself associated with the New Right in the 1980s, 
summarised matters neatly: 
The new classical liberals [Hayek, Buchanan and others]
37
 develop an incisive 
criticism of the unlimited popular democracy by which we are in effect ruled, 
and of the rationalist philosophy which supports the interventionist state in its 
attempts at social engineering.
38
 
 
Commenting upon the influential The Calculus of Consent,
39
 which he co-authored 
with Gordon Tullock, Buchanan stated: 
Explicitly and deliberately, we defended constitutional limits on majority 
voting.  In a somewhat more fundamental sense, we defended the existence of 
constitutional constraints per se; we justified bounds on the exercise of 
majoritarian democracy.  In this respect, I would argue that America’s 
political history has been “superior” to that of Britain, where neither in theory 
nor in practice have you imposed constraints on the exercise of parliamentary 
or legislative majorities comparable to those in America.
40
 
 
Apparently, Britain is too democratic. 
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 See Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960) esp. 
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University of Chicago Press, 1975). 
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 James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
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 James Buchanan [and others], The Economics of Politics (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 
1978) p.10. 
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As anticipated, then, we see a consistent distrust and neutering of democracy across a 
broad range of liberalisms.  Next, I devote a section of this chapter to social choice 
theory and, specifically, to one of its major proponents, Riker.  Riker claims to offer 
an account of democracy which is consistent with liberalism. 
 
Social Choice and Democracy 
Buchanan was one of the founders of the social choice school of political science and 
there has continued to be a strong association between social choice theory and the 
revival of classically liberal economic thought.  (The terms ‘social choice theory’, 
‘public choice theory’ and ‘rational choice theory’ are used interchangeably.)  The 
Hayekian protest against managerial and statist economics which reasserted exchange 
as the proper subject of economic study produced a form of economics that could be 
readily appropriated by the political scientist.  The study of multi-party exchange 
(essentially the matter of multi-party voluntary agreement) and the caricaturisation of 
humanity as homo economicus underpinned the social choice approach.
41
  A social 
choice is the choice of a group or of a whole society.  Social choice theory examines 
how that social choice is derived from the ‘tastes, preferences or values of 
individual[s]’42; ‘the building blocks [of the theory] are individuals, not corporate 
entities, not societies, not communities, not states’.43  Social choice theory posits that 
individuals are rational decision-makers acting in their own interests.  On the basis of 
such an assumption, the sorts of mathematical models used in economics can be 
borrowed by political science to consider social (i.e. political) choices.  While it might 
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 See James Buchanan, ‘The Public Choice Perspective’, in Liberty, Market and State (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf, 1986) Ch.3 pp.19-27. 
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 William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism:  A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy 
and the Theory of Social Choice (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1982) p.1. 
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be going too far to say that social choice theory is necessarily a liberal theory, 
political scientists that are social choice theorists are commonly liberals and the 
foundational emphasis of social choice theory on the individual suggests an affinity 
between social choice and liberalism.
44
 
 
There is a further sense in which social choice theory sits well with typical modern 
expressions of liberalism.  Broadly speaking, social choice theory takes individual 
preferences as givens, as the building blocks of social choices.  There is little 
emphasis on the way in which preferences are altered.  And that has become a 
typically liberal approach to the political:  liberal states should not exist to alter 
individual preferences or to undermine individuality; rather, the liberal state is there to 
facilitate, as far as possible, individual pursuit of individual preferences.  This is 
particularly true of liberals who endorse neutrality, as one might expect.
45
 
 
The focus of much of the research of social choice theorists is on elections and 
patterns of voting – the ways in which individual preferences generate a social choice.  
One might have thought, then, that social choice theorists would hold a high view of 
democracy and democratic outcomes.  This does not turn out to be the case.  Take the 
example of Riker, one of the leading figures in social choice theory, if not, for a time, 
the leading figure in this field.
46
  Riker, like Joseph Schumpeter, claims to be engaged 
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in a descriptive rather than a normative exercise
47
 but his work is undoubtedly 
underpinned by liberal principles.  As a political scientist and a social choice theorist, 
he is committed to the idea that political activity, like economic activity, is a function 
of individual (self-interested) preferences.
48
  In his Liberalism Against Populism: A 
Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice
49
, 
Riker draws a distinction between two accounts of democracy.  His preferred account, 
which he bizarrely calls ‘liberalism’, is a peculiarly limited account of democracy.  
The alternative account of democracy, which he calls ‘populism’, is, he believes, 
fatally flawed. 
 
Riker gives the name populism to those accounts of democracy which base the 
legitimacy of political decisions upon the premiss that those decisions properly 
represent the will of the people.
50
  Liberalism, on the other hand, is an account of 
democracy which makes no claim that government reflects the desires and intentions 
                                                                                                                         
Riker founded) as ‘the modal force in the political science discipline’ [Gerry Mackie, Democracy 
Defended (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) p.25]. 
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 Riker:  ‘… social choice is a device to analyze moral (and descriptive) propositions, not an ethical 
theory to choose among them,’ [op. cit. p.238].  [In the preface to the second edition of Capitalism, 
Schumpeter writes:  ‘I thought I had taken every care to make it quite clear that this is not a political 
book and that I did not wish to advocate anything’ [Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (2
nd
 ed.) (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1947) pp.viii-ix]. 
48
 In a somewhat bizarre note, Riker refers to what he calls a ‘public interest’.  He says that he does not 
deny that there can be a public interest.  But rather than claiming that voting cannot reveal it (as one 
would expect), he writes ‘[b]y definition, however, a common or public interest is held in common, so 
voting is unnecessary to reveal it:  Any randomly chosen member of society can articulate public 
interest as well as any other, provided he or she thinks about the interests of society rather than his or 
her own private interest’ [op. cit. p.291].  Presumably, Riker’s comments are posited upon his social 
choice-take on political involvement:  that a person is assumed to vote in their own personal, selfish, 
interests and, if voting could provide a meaningful social choice, that social choice would be an 
outcome based only on the aggregation of those personal, selfish, interests.  Only if a vote is 
unanimous do we discover the public interest, he states.  Apparently, his logic is that if everyone shares 
the same private interest, then that must be the public interest.  [Mackie analyses this paragraph at op. 
cit. pp.415-6.  I do not agree with his reading.  Riker is not claiming that there is no public interest until 
there is unanimity.  Only that voting cannot disclose it without unanimity.]  Riker’s observations only 
go to reveal the deficiency of a wholly social choice approach to political analysis.  I would have 
thought it unarguable that many people cast their vote with the intention of furthering what they 
understand to be the public good.  I comment on the complications that arise for democratic theorizing 
given that some people vote selfishly and others for the public good (or even altruistically) in chapter 3.     
49
 Op. cit. 
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of the people.  For democracy to exist, it is enough for leaders to be elected by a free 
and fair ballot of citizens and for those leaders to hold their offices for a limited 
period of time before their office becomes the subject of fresh elections.  Riker claims 
that populism is ‘inconsistent and absurd’.51  He purports to demonstrate that elections 
cannot reveal the will of the people.  Any assertion that a leader or a political 
programme is the choice of the people is impossible to prove.  At times he claims that 
that may render the outcome meaningless
52
 and, at other times, he argues that, as a 
result, ‘all outcomes of voting are rendered meaningless and uninterpretable’.53 
Riker goes further than arguing against populism on analytical grounds – that the 
attempt to find and act upon the will of the people is hopeless.  He also argues that 
populism is positively dangerous.  The belief that there is a will of the people, that this 
will has moral authority and that it should be implemented encourages tyranny and 
demagoguery.  He calls on Berlin’s account of the subversion of positive liberty in aid 
of his position:  if there is a popular will that should be put into effect, this can justify 
oppressive illiberal behaviour.  It is a small step for leaders and governments to claim 
that they understand the popular will better than anyone else, thus excusing the 
subversion or abandonment of a meaningful electoral process.
54
 
 
It is clear that Riker intends to distinguish his ‘liberalism’ from all other accounts of 
electoral democracy which are to be called ‘populism’.  His account of populism, 
though, is a gross caricature of the accounts of democracy he attacks.  While there is a 
clear distinction to be drawn between his account of democracy and all others, it is not 
on the basis of the polarity that he describes.  To defend an account of democracy that 
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 Ibid. p.233. 
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has it that democratic outcomes are some function of individual preferences is not to 
argue that democratic outcomes amount to the Rousseauian general will.  It is, of 
course, quite possible to believe that an election result reflects the current strengths of 
diverse opinions in society without believing that the election has manufactured a 
collective will from those diverse opinions.  Notwithstanding Riker’s crude and 
inaccurate description of populism, it is clear that he means to take issue with almost 
all theories of democracy – any theory of democracy that argues that, or assumes that, 
democratic outcomes reflect the intentions and desires of the electorate.  (Even 
defences of democracy on purely instrumentalist grounds accept that a democratic 
outcome is an outcome arrived at by some method of aggregating or amalgamating 
preferences of all individual voters.  Whatever the justification for democracy, there is 
general understanding of what a democratic outcome is.
55
)  Democracy (i.e. what 
Riker calls liberalism) is justified because it allows for the removal of leaders from 
office from time to time and, this being so, leaders moderate their behaviour to try to 
placate the voting public.
56
  In this way, democracy contributes towards the 
prevention of tyranny and the protection of liberal freedoms. 
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 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: OUP, 1969) pp.131ff. 
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 Even a non-democrat can recognize that an outcome is properly democratic in that it represents a 
proper amalgamation of votes (and, in that sense, is democratically legitimate).  The non-democrat, 
though, may deny that, all things considered, the outcome is legitimate.  It may be asserted that the 
democratic outcome is illegitimate because it is immoral. 
56
 This aspect of Riker’s argument is incoherently expressed.  He writes ‘[a]t best officials are 
responsive to a (possibly random) threat of expulsion from office.  But this may lead them to avoid 
gross offense to groups of citizens who can eject them from office’ [op. cit. p.245].  There are two 
ways of reading this:  either the elected officials avoid gross offence in the hope of winning the next 
election or they avoid gross offence because they may lose the next election and then, in a powerless 
position, they may be at the mercy of newly elected officials who may exact retribution or otherwise 
punish or oppress them on account of the gross offence previously caused.  The second interpretation 
seems to make more sense.  That seems to be what Riker is driving at when he writes that ‘an official 
who faces an electorate knowing that it sometimes works randomly and may “unfairly” reject him or 
her has a powerful motive to try even harder to avoid offending voters’ [ibid. p.243].  However, with 
some justification, Gerry Mackie understands Riker to mean that elected officials moderate their 
behaviour in the hope of staying in power.  That is not an unreasonable conclusion:  at one point, Riker 
writes ‘[t]he essence of the liberal interpretation of voting is … that voting permits the rejection of 
candidates or officials who have offended so many voters that they cannot win an election’ [ibid. 
p.242].  Mackie points out that, on Riker’s account, if electoral outcomes are random, the desire to stay 
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Additionally, democracy is valuable because the act of voting promotes, according to 
Riker, the ideal of individual self-realization (that is, the achievement of the human 
potential for good qualities of character and behaviour) and individual self-respect 
(that is, a sense of one’s worthiness as a person and a pride in one’s self-realization).  
Riker fails to provide any credible justification for these claims.  Indeed, his argument 
that democratic outcomes cannot reliably reflect the wills of the electorate seems to 
undermine this claim.
57
 
 
Riker states that a finding of social choice theory is that voting cannot produce an 
unequivocally fair and accurate social choice.  There are two reasons for this: 
                                                                                                                         
in office should provide no incentive for officials to avoid offence:  elected officials are as likely to 
retain power whether they cause gross offence or whether they do not [op. cit. p.412]. 
 Riker also talks of elected officials ‘abandon[ing] any effort to ensure voters’ participation through 
reading the voters’ will’ because the outcome of elections may be random and, then, contemplates an 
official winning an election by successfully manipulating the political agenda or by other contrivances 
[op. cit. p.243].  Implicitly, Riker draws a distinction between a fair and accurate social choice (which 
the politician has, apparently, no way of ensuring or promoting – so that all his efforts to ingratiate 
himself to voters so that he becomes the preferred candidate of as many as possible make it no more 
likely that he will be elected) and an unfair and inaccurate outcome (which, apparently, a politician has 
some hope of promoting).  Even if that distinction made any sense, one wonders why an official should 
expend energy trying not to offend electors (i.e. have an impact on their true preferences, which cannot 
apparently have any bearing on the electoral outcome), if he thinks that he can win the election by 
manipulating the agenda or raising spurious issues to split the opposition etc. 
[One wonders what ‘it sometimes works randomly’ [ibid.] means?  Reading Riker in the round, it 
appears that the ‘sometimes’ is redundant.  Mackie assumes as much in his critique.  Taken literally, 
the ‘sometimes’ would probably undermine Riker’s entire argument – see note 60 below.] 
57
 Ibid. p.2.  Democracy contributes to self-realization and self-respect because voting involves 
participation, liberty, and equality.  All three of these are both part of the method of voting (they make 
voting meaningful – what good would voting be if there was not a universal franchise, if people were 
not free to vote in line with their consciences and desires, if each vote did have the same weight) and 
ends which contribute to the ideals of self-realization and self-respect.  Or so claims Riker.  In truth, in 
Riker’s account of democracy, citizens have such a minimal impact on government that it is hard to see 
how democracy (if understood as Riker suggests) would contribute in any meaningful way to personal 
self-realization and self-respect.  [See also ibid. pp.244-245.] 
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 Different reasonable and fair, mechanisms for aggregating individual 
preferences may produce different social choices and there is no way to 
adjudge which mechanism is better.
58
 
 An apparently appropriate, or agreed, mechanism for producing a social 
choice by aggregating individual preferences may not, in some cases, identify 
a clear social choice so that any real-world outcome would be arbitrary.  There 
may be a ‘cycle’:  the outcome of the decision procedure is that option X is 
preferred to option Y which is preferred to option Z but option Z is preferable 
to option X!  Further, if there is a cycle, certain political players may be able 
to manipulate the mechanism so that there is an apparently clear final choice 
but it is a choice which does not properly reflect individual preferences.
59
    
 
Thus, Riker argues that attempts at finding a social choice could never be wholly and 
objectively fair because different mechanisms incorporate different notions of fairness 
and there is no meta-ideal of fairness which can reveal the better mechanism.  Further, 
because ‘cycles’ are common and manipulation is common, many outcomes will not 
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 There is any number of different aggregating rules.  We see diverse election procedures (and diverse 
methods of aggregating viewer opinions on so-called reality TV).  The Borda and Condorcet methods 
are two methods that are commonly used where ordered preferences over many options are available.  
Borda and Condorcet outcomes may give different results for the same data. 
This reason and the second reason are an expression of Kenneth Arrow’s so-called impossibility 
theorem.  In essence, if we specify four criteria that we would reasonably expect to be satisfied when 
amalgamating all individual preferences (i.e. arriving at the social preference), there is no mechanism 
of aggregation (i.e. a social welfare function) that can satisfy those criteria.  The four criteria are:  all 
logically possible orderings of preferences must be taken into account;  if all agree that x is preferable 
to y, the aggregation must show that x is preferable;  the social preference between two options should 
be independent of individual preferences in relation to a third;  the social preference should not simply 
reflect one individual or group of individuals – it should reflect all preferences.  [See Gerry Mackie 
pp.72-94 esp. pp.80-81].  The critical point that Mackie goes on to make is that the lack of an all 
singing, all dancing, social welfare function that can invariably produce complete disambiguation of 
the collective preference does not mean that generally aggregation of preferences is hopeless.  In many 
cases, the particular spread of preferences will allow for an unambiguous aggregation.  This is 
particularly so because individual preference holding is not random over all possibilities.  There is 
often a logic to the personal preference orderings that is reflected across society. 
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be accurate aggregations of individual preferences.  Given that we can rarely (if ever) 
tell whether or not a social choice is an accurate aggregation of preferences, even if a 
choice is accurate, we will probably not know.  And because we cannot tell when 
there has been manipulation and when there has not, outcomes are meaningless.
60
  
Accordingly, any account of democracy based upon the idea that government will 
reflect the will of the people (or better, the wills of the people), as populism does, is 
untenable.
61
 
 
What he calls liberalism is, Riker claims, consistent with the findings of social choice 
theory.  It is enough that leaders and governments can be thrown out of office by way 
of an election defeat.  This is the case even though the decision to reject that leader or 
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 This disequilibrium allows for manipulation in a number of ways:  by tactical voting, by introducing  
new issues and by agenda control (i.e. determining the order in which questions are tabled).  For a more 
detailed explanation see ibid. pp.72-94. 
60
 Riker’s arguments are somewhat imprecise.  At one point he writes that ‘[s]ince we cannot know 
whether manipulation has occurred, the truth and meaning of all outcomes is thereby rendered dubious’ 
[op. cit. p.236] but later he asserts that any particular method of aggregating preferences ‘lack[s] 
meaning’ [ibid. p.238].  For an outcome to be doubtful is one thing; for an outcome to meaningless is 
quite another. 
61
 Mackie argues that skepticism about the accuracy and meaningfulness of aggregations cannot be 
based upon the fact that different methods may theoretically produce different results and on the 
theoretical possibility of cycling and manipulation:  empirically these do not turn out to be significant 
problems.  He maintains that Riker’s position is really based upon the idea that ‘if undetected 
manipulation is possible in any one instance of voting it is possible in all instances taken together’ [op. 
cit. p.38] and, accordingly, we cannot have faith in the accuracy of any amalgamation. 
Try as I might I cannot read Riker in that way.  Riker’s argumentative strategy is very simple:  we 
cannot tell if any particular outcome is accurate and meaningful and so we cannot attribute accuracy or 
meaningfulness to it.  It may be that because that strategy is so inadequate Mackie has flattered Riker 
with a more nuanced approach. 
Given the material he presents, Riker’s argument should be as follows:  first, inaccuracy and 
manipulation are possible in any one aggregation;  secondly, we cannot generally tell, easily and 
immediately, if a result is inaccurate or manipulated (prompt knowledge is unlikely but not 
impossible);  thirdly, we can expect inaccuracy and manipulation in many cases;  and, finally, that 
being so, inaccuracy and manipulation is likely in any particular case and we cannot, therefore, 
justifiably readily attribute accuracy or assume a lack of manipulation (and thus attribute 
meaningfulness to it). 
That is a perfectly acceptable argument, the credibility of which depends upon, amongst other things, 
the assertion that inaccuracy and manipulation are ubiquitous or at least common-place. 
The weakness in Riker’s case is that he fails to show that inaccuracy, cycling and manipulation is 
common-place.  Riker sets out what he claims are many examples of cycling and manipulation but 
Mackie takes the hatchet to Riker’s case:  in the case of ballots where Riker has maintained that there 
was cycling and manipulation, Mackie has convincingly shown there was no cycling.   [See op. cit. esp. 
chapters 9 to 15] 
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government is a mistake because it does not reflect the social will or may be a mistake 
because the social will cannot be unambiguously identified.  It is enough that power 
cannot be entrenched. 
 
Like Mill, Riker recognises the potential clash between democratic outcomes and 
liberal imperatives.  Mill, the utilitarian, does not imagine that democratic outcomes 
have normative force because they represent the will of the people.  Democracy is 
preferred because it is the best form of government – it is most likely to produce 
good, liberal, outcomes – not because its outcomes are necessarily, because they are 
democratic, imbued with rightness.  As far as possible, democratic institutions can 
and should be designed so that bad, illiberal, outcomes are not produced.  Riker, 
though, first imagines that democratic outcomes might have value and legitimacy if 
they embody the will of the people – a legitimacy that would conflict with liberal 
tenets.  He attempts to avoid the theoretical dilemma that would transpire – the clash 
of democratic outcomes with liberal axioms – by claiming that democracy is not what 
we thought it was (i.e. not populism).  What we thought of as democracy, claims 
Riker, was an analytically incoherent theory which offers only the pretence that those 
who govern do so by reference to the will of the people.  Instead, Riker presents his 
democracy as compatible with liberalism – so compatible, indeed, that he can call his 
account of democracy ‘liberalism’.  I think Riker is intimating that democracy no 
longer has the status to provide legitimate normative demands that would conflict 
with liberal imperatives.  Riker presents his form of democracy as supportive of 
liberalism:  ‘an intermittent, sometimes random, even perverse, popular veto.  […]  
Liberal democracy is simply the veto by which it is sometimes possible to restrain 
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official tyranny.’62  Whereas populism generates decisions with an authority which 
may clash with liberal principle, Riker claims his account of democracy does not 
challenge liberalism. Even on its own, fairly incredible, terms, Riker fails to defang 
democracy.  Whatever the justification for democracy, be that that democratic 
decisions represent the will of the people or that it is a bulwark against tyranny, 
democratic decisions are accorded normative weight by his justificatory theory.  
Presumably, Riker still endorses ‘the rule of law’ and would, if challenged, confirm 
that democratic decisions are generally to be obeyed.  The reasons for obeying 
democracy cannot be wholly liberal reasons, as there can be no guarantee that all 
democratic decisions will be liberal.  (If they were, why would Riker be so concerned 
about the possibility of tyranny?)  But Riker effectively concedes this.  He makes 
clear that democracy, even as he understands it, is an insufficient protection for liberal 
freedoms.  Madisonian constitutional safeguards are also required.
63
  In effect, we 
have another liberal account which seeks to neuter democracy with a liberal 
constitutional settlement.  However, what Riker has done – which was not attempted 
by for example, Raz or Dworkin – is undermine democracy.  Liberals generally want 
to corral democracy but Riker’s account leaves us wondering why democracy should 
be endorsed at all.  As Gerry Mackie points out, Riker’s account of democracy is so 
thin that it appears to provide little basis to criticise what may be thought of as non-
democratic regimes – at least not on the basis that the regime does not reflect the 
views of the people.  If democratic outcomes cannot be said to reflect the views of the 
people then a non-democratic government may be just as good at reflecting the views 
of the people as a democratic one, which appears to be nonsensical and undermines 
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 Ibid. p.244. 
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 Ibid. pp.249-250.  Riker claims that by itself democracy (even Rikerian democracy) would be an 
insufficient bulwark against oppression and tyranny.  The full gamut of constitutional safeguards – 
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the credibility of Riker’s entire case.  Can it really be meaningless to assert that post-
apartheid governments in South Africa better represent the preferences of the adult 
population than did the apartheid regime?  The value of democratic practices seems to 
be a function of the extent to which those democratic practices hamper populism (in 
the normal sense of the term) and prevent the demagoguery, which might undermine 
liberal freedoms.
64
  However, this does not seem to offer any weighty argument for 
democracy.  If the fundamental criterion for judging regimes is whether they are 
liberal and properly protect liberal freedoms, then there seems to be no reason why 
democratic regimes should necessarily be better.  Quite conceivably a democratic 
regime which has few restraints on executive power may rate as a worse regime than 
a non-democratic but liberal regime. 
 
To my mind, Mackie has convincingly demonstrated that Riker’s criticism is invalid.  
Democratic outcomes can, and commonly do, reflect the preferences of the 
electorate.
65
  For current purposes, though, Riker’s approach illustrates once again 
both the liberal desire to neuter democracy and democracy’s resilience.  If democracy 
is tolerated in almost any way, shape or form, the potential for clashes with liberal 
imperatives remains.  This is the key point I wish to draw out:  while all the various 
liberal theories I have referred to attempt to ensure that democratic outcomes are 
liberal, by placing various extra-democratic constraints on democracy, clashes 
between democratic outcomes and liberal freedoms cannot be wholly excluded.  In 
                                                                                                                         
separation of powers, multicameralism, independent judiciary etc. – is needed to prevent authoritarian 
rule. 
64
 Interestingly, Riker is deeply skeptical of the system of democracy practiced in the UK because, in 
particular, of the lack of fixed-term parliaments and the (hitherto) right of an incumbent prime minister 
to call an election at a moment of his choosing.  [Rather like Rawls, after Riker’s lengthy investigations 
we discover that the US system of governance is the best.] 
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 See my notes 55, 56, 59 & 60 above.  Mackie’s criticisms are to some extent prefigured in Ian 
Shapiro, Democracy’s Place (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) esp. ch.2. 
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the case of Mill’s proposals, it is impossible to imagine that democratic institutions 
would be so perfectly designed as to ensure that democratic outcomes are always 
liberal (i.e. that the power of different classes will always be so balanced that the 
liberal freedoms of one class will not be curtailed in the course of the pursuit of the 
sectional interests of another).  As for Dworkin, Riker and others that advocate 
Madisonian-style liberal constitutionalism and judicial review, illiberal outcomes 
remain possible.  Under the US system, for instance, a super-majority in congress 
could overturn liberal constitutional safeguards and undermine judicial review.  A 
clash between democracy and liberalism is unavoidable unless liberal freedoms are 
entrenched in perpetuity without any possibility of constitutional amendment.
66
  If and 
when a clash occurs, the clash is between a liberal moral imperative and a legitimated 
democratic outcome.  Whether grudgingly or not, whether reasons for democratic 
legitimation are specified or not specified, the various liberal accounts explicitly or 
implicitly accept that democratic outcomes (that cannot be judicially reviewed) are 
legitimate.  Mill and Riker endorse democracy.  Mill offers a detailed account of why 
it is a good thing.
67
  Riker, too, argues that democracy is good because it prevents 
tyranny.  Mill or Riker might have stated that all democratic legitimacy was forfeited 
for any outcome that was illiberal but they have not done so.
68
  Democratic outcomes 
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 US constitutionalism did not, of course, prevent prohibition – effective from 1920 [18th amendment] 
to 1933 [21
st
 amendment]. 
67
 See especially Considerations Ch.3 
68
 Friedrich Hayek finds himself in a similarly uncomfortable position.  On the one hand, he expressly 
supports the concept of democratic, majoritarian, decision-making but, on the other, he seems to 
suggest that democratic decisions lack authority unless such decisions are derived from the commonly-
held liberal principles of the society.  [See op. cit. p.106.]  There is a ‘higher rule of law’ which 
includes protection of liberal and economic freedoms.  Those freedoms can be protected by 
constitutionalism.  However, he concludes that constitutionalism has its limits as a protector of liberal 
freedoms.  Constitutions can be amended.  The standard and consistency of judicial review will vary.  
His higher rule of law becomes ‘a rule concerning what the law ought to be, a meta-legal doctrine or a 
political ideal’ [ibid. p.206].  Hayek cannot avoid the fact that democratic decisions seem to be lawful 
in the limited sense that they are the result of a democratic process.  Hayek concedes that ‘[i]n a 
democracy this means that [the higher rule of law] will not prevail unless it forms part of the moral 
tradition of the community, a common ideal shared and unquestionably accepted by the majority’ 
[ibid.]. 
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must retain some legitimacy (for the reasons Mill and Riker offer in support of 
democracy) even when outcomes are illiberal.  They definitely do not suggest that 
extra-democratic or extra-legal action in the face of illiberal democratic outcomes is 
justified.  Significantly, they fail to explore the clash of liberal and democratic 
legitimacy and fail to explain how that clash can be resolved or how it can be 
accommodated. 
 
Berlin 
Berlin takes ethical liberalism in a new direction, incorporating his concept of value 
pluralism.  Berlin famously asserts that there are two distinct concepts of liberty:  
negative and positive.  Negative liberty is a matter of non-interference – the freedom 
that is afforded when society and government leave an area of life unobstructed, un-
policed and unregulated so that the individual is free to engage in the unhindered 
pursuit of whatever possibilities are available to them, if they so choose.  As a 
defender of such negative liberty, Berlin is in the liberal tradition.  Indeed, what 
Berlin calls ‘negative liberty’ describes the kind of liberty that Mill expressly 
endorses.  Positive liberty, on the other hand, is the freedom to govern one’s own 
affairs, to shape one’s life and the world around one.  While Berlin describes this as a 
matter of self-realisation, he has much more than the private domain of the individual 
in mind.  Positive liberty is not merely the flipside of the negative liberty that he 
believes society should allow the individual.  For Berlin, positive liberty is the 
freedom a person has to shape the wider parameters of their life, their environment 
and their society to their liking.  For Berlin, political power provides positive liberty 
and democracy, it would seem, offers a positive liberty to the enfranchised 
population. 
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In the ‘Introduction’ to his Four Essays on Liberty, Berlin stresses his commitment to 
democracy: 
I do not know why I should have been held to doubt … that democratic self-
government is a fundamental human need, something valuable in itself, 
whether or not it clashes with the claims of negative liberty or of any other 
goal; valuable intrinsically and not only for the reasons advanced in its favour 
by, for example, Constant – that without it, negative liberty may be too easily 
crushed;  or by Mill, who thinks it an indispensable means – but still only a 
means – to the attainment of happiness.69 
 
Later, he restates the point he is making:  ‘participation in self-government [what 
Berlin describes as “positive liberty”], is, like justice, a basic human requirement, an 
end in itself’.70 
 
What, then, is the relationship between liberalism (commitment to liberal freedoms) 
and democracy in Berlin’s schema?  Can liberalism be consistent with democracy as a 
political theory?  Berlin writes that ‘negative and positive liberties are not the same 
thing.  Both are ends in themselves.  These ends may clash irreconcilably.  When this 
happens, questions of choice and preference inevitably arise.  Should democracy in a 
given situation be promoted at the expense of individual freedom?’71  Moreover he 
adds: 
If the claims of two (or more than two) types of liberty prove incompatible in 
a particular case, and this is an instance of the clash of values at once absolute 
and incommensurable, it is better to face this intellectually uncomfortable fact 
than to ignore it, or automatically attribute it to some deficiency on our part 
which could be eliminated by an increase in skill or knowledge …;72 
 
Berlin is a value pluralist.  Value pluralism has it that, in any particular situation 
where different values or goods are in play, it is not always possible to conduct any 
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 Ibid. p.l. 
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sort of objective moral calculus to work out what is to be done, which value should 
prevail, which value must be compromised.  Or, put another way, for the value 
pluralist there is no meta-value against which other values can be weighed when faced 
with moral dilemmas.  For Berlin, liberal freedoms are valuable and so is democracy.  
Neither, however, is the predominant value.  Where liberal freedoms and democracy 
clash, there is no universal ethical account which can necessarily resolve the dilemma. 
 
For Berlin, the moral universe is a plural environment.  It is populated with goods 
which may, in any particular situation, be incommensurable.  In some situations, it 
may be that one good sits happily with another.  Being virtuous on a particular 
occasion may also benefit my neighbour.  In other situations, though, there is a clash 
of values.  In a classic example, someone lies in order to throw a violent aggressor off 
the trail of his intended victim.  Truth has been compromised in order to avoid the 
likely suffering of a possible victim.  Of course, in such a case, many will agree that 
the correct thing to do is obvious.  It seems better to protect the likely victim at the 
expense of telling a lie.  Not everyone will necessarily agree, though.  Even the 
brightest and the best may dissent.  And Berlin’s point is that we lack knock-down 
rational ethical arguments that would render such a contrary position indefensible.  
For Berlin, there are circumstances where values conflict and where the dilemma is 
irresolvable.  Such situations may properly be described as tragic; for example, where 
duties to family and to wider society conflict.  In essence, then, Berlin’s position is 
that liberalism is a good thing (as it offers negative freedom) and democracy is a good 
thing (as it offers positive freedom).  These are quite different goods.  Attempting to 
demonstrate the coherence and compatibility of these goods would be pointless.  
These goods may be incompatible at times and that is simply that. 
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Berlin’s approach to democracy, then, is quite distinct.  Democratic outcomes may 
still conflict with liberal freedoms but that is no longer a conflict that necessitates the 
search for a resolution – a conflict which the liberal will want to resolve by 
compromising the status of democracy.  The conflict remains.  The conflict is 
irremediable, but its existence compromises neither the position of liberalism nor that 
of democracy.
73
  Liberalism may not be consistent with democracy as a political 
theory but, strangely, that may not, of itself, undermine democracy as a political 
theory for liberals.  A Berlinian liberal’s endorsement of democracy as a political 
theory cannot be unequivocal, given the value pluralist belief that there can be no 
account that would necessarily prioritise democracy.  Nevertheless, it is conceivable 
that commitment to democracy as a political theory would be solid and conceivable 
that when there were clashes, these would be resolved in favour of the democratic 
outcome.  All things being equal, it is conceivable that a value pluralist liberal would 
choose to endorse democracy strongly for situational reasons.  Perhaps, indeed, this is 
what we see: a widespread acceptance of democratic outcomes by liberals, even when 
those outcomes are illiberal or questionably liberal. 
 
Of course, in Berlin’s schema, democracy is not justified by the fact that it promotes 
liberal freedoms.  Its justification must be quite distinct.  Before democracy could be 
accepted as a political theory, it is necessary to demonstrate that democracy does 
provide the individual with positive freedom (or indeed provides some other benefit). 
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Conclusion 
Leaving Berlin’s account to one side for the moment, it is noted that in all other 
liberal accounts, save perhaps for Nozick’s, we see some role for democracy but one 
that is limited and circumscribed by liberal rights which will generally be, to some 
extent, entrenched constitutionally.  Nozick’s minimal state, of course, has little room 
for democracy or much else for that matter.  Save for Nozick’s, Riker’s social choice 
account takes the most sceptical view of democracy and offers an apology, as do other 
liberals, for a Madisonian-style constitution. 
 
In general, then, liberalisms would sit happier with a putative political theory of 
democracy if the proposed version of democracy was limited and constrained in the 
ways liberals envisage. As alluded to above, it is doubtful whether any liberal theories 
can ever be wholly consistent with democracy.  It is not yet clear whether such a 
limited form of democracy could function as a political theory nor is it clear whether 
such a limited political theory could bring other comprehensive worldviews under its 
umbrella.  It is also far from obvious what kind of justification for such a limited 
account of democracy could be given.  Intrinsic justifications for democracy – that 
have it that democratic outcomes are legitimate because of their procedural fairness 
and egalitarianism would not seem to work in such circumstances:  if democratic 
outcomes are validated because of their procedural fairness, it is hard to see how that 
validation could be restricted to liberal outcomes or outcomes that liberals could 
tolerate.  How could the justification for democracy avoid providing a justification for 
grossly illiberal outcomes?  Of course, analogous difficulties exist for the relationship 
between other comprehensive worldviews and a procedurally justified democracy.  
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 Berlin argues that Mill is a value monist that there is always an attainable truth when making value 
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Such a theory of democracy is likely to justify outcomes that are, from time to time, 
offensive to holders of any comprehensive worldview.  Berlin’s pluralist liberalism, 
though, appears to allow conceptual space for a political theory of democracy, a 
theory which does not have to be limited or circumscribed in a fashion that will render 
it acceptable to liberals.  And in broader terms, Berlin’s value pluralism may explain 
why holders of other comprehensive worldviews could accept a political theory of 
democracy. 
 
It is now necessary to consider justifications for democracy and to see how any 
credible account of democracy would relate to liberalism and other worldviews.  
Given that democracy may sit best with Berlinian liberalism, it is appropriate to begin 
an investigation of democracy by considering whether Berlin’s assertions that 
democracy promotes positive liberty offers a justificatory possibility. 
                                                                                                                         
judgments – see ibid. p.l-li. 
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Chapter 2 
Berlin’s ‘Reconciliation’ of Liberalism and Democracy 
In this chapter, I seek to develop a preliminary understanding of what might make 
democracy valuable – an understanding that can inform further investigation.  The 
focus is upon democracy as offering a freedom to citizens.  At the end of the chapter, 
I find it necessary to offer a classification of freedoms that will assist as I move on in 
the next chapter to analyse the freedom that democracy seems to offer. 
 
Berlin recognises that liberalism and democracy do not necessarily sit easily together.  
There is, he submits, value in both liberalism, which underpins negative liberty (the 
absence of coercion) and in democracy which offers a positive liberty to citizens (the 
opportunity to influence the surrounding society and its impact on the individual).  
These values are ultimate; there is no supreme or higher value which is capable of 
subsuming them.  Indeed, these values form part of a moral universe of goods and 
values that is diverse and plural.  There is no meta-good or meta-value that subsumes 
lesser values or that is capable of ordering and prioritising those values by offering a 
standard against which those supposedly lesser values can be judged.  Ultimate moral 
values are incommensurable.  Further, that means that different political choices or 
options may be fundamentally incomparable.
1
  Option A, the liberal option, has value 
(i.e. is the bearer of value) because it offers/protects/fosters negative freedom; option 
B, the democratic option, has value (i.e. is the bearer of value) because it 
                                           
1
 Terminology in this area is not consistent throughout the literature.  Like Raz, I think of the terms 
incommensurable and incomparable as interchangeable, although, as a matter of convenience, I tend to 
describe values as incommensurable and options/choices (i.e. bearers of value) as incomparable.  Ruth 
Chang suggests that incommensurable should be reserved as a description of ‘items that cannot be 
precisely measured by some common scale of units of value’ while incomparable should apply for 
items that cannot be compared – see Ruth Chang, ‘Introduction’, in Incommensurability, 
Incomparability and Practical Reason ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1997) pp.1-34 at p.2. 
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offers/protects/fosters positive freedom; if option A and option B are mutually 
exclusive, given that no meta-value is available against which the choices can be 
measured, options A and B will be strictly incomparable.  Whichever choice is made, 
there will be a loss of value. 
 
Of course, many decisions taken in a society may not involve such a loss of value; a 
proposed course of action might offer/protect/foster both negative and positive 
freedoms – might be consistently both liberal and democratic.  However, in the 
absence of any meta-value, competing valuations which are based upon different 
incommensurable values are incomparable and the options/choices are irreconcilable.
2
  
The usefulness of Berlin’s account for our present purposes is that it seems to explain 
why the demands of liberal freedom and the demands of democracy cannot always be 
reconciled.  Critically, it excuses liberals from the task of having to reconcile liberal 
theory with democratic theory.  Liberal theory and democratic theory can proceed 
                                           
2
 Quite how decisions should be made in the face of such incomparable valuations is far from clear.  
For Gray, any choice must be, if not irrational, a-rational.  No rational process of arbitration can be 
brought to bear on the dilemma.  He writes, ‘[incommensurability] marks a limit to rational choice, and 
an occasion for radical choice – for the kind of choice that is not, and cannot be, reason-based, but 
consists in making a decision or a commitment that is groundless’ [Enlightenment’s Wake p.70]. 
Other writers argue that while many values may be qualitatively heterogeneous and that there is no 
possibility of a lexical ordering of values, choices can be made situationally – and rationally.  Galston, 
another value pluralist makes these comments:  ‘[value pluralism] is compatible with the existence of 
right answers in specific cases;  there may be compelling reasons to conclude that certain trade-offs 
among competing goods are preferable to others [my emphasis]’ [Liberal Pluralism p.7].  Quite what 
those reasons might be is not clearly spelt out.  I am not clear that Galston’s position is readily 
sustainable.  If by preferable, Galston means morally preferable (as opposed to aesthetically preferable 
or as opposed to, say, personally convenient), he is arguing that the morally preferable choice can be 
reached by deployment and consideration of reasons.  But, those reasons must be moral reasons and it 
is hard to see what those moral reasons could be other than appeals to particular moral values which 
one choice or the other bears to a greater extent – and would that not represent a denial of value 
pluralism? 
Charles Taylor argues that, while some conflicts may be unarbitratable, there are resources available 
that allow arbitration in many cases.  He appeals to an Aristotelian  and suggests that we can 
refer to ‘our sense of the shape of our lives, and how different goods fit together within it – their 
different places and times’ [Charles Taylor, ‘Leading a Life’, in Incommensurability, Incomparability 
and Practical Reason ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997) pp.170-183 
at p.183.]  It is not clear to me, though, how that can be a moral appeal or, at least, a non-relativist 
moral appeal.  If the solution is properly arrived at by appeal to our sense of the shape of our lives, then 
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along different tracks.
3
  Both liberal theory and democratic theory can be endorsed.  A 
political theory of democracy is not hamstrung by the necessary disapprobation of 
liberals.  However, in this chapter I suggest that Berlin’s detailed account does not 
deliver what was hoped of it, or at least not straightforwardly. 
 
In order to be satisfied that Berlin’s solution is viable, we would need to be convinced 
of three things: 
1. that Berlin’s account of value pluralism is robust; (if, after all, the moral 
universe is monist in nature, then theories of liberalism and democracy should 
be harmonious; liberals would expect that any account of democracy should 
be consistent with liberalism;) 
2. that negative and positive liberties are quite different moral values in that 
pluralist universe;  (if, after all, the distinction between negative and positive 
liberties cannot be maintained and there is just a single value (liberty or 
freedom) then value pluralism (even if it has been properly justified) is 
irrelevant where liberty is in issue;) and 
3. that liberalism and democracy each offer, protect and foster quite distinct 
moral values:  liberalism – negative freedom; democracy – positive freedom.   
 
I start by analysing the distinction between negative and positive liberties and will 
later make some observations about value pluralism. 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
it seems that any particular community may properly prefer its own history and own understandings as 
a guide to conduct. 
3
 To pursue the analogy further:  where the tracks cross, there is no way to avoid the possibility that 
there will be an accident as trains running on the tracks plough into each other. 
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Negative & Positive Liberties 
In his essay, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’,4 Berlin argues that the concept of liberty or 
freedom (he, like many liberal thinkers, uses the terms liberty and freedom 
interchangeably) is commonly used in two quite distinct senses.  These are the 
negative and positive senses of liberty.
5
 
Berlin writes, 
The first of these political senses of freedom or liberty …, which (following 
much precedent) I shall call the “negative” sense, is involved in the answer to 
the question “What is the area within which the subject – a person or group of 
persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without 
interference by other persons?”  The second, which I shall call the positive 
sense, is involved in the answer to the question “What, or who, is the source of 
control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather 
than that?”6 
 
Thus I have negative liberty when I can act (or simply be) without interference from 
others and I have more negative freedom when and where the tide of interference 
flows out leaving me with a greater area of potential action or being that is not subject 
to any interference.  I have positive liberty where the answer to Berlin’s question is 
that I, myself, control what is or is not done.  Berlin goes on, 
The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process 
by which my life is controlled, may be as deep a wish as that of a free area of 
action, and perhaps historically older.  But it is not a desire for the same thing.  
So different is it, indeed, as to have led in the end to the great clash of 
ideologies that dominates our world. For it is this – the “positive” conception 
                                                                                                                         
 
4
 Four Essays pp.118-172 at p.129. 
5
 Berlin’s use of the term ‘sense of liberty’ may seem to suggest that different expositions of liberty are 
merely facets of a single idea – liberty; that at root there is simply the single value ‘liberty’.  If that 
were so, we might expect that after proper analysis of any circumstance, value pluralism would not 
come into play.  However, elsewhere Berlin refers to conceptions of liberty and notions of liberty and 
he, apparently, thinks that these conceptions are sufficiently conceptually distinct to make these 
conceptions potentially irreconcilable in certain situations.  Berlin makes this explicit in his 
‘Introduction’ to Four Essays on Liberty (1969) in which ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (1958) is 
reprinted: ‘“Positive” liberty […] is a valid universal goal’ [ibid. p.xlvii] and ‘[…] democratic self-
government is a fundamental human need, something valuable in itself, whether or not it clashes with 
the claims of negative liberty or of any other goal’ [ibid.]. 
6
 Ibid. pp.121-2. 
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of liberty: not freedom from, but freedom to – to lead one prescribed form of 
life …7 
 
Is it, then, beyond dispute that the concepts of negative and positive freedoms are 
quite distinct and underpin and explain the distinction and tensions between liberal 
freedoms and democracy?  It is argued here that, as generally used, the distinction 
between negative and positive freedom is of no help in exploring the tension between 
liberal freedoms and democracy.  In effect, I argue that far from being a useful 
freestanding analytical category, the idea of positive freedom is, generally, at best 
confusing and unhelpful and at worst meaningless. 
 
It should be noted that significant observations by Berlin on negative and positive 
liberty are to be found in two distinct places – albeit, commonly, within the covers of 
the same book.  His famous essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, originally presented as 
a lecture, was written in 1958 and republished in 1969 within Four Essays on Liberty.  
That 1969 collection included an ‘Introduction’ in which Berlin writes at some length 
about negative and positive liberties and about freedom and democracy.  While the 
‘Introduction’ is ostensibly a response to his critics and a simple restatement of the 
original thesis, there are notable differences. 
 
In the original essay Berlin developed and used the idea of positive freedom first and 
foremost as a category in a genealogical investigation – how apologists for totalitarian 
states could appeal to a concept of freedom – an appeal which he convincingly 
demonstrated to be illegitimate.  It is not clear that Berlin intended, in the original 
essay, to develop the idea of positive liberty as a freestanding analytical category to 
                                           
7
 Ibid. p.131. 
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any significant extent.  At the end of his essay, he still talks of freedom in its positive 
sense.  And interestingly, when he introduces value pluralism, it is not to point out 
that negative and positive liberties are distinct values that may clash in a pluralist 
moral universe, it is to bolster his arguments in support of negative liberty. 
Pluralism, with the measure of “negative” liberty that it entails, seems to me a 
truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great, 
disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of “positive” self-mastery by 
classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind.
8
 
 
He argues that values are diverse and, accordingly, that many types of life can be 
lived, types of life that are incompatible.  Those different lives are all valuable.  There 
is no rational way to choose between those lives.  The value in those different lives is 
an argument in favour of individual negative freedom.  As all those different lives 
have value, a society should offer sufficient negative freedom to allow those different 
lives to be pursued.  In the original essay, it is, at best, only implicit that positive 
liberty and negative liberty represent potentially clashing plural values.  That is not 
Berlin’s thrust.9  He is seeking to show just how corrupted the idea of positive liberty 
has become. 
 
In the ‘Introduction’, though, Berlin’s presentation is quite different.  Now his focus 
has changed.  He writes, ‘[w]hat I am mainly concerned to establish is that, whatever 
may be the common ground between them, and whichever is liable to graver 
distortion, negative and positive liberty are not the same thing.  Both are ends in 
                                           
8
 Ibid. p.171. 
9
 In his essay ‘Agonistic Liberalism’, Gray argues that many traditional liberals see no threat to their 
accounts of liberalism from value pluralism.  Value pluralism is about values; liberalism (at least of 
certain hues) is about rights.  Liberalism is neutral when it comes to value.  Gray maintains, though, 
with Raz, that a purely rights-based account of freedom is impossible:  ‘… rights claims are never 
primordial or foundational but always conclusionary, provisional results of long chains of reasoning 
which unavoidably invoke contested judgements about human interests and well-being.’ 
[Enlightenment’s Wake pp.64-86 at p.72].  It is not clear that the Berlin of ‘Two Concepts’ recognised 
this tension between liberalism and value pluralism. 
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themselves.  These ends may clash irreconcilably.’10  The focus of Berlin’s value 
pluralism is no longer on its corollary – that lives lived are diverse and incomparable 
– but on the incommensurability of values and choices.  It is, of course, Berlin’s more 
developed position as set out in the Introduction that ostensibly offers an explanation 
for the clash between liberalism and democracy by recognising the validity of both.  
 
I do not intend to analyse what Berlin calls ‘negative liberty’ and others simply call 
liberty.  I take it as a given that there is such a (coherent) concept of liberty – the 
liberty of liberalism:  the lack of constraint or interference by other people.  Its value 
and importance are again further matters which, for the purpose of this discussion, I 
take for granted and do not consider here.  Thus, I assume that there is at least one 
type of liberty.  The concern here is to investigate whether ‘positive liberty’ is a 
distinct type of liberty?
11
 
                                           
10
 Four Essays p.xlix. 
11
 In fact, strictly, the task is to decide whether ‘positive liberty’ is a distinct value.  Ultimately, we 
need not be concerned with whether positive liberty (whatever that might be) warrants the appellation 
liberty.  It would be enough that ‘positive liberty’ is a distinct value (which will be incommensurable 
with negative liberty in a pluralist moral universe) and that democracy offers/protects/fosters that 
value. 
Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty [op. cit. pp.11-21] argues that his meaning of liberty (akin to 
Berlin’s negative liberty) is the appropriate one; implicitly other usages are to describe ideas and 
concepts which are not liberty. 
David Miller criticises Berlin’s use of the term positive liberty.  He suggests that Berlin conflates a 
number of different ideas of freedom into his notion of positive freedom.  Miller writes, 
Berlin’s positive sense of freedom, however, is far less clearly specified.  When he first 
introduces it, he identifies it as self-mastery:   a person is free when he controls his own life, 
rather than being an instrument of someone else’s will.  As the concept is developed, however, 
it comes to embrace a number of quite different doctrines, of which three in particular may be 
usefully isolated: 
1. Freedom as the power or capacity to act in certain ways, as contrasted with the mere 
absence of interference. 
2. Freedom as rational self-direction, the condition in which a person’s life is governed by 
rational desires as opposed to the desires that he just as a matter of fact has. 
3. Freedom as collective self-determination, the condition where each person plays his 
part in controlling his social environment through democratic institutions. 
[David Miller, ‘Introduction’, in Liberty ed. David Miller (Oxford: OUP, 1991) pp.1-20 at 
p.10.] 
Miller identifies the second and third of the definitions he ascribes to Berlin as the idealist and 
republican conceptions of liberty respectively. 
Miller, though, misrepresents what Berlin is doing in ‘Two Concepts’.  Berlin is not, himself, 
conflating various meanings of liberty.  Rather, he is explaining how meanings of liberty have been 
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Berlin’s introductory comments on positive liberty are far from a strong defence of 
the idea that positive liberty is a distinct type of liberty – a distinct value.  He writes, 
The freedom which consists in being one’s own master, and the freedom 
which consists in not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men, 
may, on the face of it, seem concepts at no great logical distance from each 
other – no more than negative and positive ways of saying much the same 
thing.  Yet the “positive” and “negative” notions of freedom historically 
developed in divergent directions not always by logically reputable steps, 
until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with each other [my 
emphasis].
12
 
 
He seems to be saying that, at their analytical root, there may be little distinction 
between positive and negative liberties.  Compare this with comments in the 
‘Introduction’: 
“Positive” liberty, conceived as the answer to the question, “By whom am I to 
be governed?”, is a valid universal goal.  I do not know why I should have 
been held to doubt this or […] the further proposition that democratic self-
government is a fundamental human need, something valuable in itself, 
whether or not it clashes with the claims of negative liberty.
13
 
 
We should, perhaps, be concerned about the gap between the essay and the 
‘Introduction’ and wonder whether the argument that positive liberty is a distinct 
universal goal or value has been made.
14
 
                                                                                                                         
adapted over time so that the concept can be abused by totalitarian states.  Step by step, Berlin 
demonstrates that the development of the idea of positive freedom has been flawed and is invalid.  As 
far as we can tell from the original essay, positive freedom simply ‘consists in being one’s own master 
… [and] of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them’ [Four Essays p.131] i.e. 
deciding and influencing how I live my life.  The development of the concept thereafter, which Berlin 
describes in his essay, is a development he views as generally illegitimate. 
Berlin states that freedom in this positive sense is involved in the answer to the question, ‘What, or 
who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than 
that?’ [Ibid. p.122].  Implicitly, if it is someone else, I am without positive freedom (at least to the 
extent that other person controls or interferes with what I do or am);  if it is me, either alone or with 
others, then I have positive freedom (at least to the extent that I, alone or with others, control what I do 
or am).  This is Berlin’s view of positive liberty. 
12
 Ibid. pp.131-2. 
13
 Ibid. p.xlvii. 
14
 I note George Crowder’s useful explication of Berlin’s account of positive liberty in George 
Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism, (Cambridge: Polity, 2004) pp.65-76.  Crowder, though, 
fails to recognise the full dissonance between the original lecture/essay and the ‘Introduction’ on the 
matter of ‘positive liberty’.  [Crowder writes that 
Berlin defines positive liberty as having control over one’s life (self-mastery or authentic self-
direction), but some commentators allege that he sometimes confuses that idea with quite 
different concepts [… one of which being] freedom as political participation. […] Berlin does 
not confuse them. […] 
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Gerald MacCallum suggests that when freedom is in question, the debate is always 
about a triadic relation:  ‘x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) 
z’.15  He denies there is a meaningful distinction between negative and positive 
freedoms.  What disagreements there are occur in respect of what constitutes an agent 
(i.e. x) and what constitutes an obstacle/barrier to freedom (i.e. y).  He writes:  ‘When 
reference to one of these three [i.e. x, y or z] is missing in such a discussion of 
freedom, it should be only because reference is thought to be understood from the 
context of the discussion.’16  MacCallum’s position seems right.  How can freedom 
from be separated from freedom to?  They are both parts of a relation where the 
existence of the other is implicit and unavoidable.  If the distinction between freedom 
from and freedom to is the only basis of the distinction between positive and negative 
liberties then the distinction has evaporated.
17 
 
Berlin responds to MacCallum’s criticism in the ‘Introduction’: 
                                                                                                                         
As for the alleged confusion of positive liberty with political participation, Berlin never 
equates these ideas [ibid. p.67]. 
But that is just what Berlin does in the ‘Introduction’.]    
15
 Gerald MacCallum, ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, in David Miller (ed.), Liberty (Oxford: OUP, 
1991) pp.100-122 at p.102. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Miller queries whether MacCallum’s formula is not specifically tailored to a liberal conception of 
freedom as opposed to idealist and republican conceptions.  He also wonders whether, even if all 
conceptions of freedom can be expressed in MacCallum’s triadic terms, whether that establishes that 
there is only a single valid conception of liberty [op. cit. p.18].  He goes on, 
The three traditions [liberal, idealist and republican] appear to embody very different basic 
assumptions about human beings and what gives meaning to their lives:  is it not more 
illuminating to say that, because of this, we have three contrasting ways of understanding 
liberty?  [Ibid.] 
Probably not.  No doubt liberals, those concerned about the inner fulfilment of human beings and 
republicans have three contrasting ways of understanding the human condition and three different 
beliefs about what is of value.  However, short of giving up all attempts to analyse and criticise these 
theories, it is necessary to use common analytical tools to allow for some engagement with these ideas.  
Using MacCallum’s triadic relation, we should hope to be able to analyse the use of the idea of 
freedom in each of these approaches to adjudge whether the use is meaningful and coherent.  We may 
adjudge that one or other approach misuses the language of liberty. 
 73 
[The insistence that liberty is always a triadic relation] seems to me an error.  
A man struggling against his chains or a people against enslavement need not 
consciously aim at a definite further state.  A man need not know how he will 
use his freedom:  he just wants to remove the yoke.  So do classes and 
nations.
18
 
 
But that riposte is unpersuasive.  In essence, Berlin argues that the enslaved man may 
only be concerned about being ‘free from’ and have no conscious desire to be ‘free 
to’.  In this situation, freedom is to be regarded as a dyadic concept, as Gray puts it.19  
In truth, though, Berlin’s response simply illustrates the point MacCallum himself 
makes, which is set out above:  when one aspect of the triadic relationship is missing, 
it is because it is implicit.  To be conscious of oppression, to perceive that one is 
oppressed and to want to be free of it, is surely to be aware of both a desire to be ‘free 
from’ and a desire to be ‘free to’.  Indeed, if there is no realisation of opportunities 
denied by the oppression, can there really be any recognition of oppression?  Further, 
in his response, it appears that Berlin misrepresents ‘freedom to’.  To have ‘freedom 
to’ does not mean that an agent has certain knowledge of what he or she will do.  To 
have ‘freedom to’ do some activity means only that an activity is a possibility.  When 
I wake up on Saturday morning, I may have no settled intention about how I intend to 
spend the day but that does not mean that I am not free to walk the dog, or clean the 
car, or watch sport on TV, or paint the bathroom or read philosophy.  I am free to 
undertake these activities.  In the terms of MacCallum’s algebra, if the x cannot 
specify any activity z that could be undertaken after y is lifted or removed, then y 
cannot be a constraint.
20
 
 
                                           
18
 Four Essays p.xliii. 
19
 John Gray, Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1989) p.49. 
20
 Crowder appears to be somewhat ill at ease with MacCallum’s position but accepts that Berlin’s 
attempted rebuttal ‘may not be Berlin’s best response’ [op. cit. p.77] and goes on to rehearse the 
possibility that Berlin’s two conceptions of liberty can each be presented in MacCallum’s triadic terms 
[ibid. p.78]. 
 74 
Gray also argues that MacCallum’s triadic relation is not true of all proper usages of 
freedom and as a result Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative liberties 
cannot be dismissed.  Gray submits that freedom as a social status (e.g. the status of 
the Greek citizen as distinct from that of the Greek slave) does not fit into 
MacCallum’s relationship.  However, Gray immediately goes on to comment that ‘a 
free man was entitled to take part in the political life of his city and to affect the 
workings of its legislative institutions’.21  That seems to be the freedom to part of 
MacCallum’s relation and the freedom from element is implicit:  the freedom from the 
limitations that would have been imposed by the state if the citizen had, instead, been 
a woman or a slave.  No doubt, the freedoms of a modern citizen of the West are quite 
different from those a Greek citizen – e.g. freedom from civic requirements that a 
Greek would have perceived as implicit in his status as a citizen – but it does not 
follow that MacCallum’s approach is not applicable to both.  It has been shown, then, 
that the distinction between positive and negative liberty which Berlin proposes in his 
‘Introduction’ as two incommensurable values is invalid.  There are not two separate 
forms or concepts of freedom. 
 
Is that then the end of the matter?  While there may be only one form or concept of 
freedom, is it really not possible to identify different freedoms that are sufficiently 
distinct (albeit not because one is positive and the other is negative) such that they 
represent different values that may clash – liberalism offering one type of freedom 
and democracy another?  Gray writes: 
Berlin’s claim is not that the questions, “Who is master?” and “Over what area 
am I master?” are always entirely distinct in their significance, but that they 
are generally distinguishable, and that much of the importance in social and 
political thought hangs on the difference between them.  His claim is that the 
                                           
21
 Ibid. p.50. 
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answers to these questions capture opposed conceptions of freedom, each of 
which constitutes a coherent and legitimate application of the generic concept 
of freedom which is their common source.
22
 
 
There is probably little merit in attempting to distinguish ‘concept’ from ‘conception’ 
and I am not convinced that Gray achieves much by arguing that Berlin’s claim was 
that there were two ‘conceptions’ of freedom rather than two ‘concepts’.23  Is not the 
title of Berlin’s essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’?  But perhaps Gray is right to 
suggest that freedoms can be significantly different.  The critical question for our 
purposes would be whether there are two freedoms that are sufficiently distinct so that 
they represent distinct values which are incommensurable and which may render two 
options that are valuable because they offer/protect/foster different freedoms 
incomparable.  While Gray does not concede that both positive freedom and negative 
freedom must be describable in terms of McCallum’s triadic relation, Gray does 
concede that positive and negative freedoms are versions of a single generic concept.  
But does that mean that the freedom offered by liberalism and the freedom offered by 
democracy are much the same and necessarily commensurable?  Even though the 
argument Berlin advanced fails in its particulars, it may be that what might be called 
Berlin’s broader account succeeds.  Perhaps, liberalism and democracy do encapsulate 
freedoms that are sufficiently distinct that they give rise to incomparable imperatives 
in a pluralist moral universe.  It may be that those freedoms are two forms of a single 
generic concept and yet sufficiently distinct that they are incommensurable.  
Alternatively, it may be that there is one value (freedom) at the heart of liberalism and 
quite another value (i.e. other than freedom) at the heart of democracy and that those 
values are incommensurable.  Perhaps, democracy has little or nothing to do with 
freedom.  Perhaps its value is to be found elsewhere.  In that event, it may be that the 
                                           
22
 Ibid. p.51. 
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value at the heart of democracy is quite different to the value at the heart of liberalism 
and that the distinction is such that value pluralism (if that theory is accepted) renders 
those values incommensurable. 
 
In pursuing the idea of democracy as a political theory, I need to identify what makes 
democracy valuable and what, accordingly, makes democratic outcomes valuable.  
Then, consideration can be given to the question whether the values of democratic 
outcomes and of liberal imperatives are incommensurable.  If they are that might 
render democracy as a political theory more credible because of the possibility of a 
Berlinian reconciliation of liberalism to democracy.  Before beginning that 
investigation, I make some observations about value pluralism. 
 
Value Pluralism 
I do not intend to offer a sustained critical account of Berlin’s conception of value 
(moral) pluralism here.  An investigation of the validity of value pluralism is well 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  I will assume for my immediate purpose, though, 
that, in broad terms, morality and value is plural not monist – and that such plural 
values will mean that real-life political options may be morally incomparable.
24
  
However, while I do not embark on a thorough investigation of value-pluralism, some 
exploration of the idea is appropriate.  If democratic outcomes bear value because 
they are democratic, the nature of that value and, more particularly, the distinction 
between that value and the value of liberalism will be important.  How different do 
those values have to be before they are incommensurable? 
                                                                                                                         
23
 See ibid. p.48. 
24
 As already noted, Galston and Taylor deny that there is absolute incomparability just that there is 
incomparability by reference to a higher value.  Chang argues that value pluralism does not entail 
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Some writers within what may be called the pluralist camp present their account of 
value pluralism as a prelude to a recognition that there are a variety of good ways-of-
living.  There is, they argue, any number of possible good lives that could be lived by 
an individual.  Each of those lives realises different goods and exhibits particular 
values and virtues.  To choose to live one life rather than another is to eschew certain 
goods, values and virtues and, in so doing, there is loss.  The specifically pluralist 
claim is that it is not necessarily the case that those lives are objectively, morally, 
comparable.  Those different lives cannot be ordered in terms of the better life-lived 
or the worse life-lived.  This is because the values and virtues exhibited in these 
possible lives are not themselves comparable.  These values and virtues are 
incommensurable.  In short, then, in this account of pluralism values and virtues are 
plural and incommensurable but, critically, then, so are lives-lived.  The accounts of 
John Kekes and Raz are set out in these terms.
25
  Other pluralist writers focus on the 
pluralism of goods, values and virtues and the impact this has on moral decision-
making for individuals and societies.  Here, pluralism is simply a name to describe the 
account that goods, values and virtues as incommensurable.  It is not a reference to 
the plurality of lives-lived.  William Galston and Gray use the term ‘pluralism’ in this 
sense.
26
  For Galston and Gray, the significance of value pluralism is in the clash of 
values happening ubiquitously in human happenings and affairs rather than merely in 
                                                                                                                         
incomparability. We readily adjudge, she claims, that a large measure of value A is better than a 
nominal amount of value B even though there is no common measure of valuation.  [Op. cit. p.16.] 
25
 See John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993) and Raz 
op. cit.  Raz gives a detailed and nuanced account of value pluralism in these terms which I find helpful 
[ibid. pp.395-397].  
Raz’s ambition in The Morality of Freedom is to provide an ethical justification for liberalism.  His 
focus is on the individual and on individual freedoms.  Value pluralism – for Raz, the assertion that 
well-lived lives are diverse and incomparable – is part of his case for liberalism.  As I point out above, 
in a much less detailed and less analytical fashion, Berlin deploys value pluralism in similar fashion in 
‘Two Concepts’. 
26
 Galston, Liberal Pluralism and Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake pp.64-86. 
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the lives of individuals.  The impact of value pluralism is not merely indirect as a 
result of a changed understanding of the diversity of well-lived lives.  In his paper 
‘Agonistic Liberalism’,27 Gray argues that the truth of value pluralism has an impact 
on politics and political philosophy at many levels: 
1. The value of entire political systems may not be comparable:  Gray considers, 
on the one hand, a weak liberal state which offers its citizens basic liberties 
(freedom of speech, association etc.) but is unable to control violent 
criminality which seriously prejudices the safety and well-being of citizens 
and, on the other, an illiberal state which offers stability and security to its 
citizens.
28
  If value pluralism is an accurate assessment of the moral universe, 
it cannot be demonstrated conclusively that one is better than the other. 
2. Values of quite different types may clash:  justice may clash with mercy; 
freedom with equality.
29
 
3. Values of an apparently similar type may clash.  For example, specific and 
particular freedoms clash incommensurably.  He writes, 
The liberties specified by traditional liberal theory cannot – except by 
sleight of hand – be rendered harmonious, compatible or mutually 
compossible.  Liberties – including the negative liberties which Berlin 
believes to be central to liberalism – are not elements in a structure of 
compossible rights; they are often competing and conflictual in their 
implications for practice
30
 
 
Presumably, an example of this clash of freedoms would exist where the freedom of a 
religious businessman to only employ co-religionists (i.e. freedom of religion and 
association) conflicts with the freedom of an individual to apply for any employment 
and not to suffer discrimination in the jobs’ market.  Thus, value pluralism may 
                                           
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. pp.81-82. 
29
 Ibid. p.81. 
30
 Ibid. p.72. 
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undermine some accounts of the liberal state:  liberal institutions cannot be designed 
which can properly and consistently regulate and balance liberal freedoms.
31
 
 
Gray’s account, which demonstrates the breadth and depth of the clash of values, 
provides the basis for analysis of the nature of the clashes of values and the basis for 
an investigation of the types of values that clash.
32
  Gray’s various examples appear 
quite disparate.  It is necessary to consider the nature of these clashes in more detail. 
 
Some clashes are conceptual in nature:  two values may be necessarily clashing given 
the very nature of those values.  The clash between justice and mercy is the obvious 
example.  If a commitment to justice means that there is an imperative to insist upon 
and enforce conduct which is fair and equitable but mercy is to graciously excuse the 
demands of justice, then the clash is constitutive of the clashing values.  The clash is 
one of competing imperatives applying to an individual or group:  should x be treated 
justly or mercifully?  There would seem to be a continuum of clashes.  At one end of 
the continuum are such wholly conceptual clashes; at the other end are clashes which 
are wholly contextual.  A wholly contextual clash exists between an option A and 
option B where it is impossible to do or allow both and the choosing involves no 
value judgments – there is nothing conceptual about the choice.  An extreme example 
of such a choice would be a ‘Sophie’s Choice’:  a mother faced with a tragic dilemma 
– she can only save one of her children.  The clash between saving one or the other is 
entirely a clash of context and capacity – assuming the mother places no greater value 
                                           
31
 Ibid. p.72. 
32
 Berlin’s account of value pluralism is not always clear because a tendency to conflate these various 
expressions of value pluralism in a fashion which confuses rather than enlightens. 
See ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’ in Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London: Pimlico, 
2003) pp.1-19. 
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on one child or the other.  Such a clash is clearly not a clash occasioned by value 
pluralism. 
 
The other clashes referred to by Gray (numbered 1 and 3 above) seem to have both a 
contextual element and a conceptual element.  Close to the clash of mercy and 
freedom near the far end of the continuum would be the clash of freedom and 
equality.  This clash is not, perhaps, a necessary one arising from the definition of the 
two values but given the nature of almost all societies in the early 21
st
 century such a 
clash is almost inevitable.  The example of the clash between the freedom of an 
employer and the freedom of an individual looking for work is somewhat more 
contextual.  The clash of interests is contingent upon such situations arising.  In a 
society whose members shared the same religion, the clash would not arise.  In a 
society in which members of different religions never chose to work for someone who 
did not share their religion, the clash would not arise.  
 
Thus, there are some clashes which are constitutive of the values in play.  Other 
clashes are not genuine conflicts of value; it is simply the case that the choices 
involve the same value evenly weighted; the choices bear similar values to a similar 
extent (or to a similarly unclear extent).
33
  Between these two poles are clashes which 
may be clashes of value which arise from the contingencies of circumstance.  Can we 
say anything about when such clashes will be incomparable and when rational 
resolution is possible?  When are two values really sub-values of a higher value and 
thus comparable and when are two values wholly distinct?  Consider the above 
example of the freedom of religion/association vs. freedom not to be discriminated 
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 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: CUP, 1979) p.128. 
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against:  to what extent is there a conceptual clash?  Can we not reach a judgement by 
appealing to generic freedom?  Can we compare the amount of freedom (or the depth 
of freedom) if the businessman’s freedom is upheld with the amount (or depth) of 
freedom that is lost if the freedom of prospective employees is not protected?  Gray 
clearly thinks that many negative liberties are distinct and potentially irreconcilable.  
He writes: 
Incommensurability may break out among goods that are combinable; when it 
does, it means that there is no best combination of them.  Or it may break out 
among good that are constitutively uncombinable, goods that in their very 
natures cannot be jointly realized;
34
 
 
Further investigation is appropriate.  However, I do not propose to explore this in 
more detail here.  Such an investigation would be necessary if democracy is valuable 
because of the freedom it offers.  Then, the clash between liberalism and democracy 
would be a clash of freedoms.  If, though, democracy is valuable because it offers a 
value other than freedom, such distinct values are much more likely to be 
incommensurable assuming that the value pluralist thesis is accepted. 
 
Gray would have us accept that there is something in the negative liberty/positive 
liberty dichotomy even if it is not as clear cut as Berlin had intimated in his 
‘Introduction’.  However, as a robust analytical distinction, the positive/negative 
liberty distinction fails.  Nevertheless, it may be that democracy offers a value other 
than freedom or that any freedom offered by democracy is of a sufficiently different 
ilk from the freedoms offered by liberalism so that democratic imperatives or choices 
                                           
34
 Enlightenment’s Wake p.70.  He continues ‘[t]he deepest form of incommensurability occurs among 
goods that are constitutively uncombinable.’  That is a slightly disconcerting observation.  Can there 
really be depth to incommensurability.  Are not values and choices either incommensurable or not?  
How shallow can incommensurability be before the values in question cease to be incommensurable? 
After introducing his own five-limb taxonomy of values, Nagel makes a similarly troubling comment:  
‘Conflicts can arise within as well as between [these five fundamental types of value], but the latter are 
especially difficult [my emphasis]’ [op.cit. p.129]. 
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do clash incomparably with liberal imperatives or choices.  Counter-intuitively that 
may mean that liberals can be more readily reconciled to a democratic political 
theory.  It is necessary, therefore, to explore what is the nature of the freedom that 
democracy seems to offer and whether it really does offer that freedom.  And, of 
course, we need to be clear whether democracy works as a coherent political theory, 
with or without that happy reconciliation with liberalism. 
 
Democracy seems to offer individuals the freedom to take part in the decision-making 
for a society.  This will be an appropriate place to start an investigation into the value 
of democratic decisions.  Before embarking on that investigation in the next chapter, I 
need to complete my observations about freedom. 
 
Categorising Freedom 
I intend, here, to categorise freedoms in a fashion that will undergird further 
investigation.  In so doing, I suggest that the apparent freedoms offered by democracy 
fall within a different category to those offered by liberalism – and, in passing, I note 
that that the nature of the distinction between categories may explain why the (false) 
positive/negative liberty demarcation had seemed appropriate.  Having identified the 
nature of the freedom democracy seems to offer, in the next chapter, I go on to 
investigate whether the apparent freedom offered by democracy is real. 
 
Consider everything that a person might reasonably want to do or be or see happen in 
their life.  The whole diversity of potential doings/beings/happenings (referred to as 
activities or endeavours from now on – and which will include doing nothing or the 
avoidance of happenings) might properly be broken down into three categories: 
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1. There are certain activities that someone may wish to do/be/see happen and 
which that person is individually able to realise and, further, that person’s 
community/society views them as having little bearing on other people or the 
community as a whole. 
2. There will be other activities which someone may wish to do/be/see happen 
and is able to realise individually but which that person’s community/society 
views as significantly impinging upon other people or the community as a 
whole. 
3. Finally, there will be some activities which someone might wish to do/be/see 
happen which simply cannot be achieved by individual effort; those activities 
can only be realised with the co-operation of or, indeed, the practical 
assistance of others. 
I call these type 1, type 2 and type 3 activities respectively.  With type 1 activities, a 
person might hope, and perhaps expect, to be left alone to do as he or she will.  As for 
type 2 activities, that person might hope to carry on those activities but must 
recognise that the impact upon others might lead to argument and conflict.  As for 
type 3 activities, these can only be undertaken collectively.  Some sort of regulation of 
type 2 activities is likely to be proposed and may be widely considered to be 
advisable.  Type 3 activities require, by definition, some sort of collective 
arrangement (formal or informal) if the desired activity is to be realised.  In the case 
of type 2 activities, what the individual might want is to be in charge of, or have a say 
in, regulation so that that individual has control, or a measure of control, over what is 
done.  In this way, he or she can hope to arrange matters so that he or she is allowed 
to do what he or she wants to do.  (What the person wants need not be selfish or 
simply self-satisfying.  The person may hold some idea of fairness and may intend to 
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apply that idea when making decisions as to who should and who should not be 
allowed to do certain things.)  For type 3 activities, the most an individual can ask for 
is to be able to control, or have a say in, the collective arrangements so that what is 
done is what that individual wants done. 
 
All of this can be described in the language of liberty and freedom.  In terms of 
MacCallum’s algebra, control of type 2 or type 3 activities can be described as, 
x is free from y to determine who does z.  (X could be either an individual or a 
group of which the individual is a part.) 
The algebra is the same as for basic freedoms.  The only difference is that the 
prescribed activity – the making of a determination – may be a means to another more 
primary end.  A certain activity is desired.  It cannot simply be done.  A decision or 
determination has to be made to allow it to be done.  Freedom to make such a 
determination might be described as a ‘second-tier liberty’. 
 
It seems to be a feature of human nature that freedom to make decisions and 
determinations about what is to be done is often desired for its own sake.  
Determinations have to be made and being the person who makes the determinations 
is coveted for its own sake.  It is best then to define a second-tier liberty not as a 
liberty to make a determination which is instrumental to allowing some desired 
primary activity.  Rather, a second-tier liberty is simply a liberty to control other 
actions.  The second-tier liberty may be desired primarily on account of what it 
allows.  The second-tier liberty may be desired on its own account. 
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What this taxonomy of freedom suggests is that we can better understand freedom to 
undertake activities by recognising two different axes of freedom/activity.  Along one 
axis we can lay out activities according to the degree of  collectivity involved [type-1 
to type-3];  along the other axis we can lay out freedoms according to whether they 
are freedoms to undertake primary activities or higher-tier freedoms – freedoms to 
determine what primary activities may or may not be undertaken.
35
 
 
Returning, for a moment, to Berlin’s two questions – ‘What is the area within which 
the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is 
able to do or be, without interference by other persons?’, and ‘What, or who, is the 
source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather 
than that?’36 – we see that Berlin’s first question is really about the line to be drawn 
between type-1 and type-2 activities and his second question is asking who has 
second-tier freedoms (and whether I have).  Perhaps, the essence of the distinction 
Berlin wanted to draw is to be found in the distinction between the type of activity and 
the tier of the freedom necessary to realise those activities.  In posing his famous 
questions, Berlin is exploring the domain of activities over which personal freedom 
should be allowed and exploring who should have second-tier liberty to control what 
activities are undertaken.  These are two quite different questions.  The answer to one 
does not entail a particular answer to the other (although an answer to the second may 
often assume a particular answer to the first).  There lies the possibility of conflict 
between the answer to one question and the answer to the other.  (Of course, that 
conflict may not be a conflict of values.  Someone may have the second-tier freedom 
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 We could, if we so wished, categorise the freedom to determine who makes lesser determinations 
about what should be done as a third-tier freedom and so on. 
36
 Four Essays pp.121-122. 
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to decide what is done but may have no moral justification for exercising that 
freedom.)  Berlin’s error is to imagine that he had identified two distinct concepts of 
liberty.  What Berlin thinks of as positive liberty is really the liberty to make second-
tier determinations.  Such liberties are not liberties of a different ilk – like all liberties 
they have a freedom from and freedom to component.  It is simply the case that it is 
often more natural to consider the freedom to aspect of second-tier liberties and the 
freedom from aspect of the freedom to carry on type 1 and type 2 activities.  The 
confusions that have arisen out of Berlin’s essay are due to the fact that Berlin 
presented what is merely an emphasis when considering second-tier liberties as if it 
were an exclusive feature of second-tier liberties.  We can now describe the tension 
between liberal freedoms and democracy in terms of the taxonomy I have suggested, 
avoiding the confusing association of liberalism with negative freedom and 
democracy with positive freedom. 
 
The liberal freedoms of any particular account of liberalism operate over a domain of 
activities in respect of which that particular account of liberalism asserts that the 
individual should not be interfered with – essentially the domain of type-1 liberties, as 
demarcated by that account.  Democracy, which apparently offers second-tier liberties 
to determine who does what, most obviously relates to the domain of type-2 and -3 
matters (i.e. supra-individual matters).
37
  So why does any tension arise?  It arises 
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 Perhaps, more strictly, we should describe democracy as a higher-tier freedom.  Assuming that the 
freedom that the electorate is ostensibly exercising is the freedom to elect a government [technically in 
a parliamentary system, the electorate chooses representatives who in turn elect a government], it is the 
government then that determines what is done.  And, in reality, that power is devolved to bureaucrats, 
local government and various quangos.  Perhaps the electorate in representative democracies has a 
fourth- or fifth-tier freedom! 
And democracy is by no means the only conceivable higher-tier liberty in complex western societies.  
At best, democracy, as the right to take part in representative elections, is only one of a number of 
higher-tier liberties available to individuals.  Some control over type 2 and type 3 determinations may 
be provided by the use of lobbying, the media and advertising, for instance.  And higher-tier freedoms 
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because the demarcation between the two domains is unclear and shifting.  Various 
liberal theories may propose lines of demarcation but democracy will have none of it 
– or it might be better to say that democracy necessarily cannot offer any permanent 
demarcation.  If liberalism and democracy prescribe imperatives that conflict – the 
democratic outcome compromises a liberal freedom (i.e. a democratic imperative 
involves regulation of what a liberal account views as a type-1 activity) – and if those 
imperatives bear incommensurable values, then that conflict is fundamental and 
irresolvable.
38
  If however, the values are not incommensurable, then  through a 
comparison between the value in the liberal imperative and the value in the 
democratic imperative, it would be theoretically possible to decide which imperative 
has greater moral force (or at least recognise that the imperatives are of equal force
39
.) 
 
It remains to be seen whether democracy offers real substantive second-tier liberties 
as opposed to the mere appearance of liberties.  That is what I turn to now. 
                                                                                                                         
exist throughout out private life and wider civic society – albeit that some of that control is with the 
consent of the controlled:  parents over children; employers over employees. 
38
 See note 2 above for discussion on irresolvability. 
39
 Two imperatives (or courses of action) having equal force or merit is, of course, something quite 
different to those imperatives being incomparable due to some incommensurability of value.  In the 
first case, comparison is quite possible; it is simply that, on comparison, neither imperative is found to 
be any more compelling than the other.  
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Chapter 3 
Democracy as an Individual Freedom:  Procedural Justifications for Electoral Democracy 
In this chapter, I consider whether democracy offers freedom (i.e. a value) to individuals.  
If it does offer such a freedom, I would then need to go on to consider whether that 
freedom might be sufficiently distinct from liberal freedoms so that it is 
incommensurable with those freedoms and, thus, whether democracy can operate as a 
political theory which Berlinian liberals could endorse.  In asking whether democracy 
offers individuals any freedom, I will, in effect, be considering the question whether there 
is a procedural (or intrinsic) argument for democracy.  In a later chapter, I will consider 
outcome-based (or instrumental) justifications for democracy:  democracy is the best 
form of government because it is instrumental in creating or protecting other goods and 
better at creating or protecting those goods than any other system of government – it is 
better at bringing about good outcomes than other forms of government.  If that is the 
case, then justifications for democracy must hinge upon demonstrations of and arguments 
for the instrumental effectiveness of democracy as compared with alternative systems of 
government.  If, though, the justification for democracy is procedural, then what is being 
suggested is that democracy is valuable because it constitutes the right procedure for 
reaching decisions (referendums/plebiscites) and for electing leaders and politicians, 
regardless of the quality of those decisions and the quality of the elected leaders and 
politicians.
1
  Arguments for the procedural value of democracy emphasise fairness and 
                                           
1
 It is disputed whether procedural value can ever be adjudged apart from an assessment of substantive 
benefits.  In his ‘Reply to Habermas,’ [John  Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’, Journal of Philosophy Vol. 92 
No.3 (March 1995) pp.132-180 esp. at pp.170-180], Rawls writes ‘… the justice of a procedure always 
depends … on the justice of its likely outcome, or on substantive justice’ [ibid. p.170].  He is drawing upon 
comments on procedural fairness in A Theory of Justice [pp.85-87].  There, he makes it clear that when 
considering the justice of any procedure, the substantive outcome of that procedure must always be in 
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equality – often it is said that democracy gives everyone one vote of equal weight – and 
thus, these arguments are likely to be based upon what democracy offers to each 
individual.  Implicit in the idea of fairness or equality is that some benefit is apportioned 
or distributed fairly or equally.  For democracy, that benefit will be the freedom to have a 
say in decision-making and in ‘who runs the country’.  Moreover, procedural arguments 
that have democracy qua democracy offering something to the voters (i.e. power, status, 
satisfaction, recognition or respect) must implicitly assert that what is thereby offered to 
them must be more than negligible.
2
  Thus, to consider the weight of any procedural 
argument, it is necessary to have a correct understanding of what is happening when 
people vote.  The key question is:  do voters gain anything significant (i.e. any freedom 
to) from the opportunity to vote itself, from being able to vote? 
 
Often commentators do not ask whether democracy is procedurally fair; they ask slightly 
different questions:  for example, ‘Why should anyone vote?’ and, ‘Are people under any 
moral imperative to vote?’3  These questions are somewhat broader but much of the 
                                                                                                                             
mind.  Indeed, ‘perfect procedural justice’ is present just when a procedure produces the substantively fair 
outcome.  And while ‘pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right 
result’, he does not mean that results are not relevant.  Rather, it is clear that he envisages circumstances 
where no particular result will be unequivocally right but there are a range of results which are acceptable.  
Pure procedural justice will not produce a single correct result but it will only be just if the result falls 
within that acceptable range – in line with acceptable principles. 
{Brain Barry defines procedural fairness as existing just when a procedure is fairly operated i.e. just when 
‘the formalities which define the procedure have been correctly adhered to’ [Brian Barry, Political 
Argument (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990) p.97] but that usage has nothing to say about 
the merits of the procedure at all and that is not the usage that ‘proceduralists’ have in mind.} 
2
 Procedural arguments in favour of democracy almost invariably proceed by arguing that democracy 
bestows some sort of benefit on voters which is distributed equitably.  However, a procedural argument for 
democracy could conceivably be based on burden rather than benefit.  I address this question below (at 
p.108). 
3
 The first and second questions are distinct:  even if voters do derive some benefit from voting, they may 
conceivably be under no obligation to exercise their vote and derive that benefit.  If a benefit is derived 
from voting, then that provides a reason to vote, but not necessarily a moral reason to vote (the benefit may 
be entirely the voter’s and have no other-regarding aspect and, thus, on some accounts of what is moral, 
90 
 
discussion of why people should vote and whether there is a moral imperative to vote 
revolves around the question of whether voters gain any influence from being able to 
vote, i.e. are given any freedom to influence outcomes – and that, of course, is the 
concern of this thesis.
4
  The first question – why should anyone vote? – probably covers 
the same ground as the question I am considering.  (It may, additionally, address further 
matters/reasons.  For instance, there could be Kantian imperatives to vote.)  One obvious 
reason for voting would be that the voter derives a substantial benefit from the act of 
voting.  Of course, that benefit may, nevertheless, be quite small and so the reason for 
voting may not be a powerful one.  If the benefit is miniscule then there would probably 
be no good reason to vote.  Consider these recent comments by Alexander Guerrero: 
it would be an absurd account that placed voting as one of the more important 
things that one can do, from a perspective of rational choice.  Many people do not 
vote for relatively inconsequential reasons – because they can’t get the day off 
work, because of bad weather, et cetera – and it would be a strange account that 
found those people to be making a serious mistake.
5
 
 
                                                                                                                             
have no moral significance) and, even if there is a moral reason to vote, that may on certain accounts fall 
short of amounting to a moral imperative to vote.  I will not rehearse the meta-ethical issues at stake. 
4
 Both questions might, at least at first sight, appear to be relevant to outcome-based theories as well as 
proceduralist/intrinsic accounts of democracy.  After all, moral imperatives are commonly considered to 
arise because of the effect of some potential action/inaction upon other people.  And outcome-based 
theories are about such effects:  democracy produces good effects.  However, further thought suggests that 
the question of whether there is any moral imperative to vote should not be directly relevant to outcome-
based theories.  Democracy either produces good outcomes or it does not.  It is conceivable that a 
sufficiently high voter turnout is needed to produce (generally/on average?) the good outcomes envisaged.  
But if democracy is justified simply because it produces good outcomes, then, surely, those high turnouts 
would be an inherent part of democracy.  Otherwise, it would not be democracy itself which is justified but 
democracy just where there is a turnout above some threshold (i.e. just when there is a sufficiently 
motivated population or where voting is compulsory).  Such a position would be troublesome:  would a 
non-democratic state be preferable, under certain circumstances, i.e. produce better outcomes, than a 
democratic one plagued by low voter turnout?  And one imagines that there might be complicated feedback 
issues:  democratic outcomes may encourage or discourage democratic participation. 
5
 Alexander Guerrero, ‘The Paradox of Voting and the Ethics of Political Representation’, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs Vol.38 No.3 (Summer 2010) pp.272-306 at p.296. 
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And Alvin Goldman makes the telling comment that ‘After all, voting is somewhat costly 
…’6 when wondering how strong the reason to vote might be.  Given that he rates a ten-
minute drive to the polling station on a wet night as ‘somewhat costly’, a cost that could 
conceivably outweigh the reason to vote, it might be fair to hazard that Goldman does not 
believe the reason to vote is a strong one.  There could also be expressivist reasons for 
voting.  Voting offers voters the chance to demonstrate their feelings and beliefs.  It is not 
clear, though, whether such a benefit could be the basis of a viable political theory.  I 
have suggested that the best hope of such a theory is if democracy is seen to offer a 
freedom quite distinct from (in fact, incommensurable with) the freedoms offered by 
liberalism.  A key tenet of liberalism is the freedom of speech and expression.  It appears 
that a similar freedom is being offered under expressivist accounts of democracy.  If 
expression is the benefit that democracy offers, a comparison between liberalism and 
democracy is thus entirely possible.  (And one might expect the breadth of expression 
allowed by liberalism (i.e. in many forms across society) to outweigh the limited 
opportunity for expression afforded by elections.)  Voters may derive satisfaction from 
the mere fact of voting, thinking that they are achieving something or, because their vote 
is efficacious, imagining that they are fulfilling some civic duty, even if those perceptions 
are false and their vote is wholly impotent.  The satisfaction could be a reason to vote, 
although, if political theorists expose voters’ perceptions as false, the satisfaction would 
presumably be lost. 
 
 
                                           
6
 Alvin Goldman, ‘Why Citizens Should Vote: A Causal Responsibility Approach’, Social Philosophy & 
Policy Vol.16 No.2 (Summer 1999) pp.201-217 at p.214. 
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Does Voting Offer Citizens Any Freedom to Influence Democratic Outcomes? 
Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky submit that almost invariably individual voters 
have no influence over the outcome of elections.  According to them, ‘[a single voter] 
will in fact influence the outcome of the election only in the remote case in which there is 
an exact tie among all other voters:  In all other instances, the electoral outcome is 
entirely independent of her actions.’7  They apparently view this as self-evident.  The idea 
that a single voter has anything other than a minutely remote chance of influencing an 
electoral outcome is dismissed pretty summarily.  They continue, ‘A person does not, in 
fact, choose leaders; … the belief that a single voter is extremely unlikely to have an 
impact on the outcome of an election is true.  Perhaps to assert otherwise is a noble lie, 
but it is a lie just the same.’8  Derek Parfit seems to make a similar point in his Reasons 
and Persons, 
                                           
7
 Geoffrey Brennan & Loren Lomasky, Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1993) p.19.  They suggest that an individual vote only matters when without that vote 
the election would be tied [ibid. pp.19-20].  Surely, though a single vote would have significance in the 
event that the votes cast without it would be tied and might have significance in the event that the number 
of votes for the preferred choice of the single voter without his or her vote is one less than the votes of the 
opponent (or leading opponent).  Whether the single vote would have significance in the event of the tally 
of votes for the preferred candidate being one short without that individual’s vote would depend on the 
mechanism for resolving a tie.  It would be significant in UK elections, where resolution is by toss of a 
coin.  The single vote would turn certain defeat into a 50% chance of victory.  If a tie was resolved by the 
return of the incumbent, one vote for a non-incumbent would not have been significant. 
8
 Ibid.  p.179. 
The fact that Brennan and Lomasky are so robust in their assertion probably reflects the fact that the idea 
had become something of a commonplace, particularly in that branch of political science committed to 
social choice theory flowing from or allied to Riker (see my chapter 2).  Someone as learned as Nozick 
baldly writes ‘We vote, although we are cognizant of the miniscule probability that our own actual vote 
will have some decisive effect on the outcome, …’ [The Examined Life p.286]. 
Paul Meehl pursues the logic of this position and argues that a vote for a candidate of a minor, fringe, party 
who has no conceivable chance of winning an election (he offers the example of the Flat-Earth Vegetarian 
Party) is no more wasted than a vote for a candidate that might realistically win.  [Paul Meehl, ‘The Selfish 
Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument’, American Political Science Review Vol.71 No.1 
(March 1977) pp.11-30.] 
A little further on, Brennan and Lomasky continue, 
There is, though, one qualification to be entered.  Individuals may en masse refrain from voting as 
a means of expressing lack of support for the current incarnation of a traditionally favoured party. 
…  If she is one among many such, the electoral outcome will respond – but the response is not 
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Consider a Presidential Election in the United States.  If I vote, there may be a 
very small chance that my vote may make a difference.  On one estimate, if I am 
voting in one of the large marginal states, which might go either way, the chance 
that I shall make a difference would be about one in a hundred million.
9
 
 
Taken alone, it might appear that Parfit is only commenting on the chances of having a 
decisive vote rather than making a wider point about influencing outcomes.  Indeed, in 
the same section he apparently criticises the view that ‘one cannot justify voting merely 
by appealing to the consequences of one’s act’10.  However, he only does so to make the 
point that in elections where the importance of the outcome can be very great, voters 
should be motivated to vote by the tiny chance that their vote will make the difference.
11
  
Thus, overall, Parfit is best understood as endorsing the Brennan and Lomasky position. 
 
I believe that Brennan and Lomasky (and Parfit if I understand him correctly) are 
mistaken – or at the least, they are asking the wrong question.  Below, I explain why no 
                                                                                                                             
arbitrary, and one presumably would not want to insist that such a non-voter should vote.  
Nonvoting is precisely the means by which her preference is given effect [op. cit. p.179]. 
This comment is not so much a qualification as a contradiction.  It is surely inconsistent with their overall 
thesis.  Here Brennan and Lomasky state that an electoral outcome (i.e. large-scale abstention) does 
respond to individual votes, if those votes are one of a number of similar votes.  If the individual voter, as 
one of a large group, can have influence as part of a mass abstention, why cannot that voter have influence 
when, as one of a large number, he or she votes for a winning candidate?  There is surely no difference.  I 
argue below that individual voters do have influence – as one amongst a large group of voters. 
9
 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP, 1986) pp.73-74. 
10
 Ibid. p.73. 
11
 Parfit’s assertion that a tiny chance should motivate may be questionable even on its own terms.  
According to Guerrero [op.cit. p272 n.1], recent mathematical work has suggested that the chance of 
having a decisive vote in a US Presidential election is actually 10
-90 (not Parfit’s 10-8).  Indeed, it is 
arguable that, in reality, an individual vote will never be determinative.  Where the outcome hinges upon 
the vote in a single state and that vote is close (as per Florida in the 2000 General Election), it may be 
unlikely that the election will be determined by a precise and accurate tallying of votes.  When the number 
of votes for each side is within a few thousand, there will almost certainly be disputes about possible fraud, 
negligence or technological error and about the proper legal interpretation of election rules.  Richard Pildes 
argues convincingly that such disputes are essentially unavoidable in the US without unlikely root-and-
branch reforms [Richard Pildes, ‘Disputing Elections’, in The Longest Night: Polemics and Perspectives on 
Election 2000 eds. Arthur Jacobson & Michel Rosenfeld (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002) 
pp.69-88.]  In such cases, the result will ultimately be determined by fiat of the Supreme Court or 
Congress.  In truth, there will no chance that a single vote could determine the outcome of a presidential 
election. 
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individual voter influences the outcome of elections by him- or herself and why, on the 
other hand, all voters who vote for the successful outcome or for the winning outcome in 
a referendum contribute to that outcome. 
 
In essence, the position endorsed by Brennan and Lomasky and Parfit is an expression of 
a simple counterfactual view of causation.  X causes y if y would not have occurred in the 
absence of x.
12
  If this claim is true, then there is very little chance that a vote by an 
individual could have caused the election of the successful candidate.  In any election 
where the winning margin is greater than one vote, that result would have occurred in 
spite of any one individual vote:  in the counterfactual situation in which that individual 
did not vote, the successful candidate would have been elected anyway. 
 
Perhaps the most immediately striking difficulty for the Brennan & Lomasky position is 
to explain how electoral outcomes are reached, i.e. what causes them.  It needs to be 
stressed that the Brennan and Lomasky position is not just that an individual has no 
causative impact on the result, as each vote has exactly the same status and weight, it 
must be that in every case no individual can cause the result.  If, save for the case where 
the result of an election is that the tallies for the two leading candidates are no more than 
one vote different, no individual votes have any impact, then just what factor or factors 
do influence or determine the outcome?  For Brennan and Lomasky it would appear that 
there are none but surely they are not suggesting that the election result forms out of the 
aether in some random or arbitrary fashion. 
                                           
12
 Goldman expresses this account of causation more rigorously at op.cit. p.204. 
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Further, perhaps, those who maintain that individual voters almost never have any 
influence over election results need to formulate a credible response to the actual 
behaviour of political parties:  if a single vote is almost invariably without influence, why 
do candidates and their canvassers set about trying to win elections by seeking to 
persuade one voter after another?  They clearly perceive that the votes of individual 
voters are significant.  Why this mismatch?
13
  Why is it that, on the one hand, come the 
tallying of votes cast, it is exceedingly unlikely that a single voter alone will have made 
any difference to the outcome, but on the other hand, prior to the ballot, the candidates try 
to persuade voters to vote for them as if each vote was important?  Admittedly, 
canvassing takes place prior to the ballot when the outcome is not known; but the effort 
of canvassers cannot be justified or explained by the existence of the slight possibility 
that a single vote will make the difference.  One response is that parties, candidates and 
canvassers are simply mistaken and that the view that individual voters influence 
elections, though false, is a strongly and pervasively held belief.  That response appears 
                                           
13
 Alan Carling points out that though this is often referred to as the paradox of voting - that there is no 
reason to vote but people do vote in large numbers – is a misnomer [see Alan Carling, ‘The Paradox of 
Voting and the Theory of Social Evolution’, in Preferences, Institutions and Rational Choice eds. Keith 
Dowding & Desmond King (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) pp.20-42 at pp.20-21].  He points out that the 
empirical reality, that lots of people vote, could amount to a refutation of the theory that voting offers only 
a tiny chance of influencing the outcome of an election; there is no paradox as such. 
Carling goes on to argue, using a rational choice model of behaviour, that there is no refutation because 
voter behaviour other than we see (i.e. low or non-existent turnout) is not predicted by the theory … and, 
further, he suggests that this is because the chances that an individual will influence the outcome are not 
fixed and may be properly viewed by a voter as substantial.  In short, this is because he may conclude that 
all other rational voters may reasonably believe that they have no significant influence and, for that reason 
will not vote, leaving him with a very influential vote.  Here, says Carling, lies the real paradox of voting:  
it is both rational not to vote because no vote can influence the election but also rational to vote because if 
everyone thinks rationally and decides not to vote, then it is rational for me to vote.  I do not wish to 
rehearse Carling’s argument in any more detail.  I merely comment that a moment’s consideration of the 
real-life beliefs of real voters should be enough to undermine Carling’s approach.  Contrary to the models 
of rational choice theory, people do not think similarly or according to rational-choice theorists’ conception 
of rationally.  Our experience tells us that there is no prospect whatsoever that there will suddenly be mass 
abstentionism (on the basis of rational self-interest) which might render a single vote (or a very small 
number of votes) decisive.  We will have to look elsewhere for an account that explains why voting offers 
influence (if it does). 
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inadequate.  Strongly politicised individuals (i.e. candidates and canvassers) probably 
realise that, in the case of every election in which they have ever been involved , the 
result would have been the same whether or not any particular individual had voted.
14
  
Further, political parties utilise all sorts of insights from the political and social sciences 
when running their campaigns.  If it was so demonstratively obvious that the votes of 
individual voters had no impact on the election, would they not have realised that and 
packed up their electioneering efforts and gone home to pray or cast spells? 
 
The assertion that no voter affects the outcome of an election decided by more than one 
vote is troubling but that is not the end of the matter.  Brennan and Lomasky are 
suggesting that if in my district or constituency I vote for the winning candidate and that 
candidate wins by a single vote, I can claim influence on the outcome.  (Indeed, their 
claim is that it is only in that circumstance I can claim to have any possible influence.)  
They neglect to point out that other people who voted for that candidate can claim the 
same thing.  There is nothing special about my vote.  The vote is a secret ballot and votes 
are counted en masse after voting is completed.
15
  To say that a single voter influences 
                                           
14
 A 2010 survey by YouGov asked respondents whether “If you vote in 2012, what are the chances that 
your vote will determine the winner of the Presidential election?”.  Over 40% of those who regularly vote, 
put their chances at less than 1 in a million.  The poll also showed that people who assessed their chances 
as lower were (at first sight, counter-intuitively) more likely to vote.  This tends to suggest that the most 
politicised will recognise that individuals have little chance of determining an electoral outcome by 
themselves.  See http://today.yougov.com/news/2010/11/08/does-your-vote-count [accessed 9 November 
2011].  The poll also showed, though, that the median respondent thought that she had a 1 in 1000 chance 
of determining the outcome.  This is, of course, grossly wide of the mark but would, of itself, indicate that 
the majority of voters have some understanding that electoral outcomes do not hinge upon their vote. 
On the other hand, when voters in the UK were asked to respond to the statement that “I don’t believe 
voting makes much of a difference” more than half strongly disagreed.  [Ipsos/MORI Poll, May 2001 – see 
http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=1236 [accessed 9 
November 2011].  That may indicate a grossly inflated view of individual impact on elections, although the 
‘question’ allows of many different opinions of what constitutes “making a difference”.  
15
 Admittedly, there is an ostensible difference for a roll-call vote but I am not convinced that it is a 
substantive one. 
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the outcome is a somewhat selective truth.  It would be better to say that every voter who 
voted for the winning candidate influences the outcome equally and to the same degree.  
It is only in this very limited sense that a single voter can claim that they made all the 
difference.
16
 
 
Goldman offers an account of causation which, he claims, shows why voters in 
overdetermined elections – that is, elections where there were more votes for the winning 
candidate than were necessary to elect him or her – can be thought to have influenced the 
outcome.  Richard Tuck also offers an account which he describes as ‘broadly along the 
same lines as Goldman’s’.17  What Goldman calls ‘overdetermined’, Tuck calls 
‘redundant causation’.  Goldman utilises J.L. Mackie’s work on causation.18  Mackie 
developed the notion of an ‘INUS condition’:  an insufficient but necessary part of a 
condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.
19
  An INUS condition 
exists when it is one vital part of the complete cause of an event but where that event 
could have transpired by means of a quite different complete cause.  Where an election is 
won by one vote, each vote is an INUS condition.  Each vote is a necessary part of the 
whole cause (the total number of votes) but the fact that the particular voters who voted 
for the winning candidate did so vote was not the only way the winning candidate could 
have been elected.  A different set of electors could have voted for the winner.  (In such 
                                           
16
 I know of a local election won by two votes.  From a long time afterwards, one of the election workers 
proudly recounted how she ‘knocked-up’ two voters a few minutes before the polls closed and dragged 
them down to vote.  The canvasser (and the two voters) can claim that, but for their efforts, the election 
might have gone the other way.  However, every other person who voted for the winning candidate in that 
election is entitled to claims the plaudits too. 
17
 Richard Tuck, Free Riding (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2008) p.51. 
18
 J.L. Mackie, ‘Causes and Conditions’, American Philosophical Quarterly Vol.2 No.4 (October 1965) 
pp.245-264. 
19
 Ibid. p.245. 
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an example, each INUS condition – i.e. each vote for the winning candidate – is also a 
counterfactual cause.) 
 
Goldman then suggests that in the case of a typical, overdetermined, election, we can 
show that each vote represents an INUS condition.  Consider a 100-vote electorate and a 
60-40 vote with no abstentions.  Each winning vote does not appear to be necessary.  
Only 51 votes were needed.  Any particular vote was not needed.  But consider a group 
of any 51 of those 60 votes which included the particular vote we have in mind.  Each 
vote within that 51 was an insufficient but necessary part of that group of 51 and those 51 
votes would have been an unnecessary but sufficient condition for the election of the 
preferred candidate.
20
  Admittedly, any particular voter would not be in every 
unnecessary but sufficient group of 51 but, according to Goldman, that does not matter.  
Each vote in favour of the winning candidate was an INUS condition – each vote can be 
thought to be causative. 
 
I find Goldman’s attempt unpersuasive.  He admits that in one crucial respect, he does 
not follow Mackie’s approach.  Mackie considers an example of an overall condition 
which was unnecessary but sufficient that was constituted by a concatenation of 
conditions.  He makes clear that ‘no other sufficient [overall] condition … was present on 
this occasion’.21  It appears that Mackie envisages that INUS conditions will only subsist 
where just one overall, sufficient, condition is present.  (Other overall, sufficient, 
conditions might have occurred but they did not.)  Of course, Goldman wishes to use 
                                           
20
 Tuck uses the term ‘efficacious set’ to describe a collection of acts just sufficient to achieve the desired 
result.  In this example, every possible group of 51 out of the 60 is an efficacious set.   
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Mackie’s approach in ‘overdetermined’ situations where there is more than one (probably 
many more than one) overall, sufficient, conditions present.  Goldman, though, does not 
offer any justification for this departure other than, in effect, to state that Mackie’s 
proviso has to be ignored if we want to take advantage of his scheme to describe 
overdetermined cases.  In effect, Goldman has done no more than say that in an 
overdetermined case, we can view it as if it was not overdetermined.  If it had not been 
overdetermined, each component (each vote in the case of democracy) would have been 
causative and, even though, it was overdetermined, we can go on thinking about as if it 
had not been.
22
  That will not do. 
 
Goldman and Tuck are right to argue that a simple counterfactual approach to causation 
cannot apply to the act of voting and that some different account is required.  However, 
their attempts to describe an alternative account of causation which would explain why 
the act of each individual is causative (where there is overdetermination or redundant 
causation) are unsuccessful.  Both Goldman and Tuck seek to explain why an individual 
vote has causative effect (by itself).  That, however, is not the correct approach.  My 
claim is that an individual vote can never have causative effect – save in the bizarre and 
wholly unlikely event that only one person bothers to vote.  In order to win an election, 
many votes have to be cast for the relevant candidate.  Voting is a collective endeavour.  
The individual involvement in collective endeavours (i.e. endeavours that can only 
succeed because of the combined efforts of many – in my nomenclature, type 3 activities) 
is of a quite different nature to that of the individual activity which can, by itself, achieve 
                                                                                                                             
21
 Goldman p.207; J.L. Mackie p.245. 
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a specified end (i.e. type 1 or type 2 activities).  I propose that the fundamental distinction 
to be drawn when considering causation and influence is between type 1/2 activities and 
type 3 activities.  That Goldman and Tuck fail to recognise this is apparent in their failure 
to distinguish between overdetermined events where each participant could achieve the 
desired result by themselves and overdetermined events where the efforts of a number of 
individuals are needed for any sufficient condition.  They both seem to view as analogous 
overdetermined type 1/2 activities
23
 such as the shooting of a person by more than one 
lethal shot
24
 and an overdetermined type 3 activity, an election, where many individual 
acts are needed to achieve the goal.
25
  Tuck obscures the distinction by using the example 
of a roll-call election in the Roman Republic:
26
  each vote is declared one after another, 
so there comes a point when one voter is aware that upon his vote, one candidate will 
have enough votes in total to be elected, notwithstanding that voting will continue until 
all have voted.   He writes, ‘So when Ultimus steps up to the tribunal [to vote, …] he 
knows that he has caused Gracchus’s election by his action […]’.27  Tuck points out that 
that is unlikely to amount to counter-factual causation because there are others that would 
vote for Gracchus if Ultimus does not.  Gracchus’s election would still have occurred 
even if Ultimus had not voted.  He suggests that this is analogous to the position of the 
firer of a shot:  if he does not fire a lethal shot, another shot will do the job
28
.  But there is 
                                                                                                                             
22
 Goldman offers an alternative strategy using vectorial causal system.  I believe that a similar criticism 
undermines that approach – see op. cit. pp.210-213. 
23
 More particularly it is a type 2 activity.  Shooting people is an other-regarding activity! and something 
that states generally wish to regulate. 
24
 I.e. a villain shot by two policemen or a firing squad where any one member of the squad could effect the 
execution. 
25
 Tuck pp.51-52; Goldman p.205. 
26
 Tuck n.22 (p.39). 
27
 Ibid. p.51. 
28
 Or another shot fired fractionally later will become the lethal shot. 
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no analogy:  Ultimus’s success was dependent upon all the earlier voters who were 
involved in the same endeavour, in a way that the shooter’s ‘success’ was not. 
 
Parfit asserts, both before and after the section on elections in Reasons and Persons, that 
sometimes when considering moral obligations it is inappropriate to consider whether an 
individual by him- or herself causes a perceptible benefit or harm to others but rather 
whether the individual together with others causes a perceptible benefit or harm to others 
(i.e. has an influence with others).
29
  That does not appear to be consistent with Parfit’s 
approach to elections and his thoughts about the chances of any individual having any 
influence over the electoral outcome.  With regard to an election, he appears to focus on 
what an individual achieves as an individual.  For elections, what is achieved is the 
product of the efforts of many people working together, with the common purpose of 
electing a preferred candidate.
30
 
 
                                           
29
 Op. cit. pp.70 & 77.  Parfit’s argument is simply that this must be so in order to fit with what seem to be 
wholly appropriate intuitions about the importance of carrying out collective actions which produce 
substantial benefits for others.  He does not directly address the question we are considering.  He does not 
ask whether the individual participants get anything out of taking part in a collective act; he simply asserts 
that, in certain circumstances, they should take part in such acts.  That, of course, does not necessarily 
demonstrate that democracy has a value (which may be incommensurable with liberalism).  The individual 
participants (i.e. voters) may not experience any freedom.  The moral imperative to act (vote) may 
represent a troubling obligation or constraint rather than a freedom. 
30
 Parfit’s conclusions about elections are doubly confusing.  He considers essentially the same classic 
example of an overdetermined event:  the murder committed by two assailants who each shoot a lethal 
round and kill the victim at the same moment.  Parfit asserts that the assailants must be considered to have 
caused the death together notwithstanding that the victim would have died if either had not shot.  Neither 
could be said to be responsible for the killing on the basis of counterfactual causation.  Given that Parfit has 
resolved the type 1/2 situation by relying on the idea of considering what the assailants caused together, it 
is surprising that he does not apply that approach to elections, a type-3 endeavour, which can 
demonstratively only be achieved by persons together.  So, Parfit has not explained why all the electors for 
the successful candidate in a typical (overdetermined) election should not be adjudged to have caused the 
desired outcome together with others.  Parfit’s account is, it follows, inconsistent. 
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If we are going to demonstrate that individuals gain something from democracy, the 
freedom to contribute to collective decision-making, we need to go beyond Parfit’s 
assertion.  I want to suggest that our intuitions about the morality of taking part in 
collective actions (upon which Parfit relies) make best sense if individuals do make a 
meaningful contribution to those collective events – that we do have a freedom to 
contribute to those events and, in the case, of democracy, freedom to contribute to 
democratic outcomes. 
 
Parfit offers this thought experiment: 
The weight of just four men is needed to raise a lift to bring 100 miners to safety 
out of the flooded mine.  Four men are at the mine head.  All four are needed to 
raise the lift.  However, one man could depart to do something he can achieve by 
himself.  He could go elsewhere and save 50 men single-handedly.  In so doing, 
however, he would leave the three others who are now impotent to save the 100 
drowning miners.
31
 
 
It might be argued, Parfit states, that if the one leaves the other three, he would have 
saved 50 men; if he had remained his personal effort would only have amounted to a 
‘quarter share’ of saving 100 men (i.e. just 25 men).  However, there is little doubt if the 
one man departed he would be doing wrong.  He would be judged to have done wrong 
because of all of the ramifications of his choice:  50 more men would have been lost than 
would otherwise have been the case.  Parfit puts it like this:  ‘I benefit someone even 
when my act is a remote part of the cause of the receiving of this benefit.  All that needs 
to be true is that, if I had acted otherwise, this person would not have received this 
benefit.’32  This account is not unproblematic, though.  If in Parfit’s example, each of the 
four men who raise the lift has benefitted those saved, i.e. has saved those 100 lives, (as 
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they surely must in order to avoid the wrong judgement in Parfit’s thought experiment) , 
then this may seem to suggest that their aggregate effort is equivalent to the saving of 400 
lives.  That seems nonsensical.  If we translate Parfit’s suggested analysis to an election 
with one vote in it, every individual voting for the winning candidate can claim to have 
produced the whole outcome rather than to have been responsible for a tiny fraction of 
that outcome (i.e. the weight of the outcome divided by the number of voters for the 
winning candidate).  As Jan Narveson points out
33
, that seems to produce an odd 
outcome.  In utilitarian terms, the election of the preferred candidate has a particular 
utility (say 100 units of utility or ‘utiles’) because of the good things that candidate can 
achieve in office.  Thus, the total utility of the election will be the number of votes cast 
for the winning candidate x 100 utiles – quite possibly an enormous figure.  That neither 
the fractional approach nor the aggregate approach is satisfactory suggests that the 
original assumption was incorrect:  the assumption that, in the case of a collective 
endeavour, we can judge the significance of an individual’s act in terms of what was 
counterfactually caused by the individual.
34
  My claim is that for collective (type 3) 
activities consideration of individual influence/causation and thus the individual utility of 
an action are misplaced. 
 
Consider a collective activity which is overdetermined.  Adapting Parfit’s example, 
consider the following scenario: 
                                                                                                                             
31
 Op. cit. p.68.  [Parfit’s Second Rescue Mission.] 
32
 Ibid. p.69. 
33
 Jan Narveson, ‘Utilitarianism, Group Actions, and Coordination or, Must the Utilitarian be a Buridan’s 
Ass’, Nous Vol.10 (1976) pp.173-194 at p.187 [referred to in Tuck p.41]. 
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A rescue operation requires 200 adults to save 100 miners from a flooded mine.  
A lift has to be hauled up a shaft by hand with a very inefficient pulley system.  
The alarm is raised.  There are 500 adults living in the vicinity within ready reach 
of the mine head.  Each of the 500 hears the alarm.  P, one of those 500, considers 
that there is very little prospect that his presence at the mine head will make any 
difference to whether or not the miners are saved.  It is very unlikely that exactly 
199 other people will rush to the incident.  It is quite possible that there will be 
less than 199 in which case, the miners will be lost whether he attends or not.  It is 
quite possible that 200 or more will attend, in which case the miners will be saved 
and his presence will be superfluous.  It is very unlikely that precisely199 others 
will attend such that his attendance will make all the difference.  Out of the local 
population of 500, 150 adults arrive.  P is not one of them.  The miners are lost.  P 
and the other non-attenders are vilified for their failure to proffer help.  P 
continues to maintain that he is without blame.  Indeed he points out that, with the 
benefit of hindsight, it is absolutely certain that his non-attendance made no 
difference.  If he had acted otherwise, the miners would not have been saved.  
With only 150 adults attending, the miners would have been lost whether or not 
he attended. 
How do we respond to P’s excuse?  I take it that we perceive P’s inaction to be 
reprehensible.  It might be suggested that P as a member of the community around the 
mine had moral obligations arising from that membership including a duty to attend the 
mine head whether or not his help would make a difference.  I do not propose to 
                                                                                                                             
34
 Both Harry Silverstein and Tuck, in their different ways, hint at this.  They argue that there are other 
ways around the aggregation issue.  See Tuck pp.41-43 and Harry Silverstein, ‘Utilitarianism and Group 
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investigate that approach.  Even if we were to consider that the moral offence is non-
consequentialist, we can respond to P’s excuse in its own terms.  We can show that, even 
from a consequentialist stand-point, P’s response does not suffice.  I doubt that, in 
consequentialist terms, P’s behaviour was repugnant because there was a small chance 
that his presence might have influenced the outcome (i.e. made all the difference) – if 
precisely 199 others had attended – and that, given the enormity of the crisis, that small 
chance should have motivated him to attend.  (This is Parfit’s view.35)  Perhaps he was 
morally at fault because he was not prepared to interrupt his day given the possibility 
(albeit remote) that his action would have saved the miners – that he would have caused 
(counterfactually) the rescue attempt to be successful.  However, we are not normally 
grossly offended when a person runs a risk of causing something bad but that bad event 
does not transpire – where they successfully ‘play the percentage game’.  I want to draw 
out a distinction between the likely response to this situation – where the issue is P’s 
contribution/non-contribution to a collective effort and the response to situations that 
depend upon the actions of a person acting alone.  Consider two people driving along a 
motorway using their mobile phones.  They are using the phones in exactly the same way 
and are equally inattentive to their driving.  One of them ends their call, drives home, has 
tea and puts their feet up in front of the television.  The other, due to that same 
inattention, causes a multi-vehicle pile-up in which six die but from which he walks away 
with minor injuries.  This single-person scenario is typical of the kinds of thought 
experiment that are considered in investigations about ‘moral luck’.  Clearly we respond 
to the two drivers quite differently both in legal terms and in our emotional reactions but 
                                                                                                                             
Coordination’, Nous Vol.13 (1979) pp.335-360 [referred to by Tuck p.42, quoting from p.341]. 
35
 Op. cit. pp.73-77. 
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it is a matter of considerable contention whether the action of one is more morally 
blameworthy than that of the other.  For current purposes I do not need to reach a view on 
that question.
36
  Whether the distinction is moral or not, there is no doubt that we do 
respond quite differently.  Returning to P, consider if 199 (rather than 150) others had 
attended.  Would we have responded to P more indignantly (be that more morally 
indignant or indignant for other reasons)?  P’s core excuse (such as it is) has not really 
been undermined.  The chances that 199 other rescuers would have arrived at the mine 
head have not been changed retrospectively.  It is just that a very unlikely state of affairs 
would actually have transpired – that precisely 199 and no more arrived at the mine head.  
By analogy with responses to the two drivers (the one who causes an accident and the one 
who does not) would we not feel more indignant towards P (and all the other individuals 
who could have turned out) in the event that 199 others had turned up rather than 150?  I 
am not at all sure we would.  We may be more intrigued by the event – ‘if just one more 
person had turned up, it would have been so different’ – but not more indignant.  That is 
because our disapprobation arises from the thought that things might have been different:  
the miners might have been saved, whether 150 or 199 arrived at the mine head.  The 
                                           
36
 For important defences of the concept of moral luck see Thomas Nagel Ch.3 and Bernard Williams, 
Moral Luck (Cambridge: CUP, 1981) Ch.2.  For a useful review of arguments for and against see Dana 
Nelkin, ‘Moral Luck’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Edward Zalta (Fall 2008) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-luck> [accessed 14 March 2011].  
Personally, I am satisfied that there is no need to rely on moral luck to explain the different treatment of the 
two drivers.  There are good non-moral reasons to explain our different responses to those who cause injury 
and those who do not.  [My intuitive antipathy to the concept was bolstered by David Lockwood, ‘Moral 
Theory and Political Practice: A Rule-Consequentialist Account of the Relation between Ethics and 
Politics’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Cardiff University, 2010) sections 6.4 to 6.7 inclusive.]  I would 
comment that we may well recognise that singling out and pillorying the driver who causes the death by 
careless driving is unfair.  However, such an awareness does not change our response because we also 
believe that he has brought that unfairness upon himself.  He ran a risk.  It may not be fair that of all the 
drivers behaving similarly he was the one that caused an accident but it was not fair that particular 
innocents were killed as a result of his poor driving.  We block our ears to the driver’s complaint of unfair 
treatment.  It may also be the case that we take the opportunity to mete out all the opprobrium felt for all 
immoral, mobile-phone-using, drivers on to the driver causing the accident. 
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miners might have been saved if P and the other non-rescuers had together attended the 
mine head.   
 
P behaved wrongly because he should have viewed himself not as an individual rescuer 
but as a potential member of a group of rescuers.  He is vilified not as a single individual.  
The whole group of 350 non-rescuers is being vilified.  He is not singled out for 
vilification.  All 350 could have attended.  If they had, the miners would have been saved.  
P is one of that group of non-attenders.  To single P out for vilification would be an 
analogous error to giving all the plaudits to a particular voter in a one-vote-in-it election.  
It is not unreasonable to view P as one of a group.  It is unreasonable to view him as an 
individual when considering the morality of his conduct when the achievement or failure 
of a type 3 activity is in issue.  It is only a group that can affect the rescue.  It as a 
member of the group of rescuers or non-rescuers that his conduct should be judged.
37
 
 
Returning to Parfit’s original example, assume that –  
three men are already at the mine head.  A fourth man joins them and the miners 
are saved.  But for the arrival of the fourth man, the miners would have drowned. 
Is it the case that the fourth man is responsible alone for saving the miners, while the 
original three can claim no ethical part in the rescue?  Clearly not.  The fourth man is not 
ethically privileged merely by the fact of his late arrival.  (Indeed, in truth, we might 
attach greater ethical value to the action of those who rushed to the scene of the potential 
tragedy first.)  While each rescuer can claim that the rescue would not have occurred but 
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for his attendance, each rescuer must also concede that there are three others who can 
also make that claim.  Going back to non-rescuer P, P seeks to excuse himself by, in 
effect, identifying himself as the potential 151
st
 rescuer (and the potential 350
th
 non-
rescuer).  He is giving himself a status to which he is not entitled.  He must simply 
choose to be one of the group of rescuers or one of the group of non-rescuers.  He can 
claim no special status. 
 
In the light of all this, my suggestion is that, when it comes to the act of voting in large-
scale elections, it does not make sense to consider individual influence/causation.  That 
approach only leads to confusion and makes it impossible to derive a clear sense of what 
is happening
38
.  Elections represent the opportunity for collective activity to achieve a 
given end – the election of a particular candidate or the reaching of a particular decision 
in the case of a plebiscite or referendum.  The fact that the act of casting a vote is 
generally secret, private and individual in nature has encouraged analysis of voting as if it 
were fundamentally an individual activity.  The language of ‘the right to vote’ and ideas 
such as ‘One Person, One Vote’ suggest that any moral imperatives associated with 
voting should be analysed in terms of personal individual benefit.  But to think of voting 
in that way (or as an individual duty or right) is to set off down the wrong path. 
 
The act of voting is always the act of voting for a particular choice or candidate.  It 
represents the forming of ad hoc groups – groups in favour of each option/candidate and 
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 There is a symmetry here.  Each of the 500 local inhabitants must identify themselves either with the 
group of willing rescuers or with the group of those unprepared to assist.  Each knows that in so doing, he 
or she potentially contributes to the rescue or potentially contributes to the loss of the miners. 
38
 A sense that may then inform views of the morality of voting. 
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a group of non-voters (i.e. people eligible to vote but who choose not to vote – not those 
who are disenfranchised who exercise no choice).  The fact that there may be no 
relationship between members of these ad hoc groups beyond the fact that they vote the 
same way does not compromise the essentially collective nature of the activity.  In 
essence the relationship between the rescuers in the Parfitean examples need be little 
more extensive than the relationship between those who vote the same way.  All that 
binds rescuers or voters together is the particular common cause:  the rescue attempt or 
the same preferred candidate. 
 
A further cause of confusion has been the concentration on the idea of overdetermination 
or redundant causation.  Collective type 3 activities will commonly involve 
overdetermination – or at least all those activities that involve the meeting of some 
threshold for success.
39
  Where there is communication and co-ordination between 
participants, that overdetermination may be hidden.  (Arrangements may be made so that 
no more than is necessary undertake the task.)  However, the fact that for type 3 activities 
overdetermination is ubiquitous will be recognised in any satisfactory account.  It is a 
mistake, then to draw any significant conclusions from an analysis of the situation where 
there were just sufficient contributions to meet the threshold (e.g. a one-vote-in-it 
election).  Yes, the contribution of a voter (indeed, every voter) can be described as 
counter-factually causative but this is only in a highly anomalous, special, circumstance. 
                                           
39
 I mean here to distinguish different types of collective activities.  Electing a candidate is an activity 
which involves a discreet and singular goal.  A threshold quantity of individual contributions must be 
reached for the goal to be achieved.  If there are fewer, the goal will be missed; if there are more, the goal 
will be overdetermined.  There are other collective activities such as raising money for charity which may 
not have a discreet standard of success or failure.  The more money that is donated the better because more 
can be achieved with that money.  Here there is no threshold.  For a more nuanced account of thresholds 
110 
 
What then does the individual get out of taking part in the collective activity of voting?  
Brennan and Lomasky are wrong not because an individual only causes an election result 
to occur in the highly unusual situation that the result hinges on a single vote but because 
an election result is never influenced by a single vote (unless only one person chooses to 
vote).   Thus, when Richard Vernon, for example, states that 
By now, a large body of literature has established that the chances of one’s vote 
affecting the outcome, under any conditions that are likely in real-world 
democracies, are insufficient to motivate the act of voting.
40
 
 
his point is not so much wrong as irrelevant.  It is not the ability to affect the outcome as 
an individual that might motivate any individual to vote; it is the chance to contribute to a 
collective endeavour that is potentially motivating.
41
 
 
 Elections are collective activities but it is also clear that each vote for the winning 
candidate represents a contribution to that outcome – even in overdetermined cases.42  
Outcomes do not simply materialise.  They occur because of the contribution made by 
each voter – just as bricks contribute to the building of a wall.  It is debatable whether the 
contribution by each voter to the tally for the winning candidate represents ‘influence’ on 
the outcome (as part of the collective effort).  Perhaps the idea of ‘influence’ is too tied 
up with the idea of counter-factual causation.  What we can say, though, is that each voter 
has had the opportunity to contribute to the winning effort and that each contribution is 
something significant and tangible.  That much is clear because we undoubtedly attribute 
                                                                                                                             
and collective activities see Jonathan Glover & M. Scott-Taggart, ‘“It Makes No Difference Whether or 
Not I Do It”,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp Vol.49 (1975) pp.171-209. 
40
 Op. cit. p.43. 
41
 I accept that there may be other non-consequential motivations.  Citizens may feel that they have some 
kind of civic obligation to vote, for instance.   
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moral significance to such contributions or failures to render such contributions.
43
  At this 
stage in my investigation, then, it appears that this ability to contribute to the collective 
endeavour of voting for a preferred candidate may be a distinct benefit or freedom 
offered by democracy – a freedom that may not be commensurable with liberal freedoms. 
 
Thus, we can also note that the paradox of voting evaporates.  I mean, here the apparent 
paradox that individual votes cannot cause the outcome of an election and yet we know 
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 When considering contributions to the collective endeavour it makes no sense to conclude that 
individuals do not contribute to overdetermined collective activities – unless there is some means of 
distinguishing between putative contributors so that we can tell that some do contribute and some do not.  
43
 It should be noted, though, that the existence of this contribution does not necessarily constitute a benefit 
for the voter nor does it necessarily create, in some moral schema, an imperative to vote.  This disjunction 
will be considered below [will it?] but one particular factor worth commenting upon here is the role that 
additional knowledge plays.  Up to now, the discussion of democracy has implicitly been of an idealised 
system where voters are unaware of the position and intention of other voters.  But in the real world, voters 
may have a fairly good idea about how other voters will vote.  They may know about the past voting habits 
of voters in their constituency.  They may also know of opinion polls which cast light on the intentions of 
other voters.  
Consider for a moment a variation to Parfit’s example of the four rescuers: 
The alarm is raised.  Unaware of how many others are available to counterbalance the lift, five 
men arrive at the scene.  Only four can counterbalance the lift.  No effort is required to 
counterbalance the lift.  Nothing is to be gained by being the one man not taking part in the rescue.  
There is no question of leaving the scene.  Indeed, there is a sense in which the non-rescuing fifth 
man will miss out on the kudos of being an actual rescuer.  Four out of the five are chosen. 
Do only those four share in the rescue?  That seems wrong.  Surely all five offered to contribute to the 
rescue.  Surely they each share in the moral plaudits.  Parfit thinks so.  He posits the principle that, 
Suppose that here is some group who, by acting in a certain way, will together benefit other 
people.  If someone believes that this group either is, or would be if he joined, too large, he has no 
moral reason to join this group.  A group is too large if it is true that, if one or more of its members 
had not acted, this would not have reduced the benefit which this group gives to other people.  
[Op. cit. p.83 (Section 30).] 
Similarly, the knowledge of the intentions of other potential voters has a bearing on any moral imperative 
to vote on the basis of the outcome of the ballot.  If it is clear from the demography of a constituency and 
the results of previous elections that the result is a foregone conclusion, then there can be no 
consequentialist imperative to vote in order to secure the preferred outcome.  In Parfit’s terms (see above), 
the group of voters is too large.  The group of voters supporting the undoubted winner is already numerous 
enough to secure victory. The group of voters who would rather another candidate be elected will not be 
numerous enough to succeed.  In effect, an individual voter who supports the inevitable victor can choose 
not to vote but probably has as much right to claim the plaudits for the election of that candidate.
 
 [Even if, 
for example, the act of voting involved a day long hike over rough and difficult terrain, in order to get to 
and from the polling station, it is not entirely clear why the non-voter does not share in the victory as long 
as there was a preparedness to vote if there was any uncertainty about the outcome.  If enough people are 
already prepared to do the necessary to achieve some outcome, it is a waste of time and effort to duplicate 
their efforts.]  However, as soon as the election is in doubt, then a potential voter must vote in order to 
claim a share of the rightness of the election. 
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that the number of individual votes does determine an election outcome.  If voting is a 
corporate or collective activity then it makes no sense to claim that individuals cannot 
cause any outcome and have no influence and, for that reason, they gain nothing from 
voting.  How could an individual cause an election result?  Electing a candidate is a 
collective activity not an individual one.  But voters do contribute to the collective 
endeavour and voters share in any victory or defeat.  If any moral weight attaches to the 
victory or defeat of a particular candidate (i.e. the election of candidate A is bad because 
of the bad things he has promised to do), then voters will have acted rightly or wrongly 
depending upon their choice.
44
 
 
Does Democracy Provide an Opportunity to Contribute to Collective Decision-Making 
that is a Morally Significant Freedom/Benefit for Citizens? 
I have noted that pursuing a particular democratic outcome (i.e. the election of a preferred 
candidate or the approval of a referendum question) is a collective endeavour and have 
established that, while individuals do not cause the outcome when considered as isolated 
individual voters, they can contribute to the outcome – democracy offers the freedom to 
contribute to particular democratic ends.  (Of course, a democratic system may not give 
individuals the chance to have much (or any) influence on, or contribute to, the identity 
of the choices available.
45
)  This freedom is of a somewhat different ilk from other 
                                           
44
 So for example, consider that, in the face of a fascist candidature in an election somewhere in United 
Kingdom, the three main parties agree to put forward a single anti-fascist candidate.  There is a very large 
turnout in favour of the coalition candidate and the fascist candidate is trounced.  It is both appropriate and 
correct to place moral value on the activity of each non-fascist voting elector.  There is no pretence in 
stating that each anti-fascist voter has contributed to the outcome – that each voter shares in the victory, as 
it were. 
45
 In the case of referendums, there are polities which give voters the chance to propose referendum 
questions e.g. California.  But in many countries, referendums can only be proposed by governments local 
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individual freedoms.  For type 3 activities, the freedom to aspect of the freedom is only a 
freedom to contribute to the preferred outcome.
46
  The individual cannot bring the 
outcome about by their own efforts.  Of course, in the case of what we think of as liberal 
freedoms (freedoms to carry on type 1/2 activities), we are considering freedoms where 
the individual is considered to be free just because there is no societal restraint over a 
range of activities that the individual may wish to pursue by themselves and that may be 
successfully pursued by themselves.  The freedom to contribute to a collective endeavour, 
though, is the freedom to contribute to a contingent outcome.  The possibility that a 
contribution will not be efficacious is inherent.  If a democratic outcome was bound to 
occur, then a contribution to that outcome would be redundant.  In fact, there could not be 
any contributions at all.  The outcome would have to transpire whether or not there were 
contributions and that, of course, would be paradoxical.  A contribution can only be made 
to an endeavour that may fail through want of sufficient contributions.  What voters are 
being offered is not the opportunity to contribute to an outcome that will transpire come 
what may but the opportunity to contribute to a collective endeavour that could fail, at 
least theoretically.  Conversely, for there to be a freedom to contribute, it must also be the 
case that the individual voter can make a real contribution to the preferred democratic 
outcome – it must be the case that the preferred democratic outcome may occur – there 
must be the possibility of success.  We can think of this as the inherent contingency of 
any type 3 collective activity.  (There is another type of contingency or lack of it.  In 
                                                                                                                             
or national.  In the case of the election of representatives, the existence of established, albeit usually extra-
statutory, party systems renders the right to nominate candidates of little worth. 
46
 Strictly speaking this may only be the case for type 3 activities with a threshold.  (Indeed, collective 
activities that lack a threshold, as well as being type 3 activities, seem to incorporate distinct type 1 
activities.  If I give £10 to charity appeal, I am taking part in a collective activity but my £10 may allow one 
more child to be fed for a month. )   
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practice, the outcome of a referendum, for instance, may not be contingent because of the 
known and established preferences of voters – in effect, the outcome may be a foregone 
conclusion.  Generally, the extent of the contingency will vary in the light of knowledge 
about past voting patterns and knowledge of current voter intentions.  That degree of 
contingency will be reflected in betting odds offered in respect of the referendum 
outcome.  I will deal with that type of contingency and, more generally, with the chances 
of success or failure of the collective endeavour of voting for a particular outcome below, 
when I consider the significance of procedural equality in an account of the value of the 
freedom to contribute to democratic outcomes.)  For democracy to be of significant value 
on account of this freedom to contribute to an inherently contingent outcome, this 
freedom must have three features.  First, the contribution made by individuals must be 
substantial (as opposed to being de minimis).  Secondly, that opportunity to contribute 
must be experienced as a freedom (i.e. a benefit) and not as a quasi-obligation or duty.  
Thirdly, the freedom to contribute must be distributed broadly and, probably, fairly. 
 
Vernon dismisses the argument that democracy is of value because it is procedurally fair, 
at least partly on the basis that voting does not give anyone any significant influence over 
outcomes. 
[H]aving an equal chance is neither here nor there, it would seem, since having an 
equal share in something vanishingly small or indeed non-existent is hardly worth 
it.  Equality in distribution is a good if it is a good that is being distributed, but it 
is negligible if what is being distributed is negligible, […]47 
 
Vernon, as we have seen, wrongly considers that the only benefit offered to individuals is 
the ability to influence election outcomes where the election is a one-vote-in-it election.  
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However, the claim he makes here – that for any distribution to be valuable the thing 
distributed must be non-negligible – is wholly correct.  If democracy provides no real 
benefit to voters (i.e. no opportunity to contribute substantially), there is nothing to 
apportion fairly or otherwise.  Any ostensible fairness and equity in the democratic 
process must be illusory and worthless.  The existence or absence of fairness is a 
judgment made upon a division of some subject matter.  That subject matter may be very 
tangible (such as the sweets over which the children are squabbling) or it may be less so 
(perhaps the subject-matter could be attention given or love shown).  Be that as it may, 
there has to be something substantial to be apportioned, fairly or unfairly. 
 
In Free Riding,
48
 Tuck comments at some length about the substantiality of contributions 
to collective endeavours.  In essence, he concludes that where the collective activity 
involves the meeting of a defined threshold (as it does in winning an election) and a 
specifiable number of contributions is needed to meet that threshold, any one contribution 
has a measurable impact; it cannot be negligible; it must be substantial.
49
  That must be 
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 Op. cit. p.44. 
48
 Op. cit. 
49
 Tuck draws a distinction between collective activities with defined thresholds (such as winning elections) 
and those that involve the meeting of some vague goal [see ibid. pp.63-64 & pp.101-102].  For example, for 
a demonstration to be effective, it must include a large number of protesters.  It is unlikely, though, that one 
demonstrator would make the difference between a sufficiently powerful protest and an insufficiently 
powerful protest.  The difference a single demonstrator makes is ‘imperceptible’.  A demonstrator’s 
contribution can be properly considered to be ‘negligible’.  In this kind of situation, Tuck sees a second 
problem:  not only is there the fact that a contributor will rarely counterfactually cause the preferred 
outcome but now it is not clear that he makes any meaningful contribution at all.  For Tuck this is an 
example of the sorites paradox.  I am not convinced that there really are two distinct types of case.  No 
doubt the sorites problem is troubling and no doubt it has warranted much of the philosophical effort that 
has been applied to it for two millennia but while we may not be able to define success precisely (e.g. to 
say how many grains constitute a heap), we can surely not doubt that if we have succeeded that individual 
actions have contributed to that success (e.g. if we have a heap we recognize that it is made up of grains 
and that, but for the grains, there would be no heap).  Thus, while Tuck’s detailed account of the sorites and 
responses thereto [ibid. ch.3 pp.63-98] is informative, it is unnecessary.  
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right.  (We can put the matter of an accurate valuation of the benefit to citizens to one 
side given the nature of this investigation.) 
 
Turning to the second issue, it is conceivable that that ability to contribute could be 
experienced as a burden rather than a benefit.  There could be some feeling of obligation 
or duty to vote – an obligation or duty that was not welcomed by electors – and the 
absence of any perceived benefit.  However, that seems unlikely.  It is noted that 
procedural arguments in favour of democracy almost invariably proceed by arguing that 
democracy bestows some sort of benefit on voters which is distributed equitably.  A 
procedural argument for democracy could conceivably be based on burden rather than 
benefit.  If decision-making were a burden, then it might be procedurally fair and 
appropriate to divide up and spread out that burden amongst as many people as possible.  
However, I discount this as a productive avenue of investigation for historical and 
experiential reasons:   human history seems in large part a battle over power.  The power 
or right to make decisions has been highly prized.  Those who campaigned for, agitated 
for and fought for democracy were not motivated by compassion for the few unfortunates 
who had hitherto been obliged to carry the burden of decision-making; no, they felt that 
the masses were excluded from the benefits of political power.  The suffragettes did not 
campaign as they did out of concern that men were unfairly having to shoulder the 
burden of political decision-making.  North African demonstrators taking to the streets in 
2011 are demanding democracy because they want to have a say in their governments.  
They clearly perceive that as a benefit. 
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If democracy was a burden rather than a benefit, then one might expect voting to be more 
commonly compulsory:  if democracy is justified because of the need to share a burden, it 
might be reasonable not to allow people to avoid that burden by simply not voting.  
Further, given the lack of compulsory voting, it is notable that such a large number of 
citizens do vote.  Admittedly, there is in some states some increasing disinclination to 
vote.  This has been apparent in the UK.  While, conceivably, this might suggest that 
democracy is a burden, more likely it suggests that any benefit from democracy is 
quantitatively limited or less than obvious and so the strength of any motivation to vote is 
low.  I conclude that there are few grounds for considering that voting represents a 
burden. 
 
The third, and by far the most involved, issue is whether any benefit from democracy in 
the form of an opportunity to contribute is dispensed broadly and fairly.  Political 
freedoms that are valued are freedoms that are available to all citizens.  If a nation’s legal 
and political system allowed freedom of speech and association and worship to the 
dominant ethnic group that represented 80% of the population of that country but denied 
those freedoms to the minority, ethnically-distinct, 20%, it would not be thought that, 
overall, that nation upheld the liberal freedoms of speech, association and worship.  It is 
expected that such political freedoms will be distributed equitably.  This is first and 
foremost a reflection of the generality and universality of moral principles.  If there is an 
imperative to protect and maintain a freedom, it should be protected and maintained for 
everyone.  It would not so much be unfair or an example of inequality to deny a morally 
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valuable political freedom to some citizens, it would be a wholesale denial of the moral 
nature of the imperative.
50
 
 
So, given the political nature of the freedom ostensibly offered by democracy – to 
contribute to democratic outcomes – we can reasonably consider that freedom not to be 
valuable unless it is advanced generally to adult citizens and, further, it is reasonable to 
believe that democracy must dispense the freedom to contribute to collective decision-
making fairly for the freedom it offers to be of value.  Clearly, the dictatorship of a 
military junta offers freedom to members of the junta to contribute to political outcomes 
but that is, rightly, not viewed as a value – a value which could be reasonably compared 
with (or, in a morally pluralist universe, not compared with!) other freedoms.
51
  At first 
sight, then, democracy appears to offer a substantive freedom (to contribute to collective 
decision-making) on an equitable basis. Democratic systems generally offer a universal 
franchise with each adult citizen given a vote of equal weight.
52
  However, critically, the 
putative value we are considering is the freedom to contribute to democratic outcomes, 
not the freedom to take part in elections per se. 
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 Raz makes this point in regard to liberal freedoms.  [Op.cit. pp. 221-2.] 
51
 On the other hand, the exclusion of some may not wholly undermine any value that democracy offers.  
There are always flaws in electoral registers so that some would-be voters are unable to vote.  Such failures 
to facilitate a perfectly universal franchise would not, it would seem, of themselves, extinguish any value in 
democracy as the provider of the freedom to contribute to democratic outcomes. 
There are presumably limits, though, to this leeway.  One of the many doubts about the US General 
Election in 2000 was that many individuals (predominantly poor and black) in Florida had been wrongly 
excluded from the electoral process by the Republican state government because they had been incorrectly 
designated as felons.  {See Greg Palast, ‘What Really Happened in Florida?’, Newsnight BBC2, 16 
February 2001. Transcript available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/newsnight/1174115.stm> 
[accessed 14 March 2011].}  Where the exclusions are politically-motivated and appear to have an impact 
on the outcome, this would appear to undermine any value in the freedom to vote. 
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Consider voters living in an ethnically or religiously divided polity.
53
  Let us assume that 
55% of adult (i.e. voting) citizens are from ethnic group A and 45% belong to ethnic 
group B.  The two groups hold markedly different views on most political issues and 
members of each group almost invariably vote along ethnic lines.  It follows that a 
member of group B will almost never be able to contribute to a democratic outcome.  Her 
preferred candidates/outcomes will almost never be successful.  While it may be 
theoretically possible that her preferred candidate will be elected (and so the outcome is 
necessarily contingent in that theoretical sense), in reality, the outcome is settled.  Here, 
there is some ostensible equality – the vote of a member of group B voter has as much 
weight in the count as the vote of a member of group A – and yet, the group B voter has 
no freedom to contribute to a democratic outcome.  Thus, in such situations, democracy 
has no value as a giver of freedom to individuals to contribute to democratic outcomes 
because there is no equality:  45% of the adult citizens do not have the opportunity to 
contribute to any democratic outcome.  We might say that, in addition to the inherent 
contingency, in any collective endeavour, there must be, at a minimum, a real 
contingency.  If there is not, those that do not support the inevitable outcome will be 
denied any opportunity to contribute and there cannot have been a fair or equitable 
apportionment of the opportunity to contribute.  In countries with polarised 
ethnic/religious communities, democratic outcomes may well not be meaningfully 
contingent.  It follows that in those countries democracy cannot be valuable because of 
the opportunity to contribute to democratic outcomes that it ostensibly offers.  (That does 
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 Mill’s proposal for extra-votes for intelligent citizens falls short of this standard.  Mill’s scheme does 
provide freedom to contribute (unequally) to democratic outcomes and, while that freedom is dispensed 
according to some universalisable principle, it is not dispensed equitably.  
53
 Iraq would be an obvious example. 
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not, of course, mean that democracy has no value in such polities, just that the freedom to 
contribute we have been considering is not a justification for democracy.) 
 
But why is the fact that each voter has a vote of equal weight not significant?  It only 
appears to be significant if one makes the mistake of viewing democracy as an individual 
activity (a type 1/2 activity).  If democracy was an individual activity and each vote 
achieved something by itself, then the fact that each vote had equal weight might be 
significant.  Democracy, though, is a collective activity and thus the context of the 
individual contribution is critical to its value to the voting participant.  Consider the 
following scenario.  Two equally competent tenor singers are offered the chance to join 
choirs in the hope of being a part of a winning choir in an international competition.  One 
is offered a place with the professional BBC Singers; the other is offered a place with the 
scratch, amateur, South Croydon Choir.  Both are offered a chance to sing tenor in a 
similarly sized choir.  They will, in fact, sing a similar repertoire but there is no 
meaningful equality.  The collective endeavour is to win the international competition.  
One has been given the opportunity to contribute to an endeavour that has a good chance 
of success; the other has no hope of contributing to the effort of the winning choir.  There 
is no equality of opportunity.  This example is analogous to the situation rehearsed above:  
the ethnically-divided state where one group is in a permanent minority.  The lack of 
equality is quite different from the lack of substantive equality where liberal freedoms are 
advanced.  Liberal freedoms do not offer substantive equality but they do offer equality 
of opportunity.  In these situations though (the tenors and the voters), there is no equality 
of opportunity.   
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This problem, though, does not end with these extreme cases.  It is not simply a matter of 
ensuring that there is some contingency.  The problem of the value of the opportunity to 
contribute is not limited to cases where one group of voters is denied any effective 
chance to contribute to the democratic outcome:  the value of the opportunity to 
contribute will turn out to be rarely, if ever, equal.  The extent of the opportunity to 
contribute to the electoral outcome will rarely be fairly shared out amongst voters.  The 
extent of the opportunity will depend on the demographics of the state or voting district 
and the beliefs and intentions of the rest of the electorate.  A voter may not be a part of an 
entrenched minority community but his or her views may make it very unlikely that they 
will contribute to the election of the winner at a particular election.  Over a number of 
elections, many voters will generally hold views that mean that their preferred candidates 
are unlikely ever to prevail. 
 
The existence of some contingency is not enough.  If democracy is to have value because 
of the opportunity to contribute one would expect that opportunity to be distributed 
equally.  While democracy is all about collective activity and democracy facilitates 
collective activity, it would be wrong to describe democracy itself as a collective activity, 
in its most fundamental sense.
54
  Rather, any particular democratic goal – the election of 
a particular candidate or the passing of a referendum – is a collective activity.  Thus, an 
election or referendum does not represent a single collective activity.  It represents an 
opportunity for voters to contribute to at least two competing, mutually exclusive, 
collective activities.  Viewed in this way, it is clear that no equality of opportunity to 
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 I recognise that this is a contentious statement.  Later chapters will respond in more detail to the 
perception (or perhaps better the assumption) that democracy is itself a collective activity. 
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contribute can be expected.  Some voters will have contributed to a successful outcome; 
others will have contributed to an attempt to realise an outcome that has not transpired.  
Only those who vote for the winning candidate have had the opportunity to contribute.   It 
would not be correct to argue that everyone has the same opportunity because each can 
vote for any of the candidates – the candidate that will win and all the losing candidates.  
Voting is not a lottery.  Electors have preferences and vote in line with those preferences.  
Fundamentally electors are not interested in being on the winning side; they are interested 
in the victory of their preferred candidate. 
 
Consider the dividing up of a cake between 24 salivating children.  Just before the cake is 
cut, it is discovered that the cake contains nuts.  Unfortunately, some of the children have 
a nut allergy and cannot eat the cake.  It is proposed that the cake should be shared out 
amongst the non-allergic children.  However, there is a great deal of upset and it is 
suggested by one of the allergic children that the one-24
th
 share for each allergic child 
should be thrown in the bin, spitefully restricting the amount of cake that the non-allergic 
children would receive.  There is no agreement and it is suggested that there should be a 
vote.  Would a vote be valuable to all 24 children?  If the number of non-allergic children 
was already known to be more than 12, then, I would submit, no.  There would be no 
contingency – no uncertainty about the outcome.  The vote would be no more than a 
head-count of non-allergic children.  Let us assume, though, that the number of non-
allergic children is not known and it is conceivable that children in favour of throwing 
away shares (i.e. spiteful, allergic, children) may be in a majority – the problem of nut 
allergy is ubiquitous amongst children in this locality.  In such a vote, all the children 
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would be able to vote but still only those voting for the successful outcome would have 
contributed to that outcome.  As the vote is taken, admittedly, the outcome is not known 
– the outcome is contingent – but only because of a lack of knowledge of the states of 
mind of the voting children.  If, though, democracy is about the opportunity to contribute 
to an outcome, that must be irrelevant.
55
 
 
The freedom that democracy offers is not like liberal freedoms.  Liberal freedoms are, on 
any moral account, to be proffered generally to all citizens.  If citizens are denied liberal 
freedoms, it is because practice has not matched up to principle.  On the other hand, even 
when democracy is fully realised,
56
 only some will be offered the freedom to contribute 
to a democratic outcome in any particular vote.  The freedom of democracy, such as it is, 
can never be disseminated generally or equitably.  It seems to me that this is conclusive.  
Any benefit to individuals in the form of an opportunity to contribute to a democratic 
outcome is not morally significant.  However, even if I am mistaken and somehow there 
is an equal opportunity to contribute, there is a further problem:  political decisions 
(either those that voters are involved in directly (i.e. referendums) or those that they 
influence indirectly by elections of representatives) involve, in many cases, moral 
decisions.  Under one or more accounts of morality, there may, in particular 
circumstances, be a better moral choice.  Voters, though, do not (and are not obliged) to 
act morally, to apply moral criteria when deciding how to cast their votes.  Some voters 
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 Consider a bag of numbered balls.  A wins if he draws out a ball with an odd number.  A does not know 
how the balls are numbered.  A may imagine he has a 50% chance of success but, in truth, he does not 
know what are his chances of success.  A draws out a ball with an even number.  It turns out that 99 of the 
100 balls carried an even number.  A had little chance of success and we can reasonably value his chances 
on the basis of the true contents of the bag i.e. on the basis of his eventual knowledge.  [The lack of 
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do apply moral criteria (one can call this ‘voting morally’) but other voters cast their 
votes on the basis of what they perceive their self-interest to be.  And within the category 
of those who apply moral criteria when deciding how to vote, different moral criteria are 
applied and those criteria that are applied are applied more or less carefully.  One voter 
may barely consider the issues and then make a ‘moral choice’ on the basis of a leader 
column in that morning’s newspaper.  Another voter may buy the manifestos of each 
candidate and spend hours considering and researching the relative merits and impacts 
(for good or ill) of the programmes offered by competing candidates.  How then could 
there be any equality given the fact that voters take advantage of the opportunity to 
contribute in such different ways?
57
  I am not convinced that this would be a problem if, 
                                                                                                                             
knowledge may be significant in other ways, of course.  It may increase motivation to take part (in a lottery 
or in an election), for instance.] 
56
 Quite what full realisation would look like is, I accept, debatable. 
57
 In the case of referendums, voters are usually given the opportunity to contribute to an outcome which is 
determinative of a substantial political issue.  (This is not consistently so.  Some countries hold advisory 
referendums;  sometimes, governments fail to accept and implement the outcome of a referendum – for 
example, in essence, the Irish government asked the same referendum question until it got the ‘right’ 
answer – Lisbon I (June 2008) and Lisbon II (October 2009) Referendums.)  In the case of ordinary 
elections, voters have the opportunity to contribute to a decision on the identity of political leaders, 
politicians and office holders and, thereby, have an indirect say over political decisions.  (The relationship 
between voters’ intentions as expressed in voting and the decisions taken by politicians will depend upon 
the clarity and extent of the manifesto put forward by the elected candidate and the rigour with which the 
elected candidate keeps to that manifesto.  The link is likely to be fairly tenuous at times, especially if the 
elected candidate has been particularly disingenuous or run a predominantly ‘negative’ campaign.) 
What sorts of questions are put in issue by referendums?  What sorts of decisions are taken by 
democratically elected politicians?  Most will accept that many, but not all, of those decisions are moral 
choices.  (The moral sceptic or nihilist will, of course, deny this.  Some will argue that all decisions will be 
moral because, in the political realm, all decisions are necessarily other-regarding:  all decisions involve the 
extent to which the state controls or orders or supports the lives of citizens.   I am prepared to concede that 
there may be non-moral choices.) 
Political decision might be categorised as follows: 
 Decisions involving a clear moral choice – either there is a dispute as to what is the morally-
correct outcome or there is a dispute as to the morality of various means of achieving some 
outcome.  (In this category, I would place decisions involving the preferment of one group’s 
interests over those of another.  Typically such decisions involve questions of fairness and equity 
and whether any inequitable treatment is justifiable because, perhaps, of some broader benefit.  
(Of course, while a decision might be a moral one, it does not follow that morality informs the 
voting intentions of all voters.  A voter’s choice might be made on an entirely sectarian basis with 
a passing nod, a disingenuous nod or no nod at all to moral imperatives.)  [Judgments about right 
and wrong, good and bad obviously differ.  For example, for the Rawlsian or for a proponent of 
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contrary to the case I have advanced, we could properly think of the opportunity to vote 
as a liberal, type 1/2, freedom.  As already noted, individuals make use of their liberal 
freedoms in very different ways.  Those freedoms are of quite different substantive values 
to different people.  One might argue that the opportunity to vote is similar.  All adults 
have the freedom to vote; how they choose to avail themselves of that freedom would 
not, perhaps, undermine an essential equality of opportunity to vote (if the opportunity to 
vote was of value).  However, the analogy here with liberal freedoms may not be a good 
one.  Liberal freedoms allow an individual to carry on an activity which is distinct and 
probably has value in itself (e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of worship).  Those 
freedoms are not directly and immediately affected by the freedom of others.  Voting, 
                                                                                                                             
another rights-based approach, decisions which have any bearing on basic rights will be more or 
less good depending upon whether or not they foster or compromise basic rights.  Others will have 
a different conception of good or bad democratic decisions.  I do not need to attempt any 
adjudication of the relative merits of alternative ethical systems.  I do, however, of course, assume 
that, whatever meta-ethical position is taken, sometimes one position or outcome is better or more 
correct than another – that what is disputed is sometimes more than a matter of mere preference.  It 
is often argued, as I accept, that there are morally incommensurable choices.] 
 Decisions where there is no dispute about the preferred outcome but there is dispute about the best 
means of achieving that outcome where the argument is about the effectiveness of the various 
possible means of achieving the desired end and not about the morality of those means. 
 Decisions where there is a choice between non-moral or aesthetic options. 
 Decisions where there is no real dispute.  (For example, administrative actions which technically 
require the approval of a minister but which are not contested – perhaps the institution of some 
uncontested procedure within the civil service – perhaps the setting of the date of some annual 
holiday.) 
The precise extent of each of these categories will be somewhat unclear. 
As was seen when we examined the 500-rescuers experiment, there may be a moral obligation to take part 
in a collective endeavour.  Given the link (sometimes stronger, sometimes weaker) between voter choice 
and substantive political decisions – decisions which may be more or less morally right – there may be a 
moral obligation to vote.  There may be an obligation to cast a vote in the hope that that contribution along 
with the contributions of others (their votes) will be sufficient to see a certain candidate elected – a 
candidate/representative who will make the more morally-correct decisions.  However, that chance to vote 
(whether in the context of a moral obligation to vote or in the absence of such a moral imperative), that is 
the opportunity to contribute to the outcome of an election, does not necessarily afford the individual voter 
any benefit.  That is something quite different.  [I do not mean to suggest that reaching a clear decision 
based on moral imperatives is easy.  It needs to be borne in mind that there is a one-to-many relationship 
between the act of a voter in contributing to the group electing a candidate and the decisions of that elected 
candidate.  Those decisions are likely to be highly diverse.  Many of those decisions will involve moral 
choices.  The sheer difficulty of performing the moral calculus could obviate any obligation to vote.  It is 
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though, is fundamentally not an end in itself; it is a means by which a person is elected to 
public office or the means by which a referendum question is resolved.  The votes of 
others have immediate impact on the value of the vote of each individual.  For liberal 
freedoms, the value of the freedoms to individuals varies circumstantially.  While those 
circumstances include the attitudes and conduct of other people, the attitude and conduct 
of others is but a part of those circumstances – quite possibly a remote part.  The value of 
the freedom to vote, though, is immediately, intrinsically and fundamentally affected by 
the conduct of others. 
 
Other Benefits from Being Able to Contribute 
Democracy is fundamentally about deciding for something or someone and deciding 
against something or someone else.  It is about winning and losing.  It was reasonable to 
proceed on that basis when investigating whether democracy offered a valuable freedom 
to individuals.  It was reasonable to start from that point because, whatever else 
democracy might be, or offer, it should be taken at face value first.  Modern deliberative 
accounts there may be but democracy fundamentally purports to be a contest over 
representatives and political decisions.
58
  I have emphasised that democracy is 
fundamentally about one collective endeavour – the goal of having the state endorse or 
adopt something or someone – overcoming other collective endeavours – endeavours that 
fail in their aim to have the state endorse or adopt something or someone else.  My 
                                                                                                                             
not hard to imagine being in the position where one simply has little or no idea whether the overall better 
outcome will be fostered by candidate A or candidate B.] 
58
 In real life, democracy and politics is marked by much mutual antagonism and contempt.  The 
assumption of deliberative theorists that politicians and citizenry are committed to an open and fair 
discourse in the hope of reaching fair and appropriate solutions is not in keeping with the world as we know 
it. 
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analysis has suggested that the benefit from democracy to individuals is the opportunity 
to contribute to a collective outcome.  However, it is conceivable that democracy may 
offer freedoms to citizens other than the freedom to contribute to democratic outcomes 
and, for the sake of completeness, I consider these here. 
 
We should consider whether voters gain satisfaction from having contributed to the 
outcome (i.e. the successful outcome – a satisfaction that would not have existed if the 
voter’s preferred option had been imposed by the diktat of some unelected person).  We 
should consider whether voters gain satisfaction from voting for their preferred candidate 
(whether or not successful) and from the expressive power of voting (again, even if their 
preferred option/candidate does not win the ballot).  We should consider whether voters 
gain a satisfaction having been shown respect in that his or her opinion has been or could 
have made a contribution to the outcome. 
 
For similar reasons to those already rehearsed, the opportunity to have the satisfaction 
from having contributed cannot form the basis of a valuable freedom.  There is no 
equitable division of this opportunity of satisfaction.  The voters who vote for the 
winning candidate may derive a satisfaction but those who vote for an unsuccessful 
candidate will not.  Voters are likely to experience a certain satisfaction because the voter 
prefers a particular outcome and the voter has helped to make that outcome slightly more 
likely by voting, whether or not that outcome materialises.  A voter may also derive some 
satisfaction from the expressive nature of voting.  Even if the preferred choice does not 
prevail, the voter may experience some satisfaction from having had the opportunity to 
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have their opposition to some outcome registered and counted.
59
  It is doubtful, though, 
whether such satisfactions are distinct from the satisfaction of having contributed to the 
successful outcome/candidate or the dissatisfaction of having contributed to the failed 
bid.  Surely all the satisfactions/dissatisfactions of voting should be aggregated.  If that is 
the correct approach, it is likely that the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of voting for the 
successful/unsuccessful candidate will always be sufficiently strong to render the 
aggregate satisfactions of voting unequal.  The satisfactions of those voting for the 
winner will always be significantly greater than the satisfactions of other voters and, that 
being so, the satisfactions offered by democracy will not be morally significant. 
 
Even if the moral significance of the satisfactions of contributing to a preferred outcome 
(whether or not the preferred choice is unsuccessful) and the opportunity to express a 
commitment are considered separately from other satisfactions, these satisfactions do not, 
themselves, appear to be distributed equitably.  Even if assessed distinctly, these 
satisfactions must be considered contextually.  Voters who voted for the unsuccessful 
option or candidate may reflect upon the fact that democracy provides other citizens with 
the opportunity of voting in self-interested, shallow or perverse fashions.  Indeed, given 
that those that voted for the unsuccessful option/candidate on a moral basis consider that 
the voters voting for the successful option/candidate were mistaken, they are quite likely 
to harbour doubts about the bona fides, integrity and insight of many of those other 
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 This expressive satisfaction is likely to be greater for the voter who is morally opposed to the successful 
outcome than for the person voting for reasons of self-interest.  But it should be noted that a voter may gain 
a satisfaction from voting in a fashion which is in some sense morally dubious or even reprehensible.  A 
voter might be voting in favour of some militaristic adventure fuelled by an embittered nationalism.  It 
seems doubtful that a satisfaction so derived should be viewed as significant and as a proper subject of 
some procedural fairness. 
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voters.  Thus, unsuccessful voters are likely to feel that their contribution, their 
expression, has been subverted by those who act out of self-interested motives and those 
who act without thought.  This will surely undermine any satisfaction that the 
unsuccessful voters would otherwise have experienced.  Their expression of support 
based on moral integrity has been drowned out by those acting from more base motives.  
Now admittedly, those feelings are likely to be felt whoever loses.  We all tend to flatter 
our own opinions and conclusions and tend to be disdainful of those who disagree with us 
– look no further than academic journals.  The point I am making though is that there is 
an inequality:  those that contributed to a losing venture are going to be troubled by the 
assumed attitudes and motivations of the contributors to the winning venture whereas 
those who contributed to the successful outcome are unlikely to be so troubled.  I suspect 
that this difference in satisfactions is always likely to be present where there is a single 
practice but incorporating two or more competing collective activities.  Consider, for 
example, a cup final which passes off without any suggestion of bias or incompetence by 
referees and officials (or spot-fixing by players).  All players on both sides may take 
some satisfaction from having taken part.  All players had the opportunity to contribute.  
However, the losing players are likely to reflect on the fact that the other side had better 
players or that their team was hampered by some weak players or some injury, etc.  The 
satisfactions of taking part in a sporting fixture or an election are not likely to be equal 
and thus will not be of moral significance.
60
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 Even if the satisfaction of taking part and expressing oneself had been of moral significance, it may be 
worth noting that such satisfactions may have been minimal.  First, the extent of the contribution voters 
have is not generally very great and that contribution is but one of very many and, secondly, immediate 
satisfaction must be set off against the possibility of later dissatisfaction. 
First, then, the effort involved in voting is fairly minimal and any beneficial outcome is only achieved in 
concert with many other voters.  That suggests that the satisfaction from having contributed or having 
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Perhaps, citizens derive satisfaction from the fact that each is accorded respect by the 
electoral process.  Democracy is often thought to be an expression of the equal value of 
each human being.  On the face of it, the influence over decision-making given to each 
voter suggests that the view and opinion of each voter is equally important.  Indeed, it 
suggests that the each voter is afforded respect.  The respect is apparently distributed 
equitably.  So could the respect for citizens implicit in democracy be morally significant?  
There are reasons to doubt this.  Again, such respect is not likely to be distributed 
equitably.  The respect which a citizen may be conscious of, because the state allows for 
his contribution to the democratic process, is not felt simply when the citizen has voted 
for the winner.  So the benefit from being respected is not distributed similarly to the 
freedom of being able to contribute to the successful candidate or the satisfaction of 
having voted for the successful candidate.  However, the way in which that respect is 
experienced by individual voters will be related, to some extent, to the likelihood that that 
voter will contribute to a successful outcome.  In the situation rehearsed above where 
                                                                                                                             
expressed oneself will be quite limited.    Thirdly, my satisfaction may be transient.  Consider:  I have the 
chance to contribute to a democratic outcome.  I want the outcome to be x because I consider that x is the 
morally preferable outcome.  I perceive my vote to be a benefit because by voting I can make x more likely 
to transpire.  However, sometime later, I am persuaded that I was mistaken and conclude that y and not x 
was the better option.  I now perceive my vote to have been anything but a benefit (at least in terms of its 
contribution to the moral good).  I now wish that I had voted differently or, at least, had failed to vote.  
There would appear to be a satisfaction benefit from voting for a morally bad choice as long as the voter 
continues to believe that the choice was the correct one.  But as soon as the voter realises that they voted 
wrongly, they suffer a loss of satisfaction.  While no exact comparison is possible between the pleasure 
derived from voting on the basis of a mistaken belief and the later upset upon the realisation of error – we 
are considering internal states of mind and the psychological make-up of individual voters – it may be 
reasonable to conclude that the later loss, at the very least, cancels out the initial satisfaction benefit.  
Indeed, it is likely that a later realisation of error will more than outweigh the initial satisfaction.  The later 
realisation is likely to be accompanied by feelings of regret and possibly guilt.  [What about the voter who 
votes for self-interested motives?  What satisfaction does he derive?  It is impossible to generalise.  The 
extent of the satisfaction will depend upon the particular psychological make-up of the voter.  A sociopath 
might derive the most satisfaction from voting in his or her direct self-interest.  On the other extreme, an 
individual might, almost immediately, be racked with guilt for voting immorally.] 
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there is no contingency because there is an entrenched majority, members of the minority 
will not feel respected.  The feeling of respect is likely to be at its greatest when voters 
accept various popular myths about democracy and the individual’s role in democracy 
(and may be undermined if voters come to believe what many political scientists argue –  
that their vote has no significance).  There are other factors, though, that may undermine 
this feeling of respect:  parties’ concentration on very few marginal constituencies or 
swing districts while the voting behaviour of large swathes of the population are assumed 
and taken for granted;  the negative, disingenuous and obscurantist campaigning which 
suggests contempt for the intelligence of voters.
61
 
 
Summary 
Democracy does not give individuals as individuals the freedom to influence democratic 
outcomes.  Democratic outcomes (i.e. the election of a candidate or the result of a 
referendum) are not caused by individuals.  However, democracy does give individual 
voters the opportunity to contribute to democratic decision-making.  They do this as part 
of a group of voters.  It is necessary to bear in mind that the value of the freedom is not in 
the freedom to vote per se but in the freedom to contribute to particular democratic 
outcomes.  Accordingly, the freedom has a different value to different voters.  To those 
living in a polarised polity who are in an entrenched minority, the freedom may have no 
value at all.  In other polities where the outcomes of elections are uncertain, the value to 
voters will depend upon the particular opportunity they have to contribute to successful 
                                                                                                                             
 
61
 I leave aside subjective factors – the psychology etc. of individual votes – which will affect the level of 
satisfaction that individual voters will derive from the respect accorded by being able to vote.  I assume that 
132 
 
democratic outcomes in that polity.  The extent of that opportunity will differ from voter 
to voter, depending upon their interests and commitments and the interests and 
commitments of all other voters (i.e. upon the demographics of the polity and their voting 
district).  Given that the moral value of political freedoms lies in their universality, the 
freedom offered by democracy lacks moral value and significance because it is not 
disseminated equally. 
 
I went on to consider whether the freedom to vote is valuable because of the satisfactions 
that may be derived.  I concluded that what satisfactions there are are not disseminated 
equally and, thus, they also lack moral significance. 
 
Democracy does not offer any valuable freedom to individuals which might account for 
the worth of democracy and which might represent a value which could stand in 
Berlinian tension with liberal freedoms.  Democracy cannot be justified procedurally or 
intrinsically. 
 
I have insisted that when analysing democracy, alternative possible democratic outcomes 
(i.e. the election of different candidates) should be viewed as competing endeavours.  
Democracy can be seen as a background set of rules which determine how alternative 
politicians and political agendas compete for adoption by the state.  A democratic vote 
does not represent a single endeavour; it represents two or more competing endeavours 
only one of which will succeed.  Supporters of deliberative democracy argue that 
                                                                                                                             
what should be equal is the opportunity to be satisfied rather than the subjective feeling of respect 
experienced by voters.  
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democracy is a single practice and all citizens (or at least those that engage with the 
process) contribute to the process which leads to the final outcome.  In the next chapter, I 
turn to deliberative democracy.  Can democracy be viewed as a single practice and can 
the advocates of deliberative democracy demonstrate that electoral democracy has a 
value that might explain how electoral democracy could function as a political theory? 
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Chapter 4 
Deliberative Democracy and Electoral Democracy 
‘Deliberative democracy’ is undoubtedly of significant current interest to the academy.  
Stephen Elstub, admittedly a proponent of deliberative democracy, writes that 
‘[deliberative democracy] now dominates theoretical discussions of democracy, and is 
starting to receive broad coverage in practical discussions of democracy’.1  Most 
undergraduate texts on democracy now include sections on deliberative democracy.
2
  
Whatever doubts, then, that this writer has about the coherence and value of this 
burgeoning body of research and reflection, deliberative democracy cannot be ignored.  
In this chapter I try to elicit from theories of deliberative democracy an account of the 
value of electoral democracy so that an assessment can be made whether electoral 
democracy so valued can amount to a political theory that is compatible with liberalism 
and, indeed, with other comprehensive worldviews.  Having set out the main 
distinguishing features of deliberative democracy, I note that a dividing line can be drawn 
between those deliberative democrats I call ‘purists’, who do not seem to imagine any 
valuable role for elections, and those I call ‘pragmatists’ (for want of a better name),3 
who envisage an, albeit unclear, role for electoral democracy.  I argue that deliberative 
democrats of both ilks hold negative, ambivalent or incoherent views about the value of 
electoral democracy.  Thus, they provide no credible explanation for the value that is 
                                           
1
 Stephen Elstub, ‘The Third Generation of Deliberative Democracy’, Political Studies Review Vol.8 No.3 
(September 2010) pp.291-307 at p.291. 
2
 See, for instance, David Held, Models of Democracy (3
rd
 ed.) (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) Ch. 9 pp.231-
258, Albert Weale, Democracy (2
nd
 ed.) (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) Ch.4 pp.77-100 and 
Michael Saward, Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2003) pp.121-124.  Anthony Arblaster has so far held out 
– see Anthony Arblaster, Democracy (3rd ed.)  (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002). 
3
 It may be that, in the round, such theorists hold almost anything but a pragmatic view of democracy and 
government but they are pragmatic in this one respect:  they acknowledge the existence of electoral 
democracy and make some attempt to accommodate it into their accounts of deliberative democracy. 
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commonly thought to be borne by electoral outcomes and do not offer any justification 
for electoral democracy as a political theory. 
 
As alluded to above, there is now a vast body of work on deliberative democracy.  I 
neither have the space nor the inclination to draw upon all of that literature. I have had to 
confine myself to analysis of the writings of some of the seminal writers in the field:  
Seyla Benhabib, James Bohman, Dryzek, Jon Elster, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson 
and Iris Young.  These writers figure significantly in survey articles on deliberative 
democracy and, as I hope will become clear, they reflect the diversity of deliberative 
democratic thinking, serving as satisfactory proxies for the breadth of deliberative 
democratic writing.
4
 
 
It should be noted that deliberation is considered significant by other writers who identify 
themselves as liberals.  I do not class these writers as deliberative democrats.  As might 
be expected, the accounts of such writers only allow for deliberation that is consistent 
with their liberal accounts.  I note that these liberals have appropriated deliberative ideas 
in a fashion which purports to bolster their liberalism.  Thus, for such writers, there is no 
tension between liberalism and what they think of as deliberative democracy and, further, 
for them, any tension between liberalism and electoral democracy will tend to be 
implicitly downplayed in so far as such thinkers accept or adapt the deliberative critique 
                                           
4
 See, for example, James Bohman, ‘The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy’,  Journal of Political 
Philosophy  Vol. 6 No.4 (December 1998) pp.400-425, Simone Chambers, ‘Deliberative Democratic 
Theory’, Annual Review of Political Science Vol.6 (June 2003) pp.307-326 and Elstub. 
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of electoral democracy.  Indeed, as with other liberals, their preferred accounts generally 
undermine the role and legitimacy of electoral democracy.
5
 
 
Deliberative Democracy 
As Dryzek puts it, for the proponents of deliberative democracy ‘… democratic 
legitimacy
6
 came to be seen in terms of the ability or opportunity to participate in 
                                           
5
 The idea of deliberation has become ubiquitous in political philosophy.  Due in no small measure to 
Rawls and Habermas, deliberation is seen as significant by those that are outside of the deliberative 
democracy fold, as I have defined it.  Dryzek offers a broader definition of deliberative democracy than I 
do and includes within it those accounts where deliberative democracy, as he thinks of it, has been 
assimilated to liberalism – see op.cit. especially ch.1.  Dryzek claims that Rawls identified himself as a 
deliberative democrat in Political Liberalism [op.cit. p.2].  In a later paper, Rawls equates the term 
‘deliberative democracy’ with the well-ordered constitutional democracy he endorses [‘Public Reason’ 
pp.771-772].  Elstub goes so far as to assert that Rawls stands alongside Habermas as a ‘first-generation’ 
deliberative democrat – in essence, as a father of deliberative democratic thought [op.cit. especially pp.291-
293].  It is not immediately clear why Rawls should be so readily appropriated by the deliberative tendency.  
Primarily, Rawlsian deliberation takes place in the hypothetical original position and leads to a pre-
democratic constitutionalism.  It is noted, though, that he also envisages actual deliberation in the form of 
the exchange of public reason taking place between judges in a supreme court, within the executive and 
legislature and amongst candidates for public office albeit only in connection with constitutional essentials 
and ‘basic justice’ [‘Public Reason’ p.767].  This is quite unlike the deliberative democracy envisaged by 
the likes of Dryzek, James Bohman, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. 
Dryzek distinguishes two branches of deliberative thought – one liberal and one critical.  He is prepared to 
classify both as deliberative democracy but I see that as too generous.  Only the critical branch properly 
warrants the designation ‘deliberative democracy’.  The liberal branch remains fundamentally liberal not 
democratic.  Dryzek suggests that the liberal stream deploys deliberative insights so that liberal thought and 
democracy can be reconciled.  I would say that that reconciliation is very much on liberalism’s terms.  The 
approach is, Dryzek claims, three-fold [op.cit. pp.8-17].  First, it is argued that certain liberal rights must be 
respected in order to facilitate democracy.  [Presumably, this is a slightly fuller account than might be 
offered by democrats uninfluenced by deliberative thought.  Such democrats might point out that free and 
fair elections, involving party organisation, campaigning and the dissemination of information about 
candidates and parties requires certain liberal freedoms (at least at or around election time).]  Secondly, it is 
argued that liberal constitutionalism promotes deliberation – it provides various arenas (i.e. the institutions 
of a liberal state) and a liberal public sphere where deliberation can take place.  Thirdly, it is pointed out 
that constitution-making itself can and should be a deliberative exercise. 
We should not, perhaps, be surprised by the readiness of liberals to appropriate deliberative ideas.  There 
are obvious connections.  Dialogue and deliberation are facilitated by freedoms of speech, expression and 
association.  The appropriation of deliberative ideas may seem harmless from the liberal perspective and, 
further, given that democratic outcomes may clash with liberal nostrums, the deliberative account can be 
deployed not to give a distinct justification for electoral democratic outcomes but rather to criticise and 
undermine the legitimacy of electoral democratic outcomes.  There are now ‘democratic’ reasons as well as 
liberal ones for criticising electoral democratic outcomes that are not acceptable to the liberal.  Dryzek 
makes this point [op.cit. p.10]:  a reconciliation between liberalism and democracy is easier if democracy 
can be thought of deliberatively.  [See also Patrick Deneen’s polemical response to deliberative democracy 
in Patrick Deneen, Democratic Faith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) Ch.1 esp. pp.20-29.  
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effective deliberation on the part of those subject to collective decisions’.7  That 
distinguishes deliberative democracy from other accounts of democracy which perceive 
democracy as being about competition or about the aggregation of voter interests (e.g. 
competitive elitism or social choice theory).  Given that the aim of deliberation is 
consensus where all agree to own the deliberative outcome, democratic decisions could 
‘embody the “will of the people”’8 and democracy really could be government by the 
people.  There are, thus, three key features of deliberative democracy:  first it involves 
participation; secondly, that participation is participation in deliberation; and, thirdly, that 
deliberation is determinative of collective action – deliberation must be more than an 
academic exercise – it is about the exercise of power.  Given that we are concerned with 
democratic participation, we can reasonably assume, and indeed it is clear, that 
deliberative democrats have in mind an egalitarian participation:  all citizens should have 
the free and equal opportunity to participate meaningfully in political decision-making.  
As for deliberation, proponents of deliberative democracy have in mind a process which 
involves communication and reflection.  All participants may act as both speakers and 
listeners.  The requirement for reflection imposes reciprocal obligations upon speaker and 
listener.  The listener must be open to the possibility of a change in beliefs and 
preferences; the speaker must communicate reasons that are potentially acceptable to 
                                                                                                                             
What Deneen seems to have in his sights are those accounts which are fundamentally liberal with 
deliberative ideas bolted on.] 
6
 It might be noted that the use of the idea of legitimacy, in this context, has strongly monist overtones.  If 
deliberative democracy legitimates, then any clashing liberal imperative must be delegitimated.  I return to 
the question of legitimacy at the end of my chapter 7. 
7
 Op. cit. p.1. 
8
 Bohman, ‘The Coming of Age’ pp.400-401 
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listeners.  Those reasons must be public because reasons must be potentially acceptable to 
all.  The mere statement of preferences and beliefs will not suffice.
9
 
 
Necessarily, one would have thought, deliberative democrats must contemplate the 
process of deliberation leading to an outcome, but deliberative democrats are rarely 
prescriptive, and often silent, about how any outcome will be arrived at or, indeed, what 
constitutes an outcome.
10
  Deliberative democrats do attempt to explain what will 
legitimate an outcome.  Largely adopting Habermasian discourse ethics, an outcome is 
considered legitimate if it has been arrived at by a public process of the exchange of 
reasons leading to a consensus (i.e. the agreement of all citizens, sharing the same 
reasons for preferring the agreed outcome).
11
  Later deliberative thinkers have addressed 
the impracticality of this ideal of legitimacy.  Bohman clearly endorses this ideal of 
consensus given appropriate conditions, but he goes on to comment – indeed, what else 
could he reasonably do? – that ‘… this standard of agreement is hard to achieve and is 
usually considered a counterfactual and regulative ideal’.12  There is also an explicit 
                                           
9
 Deliberative democrats differ markedly in what constitutes valid communication.  For some a valid 
communication must be in the form of rational argument; it must be overtly and expressly reason-giving; 
for others, valid communication may take a number of forms e.g. story-telling, rhetoric (probably not meant 
in a strictly Aristotelian sense), etc. 
10
 The prevalent failure of deliberative democrats to specify procedures for arriving at decisions has lead to 
trenchant criticism.  Carol Gould writes ‘… these discursive interpretations of democracy focus exclusively 
on participation as talk or discussion or deliberation.  In effect, it becomes all talk and no action, in the 
sense of effective decision-making.  We may say that while a decision without deliberation is blind, 
deliberation without decision is empty’.  [Carol Gould, ‘Diversity and Democracy:  Representing 
Differences’, in Democracy and Difference ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1996) pp.171-186 at p.176.] 
11
 Iris Young, for one, is explicit in her reliance:  ‘I mean this paragraph to echo the pragmatic theory of 
rightness expressed in discourse ethics.  On this theory a norm is valid if it is the result of free discussion 
and agreement under circumstances of inclusive equality.  See Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Ethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990) esp. chs. 3 and 4.’  [Iris Young, Inclusion and 
Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 2000) n.23 (p.30).]
 
12
 James Bohman, Public Deliberation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) p.6. 
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acceptance, at least by some, that a deliberative democracy must produce outcomes.
13
  
Decisions need to be reached.  One would have thought that all acceptable deliberative 
accounts should recognise that. 
 
These aspects of deliberative democracy – the account of deliberative democratic 
legitimacy and the requirement that there be actual decisions and outcomes – seem to be 
in tension.
14
  In the real world, reaching a political decision, bringing about a political 
outcome, will mean terminating the deliberation while it is still inadequate.  Deliberation 
cannot extend indefinitely in the real world.  The termination of the deliberation will, 
inevitably (or, almost inevitably) produce a deliberatively incomplete outcome.  The 
quality of outcomes will be a matter of degree.  Dryzek writes, ‘Authentic democracy can 
… be said to exist to the degree that reflective preferences influence collective outcomes 
[my emphasis]’.15 
 
The Value of Electoral Democracy in Accounts of Deliberative Democracy 
Deliberative democrats are critical of electoral democracy – what is often called, 
disparagingly, ‘aggregative democracy’.  From the deliberative perspective, electoral 
democracy is demonstratively inadequate.  At its worst, it is a crude exercise in head-
counting.  True democracy is not that.  Young writes, ‘Participants arrive at a decision 
                                           
13
 E.g. Gutmann and Thompson (at least in later writings).  They are something of an exception.  They 
assert that deliberative democracy ‘… aims at producing a decision … [my emphasis]’ [Amy Gutmann & 
Dennis Thompson, What Deliberative Democracy Means (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 
p.5.]  It is not clear, though, what value Gutmann and Thompson place on the decision-making procedures 
that are available – they refer to executive orders, legislative votes and elections [ibid.].  Do elections have 
particular value as mechanisms for decision-making or are they simply the decision-making givens that 
happen to exist in the types of state that their readers will be most acquainted with?  
14
 This tension is explored in some detail by Jack Knight & James Johnson, ‘Aggregation and Deliberation: 
On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy’, Political Theory Vol.22 No.2 (May 1994) pp.277-296. 
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not by determining what preferences have greatest numerical support, but by determining 
which proposals the collective agrees are supported for the best reasons.’16  While I have 
previously shown that electoral democracy is about collective activity, it is about 
competing collective endeavours:  the collective endeavour to elect A against the 
collective endeavour to elect B.  Deliberative democracy claims, in effect, to be a single 
collective endeavour:  a process of deliberation in which all can take part.  The common 
pretension of electoral democracy that its outcomes are legitimate simply because they 
are the result of a fair and valid electoral process must necessarily offend the deliberative 
democrat and bring electoral democracy into the deliberative democratic firing line.  I 
suggest that attitudes to electoral democracy provide a litmus test for deliberative 
democracy.  Any account that ascribes legitimacy to electoral democratic outcomes 
simply because they are majoritarian or represent the view of a plurality cannot be 
deliberatively democratic.  If electoral outcomes are legitimised independently of any 
deliberative legitimation, then deliberation has effectively been isolated from the exercise 
of power.  The deliberating community is left in a position where it can comment and 
criticise to its heart’s content but, if the legitimacy of electoral outcomes is independently 
accepted, the comment and criticism is unrelated to the exercise of power.
17
  Such an 
account which legitimises electoral democracy independently of the deliberative exercise 
cannot be deliberatively democratic. 
 
                                                                                                                             
15
 Op. cit. p.2. 
16
 Op. cit. p.23. 
17
 I rely here on insights in Bohman Public Deliberation pp.153-154.  Bohman does not state matters in 
such stark terms but clearly sets out the problem for deliberative democrats.  {Given Habermas’s revised 
account in Jurgen Habermas, Beyond Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy trans. William Regh (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), it is questionable, then, whether 
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None of this is to suggest that, necessarily, electoral democracy cannot play any role in a 
deliberatively democratic scheme but it cannot be endorsed upon the same basis that a 
non-deliberative democrat accepts electoral democracy.  Electoral democracy may be 
inadequate but still conceivably have some function for deliberative democrats.  So what 
value (if any) does deliberative democracy attach to the decisions and outcomes of 
electoral democracy?  Some deliberative democrats have tended to be either silent about 
electoral democracy or, if electoral democracy is mentioned, no meaningful role for it is 
articulated.  Elster writes: 
The core of the [deliberative approach ...] is that rather than aggregating or 
filtering preferences, the political system should be set up with a view to changing 
them by public debate and confrontation [...  T]here would not be any need for an 
aggregation mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce 
unanimous preferences.
18
 
 
Further, the concentration of such deliberative democrats on the diverse and multi-faceted 
public sphere where deliberation proceeds away from the formal governmental apparatus 
of a state, suggests that their work is to be read as dismissive of the value of electoral 
democracy.  I call these ‘purists’.  Understandably, perhaps, the purists may have felt that 
attributing any value to electoral outcomes would undermine their account of the 
inadequacy of electoral democracy.  Dryzek who deserves to be placed firmly within the 
purist camp, does concede that ‘[s]ome deliberative democrats have been rather silent on 
how collective decisions are in fact made.  As such they leave themselves open to critics 
                                                                                                                             
Habermas can properly be considered to be within the deliberative democratic fold.  I think this is the point 
that Bohman makes [Public Deliberation p.182].} 
18
 Jon Elster, ‘The Market and the Forum’, in Foundations of Social Choice Theory eds. Jon Elster & 
Aanund Hylland (Cambridge: CUP, 1986) pp.103-132 at p.112 [quoted in Christian List, ‘Group 
Communication and the Transformation of Judgments:  An Impossibility Result’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy Vol.19 No.1 (March 2011) pp.1-27 at p.1].  See also comments by Knight & Johnson, ‘They 
insist that aggregation needs to be supplemented and perhaps entirely supplanted […]’ [op.cit. p.277] and 
by Bohman, ‘In the early formulations […], deliberation was always opposed to aggregation […]’ 
[‘Coming of Age’ p.400]. 
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who point out that deliberation is a radically incomplete democratic theory.’19  However, 
while he apparently accepts the view that deliberative democracy should include an 
account of how decisions are reached, this acceptance is followed by a painfully thin 
account of how decisions might be arrived at and Dryzek does not admit to any 
meaningful role for electoral democracy.
20
  
 
The purist position is not typical of all deliberative democrats.  Bohman, Gutmann and 
Thompson acknowledge electoral democracy and seem to place some value on it but, as 
deliberative democrats, they do not place any independent value on it.  Bohman accepts 
that representatives should make decisions (presumably he has elected politicians in 
mind) because it is not practical to involve all citizens directly in a deliberation but he 
attributes value to the decisions of representatives only if those decisions are properly 
deliberative.
21
  Bohman gives a brief account of what he calls ‘deliberative majority 
rule’.22  This, though, is not a strong and independent valuation of electoral democracy.  
Majority rule simply ‘provides a perfectly acceptable basis for [the cooperative use of 
                                           
19
 Op.cit. p.38. 
20
 Dryzek gives us observations such as ‘[d]iscursive democracy emphasizes intersubjective 
communication across discourses within the public sphere, and treats public opinion as the outcome of their 
contestation’ [ibid. p.56].  I am not convinced that that answers the critics who assert that much deliberative 
democracy lacks an account of how actual decisions are reached.  In truth, it is not clear whether Dryzek 
would or would not concede any role for electoral democracy.  At one point he refers to ‘[d]owngrading the 
centrality of voting’ [ibid. p.47] which might suggest some continuing role.  However, his attack on 
electoral democracy is in significant part based on his acceptance of the social choice critique of the 
meaningfulness of electoral outcomes [see my chapter 1] and it is not clear what role he would concede to 
electoral democracy given that acceptance.   [Deliberative democracy, for Dryzek, can survive the social 
choice critique in a way that electoral democracy cannot.]  It is noted that Dryzek made these observations 
prior to the publication of Gerry Mackie’s powerful criticism of social choice scepticism about the 
meaningfulness of electoral democracy in Democracy Defended. 
21
 Public Deliberation p.6:  ‘the quality of deliberation is crucial to determining the reasonableness of an 
outcome or a decision’. 
22
 Ibid. p.184.  For Bohman’s pains, Dryzek refers to his ‘seeming defection’ from the cause [op.cit.p.27]. 
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practical reason among citizens]’.23  It is not clear whether Bohman is claiming that there 
is any imperative to facilitate or improve electoral democracy in order to assist the 
deliberative endeavour;  he may simply mean that in whatever form electoral democracy 
happens to exist, it can be co-opted to the deliberative need.  Once co-opted, electoral 
democracy may have value.  The value Bohman describes, though, has nothing to do with 
the quality of an electoral outcome.  Rather, electoral democracy may reveal the 
existence of an entrenched minority opinion.  A deliberatively democratic state will then 
be motivated to amend or develop its structures so that the voice of the minority can be 
heard.  Bizarrely, then, electoral democracy has value because of its failures rather than 
its successes.
24
  However, in a 1998 review article, Bohman seems to go further, writing 
approvingly of accounts offered by Carlos Nino and Young which give ‘representative 
institutions’ both a pragmatic and a normative role in deliberative democratic accounts.25  
In Inclusion and Democracy, Young offers a lengthy defence of the role of 
representatives in the deliberative process.
26
  We need to exercise care here, though.  The 
requirement for, and the appropriateness of, representation, presumably by elected 
representatives
27
, is accepted but such an acceptance is on a wholly different basis to such 
acceptance by non-deliberative democrats.  Non-deliberative democrats endorse the 
election of representatives because they believe that the electoral process gives 
legitimacy not merely to the representatives but, by extension, to the legislative and 
                                           
23
 Op.cit. p.184. 
24
 Ibid.  If a citizenry revises its electoral democratic procedures so that the minority opinion is taken into 
account, does that not suggest an improvement in the legitimacy of the electoral democratic outcome?  
Presumably not:  legitimacy does not lie with electoral outcomes.  For Bohman, ‘popular sovereignty lies 
[elsewhere]’ [ibid. p.182].  
25
 ‘The Coming of Age’ pp.415-416. 
26
 Op. cit. pp.121-153 (Ch.4). 
27
 It is not altogether clear why satisfactory representatives could not be identified other than by elections:  
communities may believe that tribal chiefs or ‘community leaders’ speak for them. 
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executive decisions made by those representatives.  Any endorsement by deliberative 
democrats of the electoral process of choosing representatives must be limited to an 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the representatives.  The quality of the deliberation 
between representatives (or between representatives and other discussants) will determine 
the degree of legitimacy of the eventual political outcome.  It should be noted that any 
endorsement of electoral democracy as a process by which representatives are identified 
and appointed cannot be a broad endorsement of electoral democracy per se;  any 
endorsement would be for a particular system at a particular time.  The system would 
need to identify a sufficiently broad range of representatives so that, essentially, all 
citizens are represented in the deliberation that continues after the election.  Deliberative 
democrats may argue about the best mechanisms for achieving a sufficiently diverse 
collection of representatives – perhaps, proportional representation or selection of party 
candidates from all-women shortlists or the reserving of legislative seats to specified 
minority groups.  If the electoral system is so designed that it fails to produce 
representatives who properly reflect the diverse views in the polity, such a system will 
presumably be invalid. 
 
What is critical to Bohman’s account is that the deliberation does not end when a political 
decision is reached.  Instead, the deliberation is ongoing.  In that way, the concern about 
the inadequacy of an electoral outcome (i.e. the lack of a true Habermasian consensus) is 
addressed:  those that do not agree with the electoral outcome have the opportunity to 
continue to deliberate in the hope of changing the decision with which they did not 
concur.  A similar approach is outlined by Gutmann & Thompson:  ‘[a]t some point, the 
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deliberation temporarily ceases, and the leaders make a decision [my emphasis].’28 
However, they go on to state that such ‘conclusions […] are binding in the present on all 
citizens but open to challenge in the future’.29  The fact that decisions are binding 
suggests that Gutmann and Thompson place significant value on electoral democracy.  
We are told that ‘[o]n any conception of democracy, elections must be held […]’30 but 
Gutmann and Thompson go on to make clear that electoral outcomes are not necessarily 
fair, indeed, may well not be fair and, further, the outcome can tell us nothing about 
whether that outcome is fair.
31
  But there seems to be something of an inconsistency here:  
on the one hand, electoral outcomes lack deliberative value but, on the other hand, 
citizens are to consider themselves bound by those decisions.
32
  Gutmann and Thompson 
do not explain why citizens should consider themselves bound.  If elections and the 
decisions of duly elected legislatures and executives may have no value as deliberatively 
democratic outcomes, why are they legitimate?  If they are legitimate, it follows that this 
does not appear have anything to do with their relation to deliberative democracy.  
However, Gutmann and Thompson offer no other justificatory account of electoral 
democracy.  Reading between the lines, Gutmann and Thompson’s account suggests, 
perhaps, an instrumentalist justification for electoral democracy.  What is implied is an 
endorsement of the view that political decisions have to be made and that electoral 
democracy is the best way of reaching those decisions.  This, however, is an argument 
that they do not seem prepared to make overt.  Indeed, as deliberative democrats they 
                                           
28
 Op.cit. p.5. 
29
 Ibid. p.7. 
30
 Ibid. p.16. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. p.5. 
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cannot do so, for such an instrumentalist account would be quite independent of 
deliberative theory. 
 
Typically, reading parts of Benhabib’s writings on deliberative democracy, there is little 
hint that electoral democracy is any part of democracy at all.  In her The Claims of 
Culture, she writes, 
Democracy, in my view, is best understood as a model for organizing the 
collective and public exercise of power in the major institutions in society on the 
basis of the principle that decisions affecting the well-being of a collectivity can 
be viewed as the outcome of a procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among 
individuals considered as moral and political equals.
33
 
 
Tallying preferences, as happens in electoral democracies, does not feature in her 
definition of democracy.  Her position is even clearer when she states 
The basis of legitimacy in democracy is to be traced back to the presumption that 
the institutions that claim obligatory power do so because their decisions 
represent standpoint equally in the interests of all.  This presumption can be 
fulfilled only if such decisions are in principle open to appropriate processes of 
public deliberation by free and equal citizens.
34
 
 
There is no reason why the outcomes of elections in electoral democracies should 
represent the standpoint of all equally.  In truth, they demonstrably do not.  Clearly, 
Benhabib does not have electoral democracy in mind here.  However, such a definition of 
democracy, which makes no reference to electoral democracy, is the obligatory assertion 
of her deliberative democratic credentials not an indication that she is a ‘purist’.  While 
there is little in The Claims of Culture that suggests a role for electoral democracy, 
elsewhere she writes that ‘[a]mong the practices that such a [deliberative] theory of 
democracy can elucidate [… is] the rationale for employing majority rule as a decision 
                                           
33
 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002) p.105. 
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procedure.’35  Indeed, in that 1996 essay, she goes further than Bohman or Gutmann and 
Thompson.  She suggests a normative justification for majority rule: 
In many instances the majority rule is a fair and rational decision procedure, not 
because legitimacy resides in numbers but because if a majority of people are 
convinced at one point on the basis of reasons formulated as closely as possible as 
a result of a process of discursive deliberation that conclusion A is the right thing 
to do, then this conclusion can remain valid until challenged by good reasons by 
some other group.  … such a conclusion has a presumptive claim to being rational 
until shown to be otherwise.
36
 
 
Benhabib’s position is similar to Gutmann and Thompson’s in that both recognise 
electoral democracy, seeing it as a step along the way towards an ideal, fully deliberative, 
decision.  However, whereas Gutmann and Thompson are somewhat diffident about the 
value of electoral democracy, Benhabib seems to present electoral outcomes positively:  
electoral outcomes, albeit that they must always be provisional, are for her ‘valid’.  There 
is an important caveat, though:  what Benhabib actually defends are majoritarian 
decisions.  The validity of provisional electoral outcomes hinges upon the fact that they 
indicate just how many people have been persuaded that a particular conclusion is 
correct.  Her endorsement, then, appears to be for plebiscites rather than for electoral 
democracy as a whole.  The election of representatives involves too much conflation of 
different issues to allow, generally, for an electoral outcome to be clearly indicative of the 
extent to which citizens have been persuaded that a particular conclusion is the correct 
one. 
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 Ibid. pp.105-106. 
35
 Seyla Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, in Democracy and 
Difference ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999) pp.67-94 at p.84. 
36
 Ibid. p.72. 
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Thus, for those I have termed ‘pragmatists’, the accounts offered of electoral democracy 
are limited and contradictory.  Young offers a justification for representative democracy 
but not plebiscites;  Benhabib a justification for plebiscites but not representative 
democracy.  On the whole, electoral democracy seems to be acknowledged, somewhat 
tacitly, as a means of arriving at outcomes that, while they should not be allowed to 
terminate the discursive process, are needed as a matter of practical politics and 
governance.   
 
Summary 
I began this chapter by asking whether deliberative democracy offered some account of 
electoral democracy which might point towards a justification for electoral democracy as 
a political theory.  I noted that the ‘purist’ camp of deliberative democrats seems to deny 
that there is any value in electoral democracy and electoral democratic outcomes.  
However, I have identified two, more ‘pragmatic’, accounts of deliberative democracy 
which place some value on electoral democracy.  Both accounts are partial.  Each 
justification such as it is justifies only one type of electoral democracy and, troublingly, 
those two accounts are contradictory.  We cannot properly view either one of these 
limited justifications as providing an acceptable justification for electoral democracy 
which might form the basis of a political theory of electoral democracy.  For a political 
theory, we are looking for a robust account that will attract the endorsement of citizens 
holding a range of comprehensive worldviews. 
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If deliberative democracy had offered a meaningful and coherent role for electoral 
democracy, it would have been necessary to go on to examine deliberative democracy in 
more depth.  On Benhabib’s account, electoral outcomes are valid only in so far as they 
presumptively identify a deliberative outcome.  Young’s account of the value of 
representative democracy stands or falls on the credibility of deliberative democracy.  
Those holding different comprehensive doctrines would need to have been persuaded by 
an overarching theory of deliberative democracy. 
 
In the next chapter, I continue to investigate deliberative democracy, not as the 
justification for electoral democracy, but to adjudge whether deliberative democracy can 
directly constitute a political theory. 
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Chapter 5 
Deliberative Democracy as a Political Theory 
To adjudge whether deliberative democracy can function as a political theory, we need to 
consider both the operation of deliberative democracy as a possible regulator of the 
political domain and the extent to which it is compatible, or likely to be compatible, with 
prevalent comprehensive worldviews.  Before exploring those questions in more detail, 
we should, perhaps, note the ‘positive mood music’ emanating from deliberative 
democrats which hints that deliberative democracy may function as a political theory.  
Fundamental to a political theory is its ability to foster stability in a pluralist society - that 
is, to be accepted as binding by a sufficiently wide range of people within the society 
holding a variety of comprehensive doctrines.  Many of its proponents claim that 
deliberative democracy is peculiarly relevant to conditions of cultural pluralism.  Melissa 
Williams claims that ‘[t]he challenge of pluralism to political legitimacy lies at the heart 
of the project of deliberative democracy’.1  Benhabib states 
The emphasis of the deliberative democracy model on democratic inclusiveness 
makes it particularly attractive to the concerns of excluded minorities, whether the 
sources of this exclusion lie in gender, ethnic, “racial”, cultural, linguistic, 
religious, or sexual preference grounds.
2
 
 
We might also note that accounts of deliberative democracy suggest a narrow, thin, 
procedural kind of fairness that resonates with what we might be looking for in a political 
theory.  Deliberative democracy, we are told, prescribes conditions only in respect of the 
process of reaching substantive decisions.  Ostensibly, it has nothing to say about the 
                                           
1
 Melissa Williams, ‘The Uneasy Alliance of Group Representation and Deliberative Democracy’, in 
Citizenship in Diverse Societies eds. Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman (Oxford: OUP, 2000) pp.124-152 at 
p.125. 
2
 Claims of Culture p.134. 
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substantive decisions themselves.
3
  In this way, it might be thought that deliberative 
democracy avoids treading on the toes of the various comprehensive worldviews existing 
in any particular society.  Compare this with Rawls’s political liberalism which 
prescribes a lengthy list of substantive Basic Liberties that must be accepted by those 
adhering to the various existing comprehensive worldviews.  On this basis, then, 
deliberative democracy might seem to be a more promising candidate for a workable 
political theory. 
 
Does Deliberative Democracy Work as a Political Theory, as a Fair Procedural Theory? 
As for electoral democracy, we aim to discover whether deliberative democracy offers 
something to individual citizens that makes deliberative democracy in some way 
procedurally fair.  If deliberative democracy is procedurally fair, then, that may offer 
some justification for deliberative democracy as a political theory.  Holders of different 
comprehensive views may be prepared to endorse deliberative democracy on account of 
its procedural fairness.  So, could deliberative democracy be procedurally fair?  It might 
be noted that the fundamental demand of deliberative democracy is that all citizens must 
                                           
3
 Benhabib continues, ‘[f]urthermore, deliberative democracy promises not only inclusion but 
empowerment, in that the insistence that democratic legitimacy can be attained only through the agreement 
of all affected assures, at the normative level at least, that norms cannot be adopted and institutional 
arrangements advocated at the cost of the most disadvantaged and disaffected’ [ibid].  It seems to me that 
that is an overstatement of the generally held deliberatively democratic position at least in so far as 
deliberative democracy is based upon a Habermasian discourse ethics.  Benhabib infiltrates a substantive 
outcome – that an outcome should not be costly to those who are already disadvantaged or disaffected – in 
breach of the axioms of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy that discourse ethics and deliberative 
democracy should be about process not substance.  If Rawls’s criticism of Habermas is sustained – that 
Habermas’s view cannot be simply procedural, that there must be a substantive element – then my point is 
that Benhabib’s comment suggests a substantive criterion beyond anything in discourse ethics.  [See John 
Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’ pp.170-180.] 
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be given the opportunity to participate in the process of policy and decision-making.  
Again, that might look promising. 
 
As already noted in chapter 4 above, accounts of deliberative democracy include a 
requirement that, during the process of deliberation, reason-giving must be public in 
nature.  A reason is public when everyone affected by the matter-in-hand can deem the 
reason to be acceptable.  Given that our concern is with pluralist societies with highly 
diverse citizenries, the demand for public reason-giving may be quite an exacting 
requirement.  Firstly, individuals from disadvantaged groups are likely to find it difficult 
to articulate their interests in terms that others will recognise as reasons.  Individuals 
from a cultural or ethnic minority may be inarticulate when it comes to communicating in 
the generally accepted fashion.  People from minority cultures may express themselves in 
a way which is not immediately easy for others to grasp.  More generally, many 
individuals may have difficulty expressing their interests and concerns in a dispassionate 
and fully coherent way and may express themselves in fashions which ostensibly 
disadvantage them in the discourse and deliberation.  Deliberative democrats who are 
prepared to acknowledge these difficulties argue that forms of communication other than 
reasoned argument can be incorporated into the deliberative process.  They maintain that 
diverse forms of speech do communicate information and can be heard by other 
deliberators.  Ultimately, though, such communication must still provide reasons of a 
public nature.  Young is one of those who recognises the problem.  She states that, 
‘[c]ertain interpretations of the model of deliberative democracy […] make it too narrow 
or itself [sic] exclusionary to aid the task of deepening democracy in mass societies with 
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structural injustices’.4  By way of response to this concern, she continues ‘[w]hile 
argument is an important contributor to political discussion, there are reasons to be 
suspicious of privileging argument […] over other forms of communication’.5  She 
explains that, ‘[b]y argument I mean the construction of an orderly chain of reasoning 
from premisses to conclusion’.6  It is clear why Young starts down this line.  She wants to 
avoid, if at all possible, the exclusion of individuals from the process of deliberation, an 
exclusion that would undermine the deliberative democratic account.  But, practically, it 
is not clear what Young envisages.  It could be that she has a two-stage process in mind 
whereby, (i) all parties have the unrestrained opportunity to communicate their concerns 
and interests in a way they feel most at ease with, and (ii) the discussion continues by a 
process of argument.  Alternatively, she may mean that argument is not privileged at any 
point in the deliberation.  The logic of her position is to eschew any priority to argument:  
if deliberation is a two-stage process and argument is privileged in the decision-reaching 
part of the deliberation, then this runs the risk of being patronising and of delegitimising 
post facto the contributions made by those who did not express themselves in terms of 
argued reasoning.  But if argument is not prioritised at any stage, it is not clear how the 
deliberating population will ever come by an agreed outcome:  will the outcome be the 
option that eventually everyone emotionally responds to or the alternative that seems the 
most motivating or the choice which generated the most extreme show of commitment?  
Given that Young is clear that the reciprocity of deliberative democracy remains a part of 
her account – reasons must be public and there must be a willingness to revise opinions in 
the course of deliberation – there must be significant doubts about the stability of 
                                           
4
 Op.cit. p.36. 
5
 Ibid. p.37. 
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outcomes that are not reached on the basis of an acceptable argument.  Consider the case 
of a non-argument-based outcome:  in that event, it must be the case that those in the 
population that generally reach conclusions on the basis of reasoned argument have 
allowed their arguments to be overcome by the weight of some other rhetorical or 
emotional factor.  Away from the process of deliberation, will they not begin to revisit 
the issue, examining it more coolly, dispassionately and logically?  It is questionable 
whether such participants will remain committed to the outcome of the deliberation.
 
 
If argument is not prioritised, then there is another possibility.  It could be that though a 
conclusion is reached, different participants assent to the outcome for different reasons:  
some agree to it because they are persuaded that there is a reasoned argument for the 
agreed position; others may agree to it for emotive reasons or because of some traditional 
commitment.  Dryzek writes ‘In a pluralistic world, consensus is unattainable, 
unnecessary and undesirable.  More feasible and attractive are workable agreements in 
which participants agree on a course of action, but for different reasons.’7  While, it 
clearly seems to make deliberative democracy more workable, it is far from clear that 
such an outcome is satisfactory from the perspective of deliberative democracy itself.  
There has been no fundamental meeting of minds.  And in the absence of that quality of 
interaction, why should the outcome acquire the validity that deliberative democrats 
attach to the outcomes of deliberations?  Surely, without that deep agreement, all that has 
been reached is an accommodation.  Deliberative democrats are adamant that what they 
envisage is most definitely something more than an accommodation (strategic or 
                                                                                                                             
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Op. cit. p.170. 
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otherwise) but it is not clear that they have delineated the theoretical space for such an 
‘agreement for different reasons’.  Critically, they have failed to explain why the 
emotional response of one, the traditional allegiance of another and the reasoned position 
of a third should happen to coincide so that there is a commonly held agreed proposal.  If 
there is an ‘agreement for different reasons’, there may be little deliberative input.  
Consider proposal X.  Individual 1 has reason A for endorsing X.  Individual 2 is 
considering the merits of reason B for endorsing X.  Reason B is wholly different from A 
both in form and substance.  No amount of dialogue about A can make B more 
persuasive for 2.  If there is an agreement for different reasons the dialogue about A will 
have been irrelevant.  It is not a deliberative decision and, indeed, in the absence of 
common reasons, the view of each party might just as easily have been different, so 
precluding agreement.  I am not suggesting that dialogue is worthless.  It may create what 
might be called second-order reasons for agreement:  2 may realise during the course of 
dialogue that 1 holds her views honestly; 2 may come to believe that ‘“1”s are people we 
can do business with’.  Such a ‘reason’, though, is not a reason for a particular proposal; 
it is a reason for an accommodation. 
 
This difficulty may be more significant still.  Williams argues that even if reasons can be 
presented during the deliberation in a form other than reasoned argument that does not 
solve the problem:  ‘if we take the challenges of social difference seriously, we find that 
they threaten to undermine the very notions of reasonableness and reason-giving upon 
which deliberative theory depends for its conception of legitimacy’.8  Later, she 
                                           
8
 Op. cit. p.125. 
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elucidates her Lyotardian concern further:  ‘The recognition of marginalized groups’ 
reasons as reasons for (or acceptable to) other citizens is a highly contingent matter’.9  In 
summary, Williams’s argument is that, even if the deliberative environment is ideal and 
even if the ‘participants exhibit […] the virtues of open-mindedness and mutual respect 
(as deliberative theory emphasizes)’10 that is not enough.  There may still be reasons 
proffered by some participants which other participants are deaf to.  In particular, ‘the 
social meanings of existing practices’ may diverge.  She offers the example of a debate 
about the acceptability of the Confederate flag:  for some, it is a symbol of slavery; for 
others, a symbol of the sacrifices made for one’s homeland.  The meaning understood by 
a dominant group may be established and resilient and may make it impossible for the 
meaning offered by a marginalised group to be recognised by the dominant group.  
Williams suggests that there needs to be something more, something that is not 
prescribed by deliberative theory, in essence, something approaching a presumption in 
favour of the interpretations of marginalized groups.  
 
Benhabib accepts that this is a ‘very’ substantial criticism.11  She attempts to answer it by 
distinguishing between what she calls the syntax of public reasons and the semantics of 
public reasons.  While all public reasons must, she states, share a certain syntax, this does 
not introduce prejudice.  Syntactically, all reasons must be expressible in the form:  ‘X 
[is] in the best interests of all considered equal moral and political beings’.12  This 
                                           
9
 Ibid. p.134 [quoted by Benhabib Claims p.140]. 
10
 Ibid. p.138 [quoted by Benhabib Claims p.142]. 
11
 Claims p.142. 
12
 Ibid. p.140.  I am not convinced that all deliberative democrats would demand that all sufficient reasons 
be ultimately expressible in such terms.  Is consequentialism really at the heart of deliberative democracy?  
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syntactical limitation, however, does not restrict the semantic substance of the claims and 
perspectives that may be advanced as reasons.  She gives the example of Gitxsan people 
of Kispiox, British Columbia, who persuaded the Canadian Supreme Court to accept their 
oral stories as evidence of their land claims.
13
  While the reason was semantically unusual 
(oral history), the syntax was appropriate – it was fair and just for all Canadians to 
recognise the land claim.  Benhabib seems to be suggesting that, while the requirement to 
give public reasons may at first sight seem oppressive to marginalised groups and, thus, 
cast doubt on whether, even in an ideal discourse, an agreed outcome could be 
forthcoming, deliberative democracy can function successfully.  For her, it can do so 
because there is no a priori limitation with regard to how a reason might be offered (or of 
the semantics of the reason, as she puts it).
14
 
                                                                                                                             
Less is sometimes more:  surely it is sufficient that each deliberative offering should amount to a reason 
which is potentially acceptable to others who are implicitly treated as equal moral and political beings. 
13
 Ibid. p.141.  Benhabib actually writes, ‘It is conceivable that a minority can convince a majority that it 
should accept its oral narratives to serve as legitimate titles to their ancestral land.  This happened when the 
Supreme Court of Canada decided to accept the oral stories of the Gitxsan Indians … as evidence of their 
land claims in the region.’  Of course, Benhabib’s example is not an example of oral narratives serving as 
legitimate land titles.  She herself notes that the oral stories were merely evidence.  The uninterpreted oral 
stories did not constitute the full reason for the court’s decision.  The oral stories provided some evidence 
of the extent of the Gitxsan connection to the specific area of land in question.  The court did not resile 
from its normal approaches to legal decision-making.  {See Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 
1010 <http://sisis.nativeweb.org/clark/97delrul.html> [accessed 14 March 2011] especially the leading 
judgment of Lamer CJ at paras.92-98.} 
14
 I detect a significant lack of clarity through Benhabib’s account of deliberative democracy in her The 
Claims of Culture. When she refers to a reason for some proposal, does she have in mind a ‘reason’ that is 
proffered as being determinative of the matter-in-hand or does she have in mind a ‘reason’ that may be 
outweighed by other reasons for alternative proposals?  English usage is problematic here.  We talk of both 
the reason for doing something (i.e. the full, everything considered, and thus sufficient reason) and the 
reasons for doing something.  I want to distinguish what might be called a ‘full reason’ or a ‘sufficient 
reason’, on the one hand, from what might be better called a ‘factor’ or ‘part of the full reason’, on the 
other.  Benhabib’s characterisation of a reason for a proposal as amounting to a claim that that proposal is 
in the best interests of all suggests that, at that point, she has a ‘full reason’ in mind.  But surely, that is not 
how deliberation necessarily works.  If that is how it should work, then the problems that disadvantaged 
groups have in articulating reasons would be compounded.  In the course of deliberation, a party may make 
a statement of some sort which amounts to a full or sufficient reason for a particular proposal.  
Alternatively, a party may advance a factor to be taken into account which is not, by itself, a sufficient 
reason.  In the course of deliberation a number of factors may be offered by different parties and 
deliberative effort goes into deciding upon the cumulative weight of those factors or, if they point in 
different directions, into balancing those factors.  Given that deliberative democracy is often portrayed as a 
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However, Benhabib achieves little when she draws her syntax/semantics distinction.  
Every sentence has syntactical and semantic elements.  It is really no more than a 
restatement of the defence that deliberative democrats had already offered and which is 
described above:  deliberative democracy can cope with all kinds of speech acts; reasons 
can be contained within all sorts of speech acts.  Benhabib fails to respond to Williams’s 
concern;  Benhabib does not explain why the recognition of a reason as a reason is 
anything other than highly contingent.  Attempts, then, to address the potential 
disadvantage of many participants in the deliberative democratic process do not appear 
successful.  There is serious doubt that there will be an equality-of-arms to form the basis 
for the kind of procedural fairness we might expect in a political theory. 
 
Are Proper Deliberative Outcomes Likely? 
Notions of incommensurability raise doubts about the likelihood of achieving legitimate 
deliberative outcomes and go further calling into question the theoretical validity of 
discourse ethics and deliberative democracy.  Benhabib considers the argument that the 
possibility of agreement is prejudiced because different cultures and people-groups with 
different conceptual schemes and/or worldviews will simply not be able to understand 
each other – that the concerns, values and imperatives in the conceptual scheme of one 
culture may not be translatable and, thus, may not be comprehensible by those of another 
                                                                                                                             
co-operative endeavour, we might hope or expect that participants will be prepared to offer up relevant 
factors and grounds as open-minded participants in the deliberation rather than always presenting a 
sufficient reason which is more likely to be the immediate subject of contest and dispute.  If there is a need 
to bring a sufficient reason, then surely that disadvantages members of those groups that are likely to 
communicate in semantically unusual ways and will find it hard to articulate their position in a way that 
demonstratively amounts to a sufficient reason. 
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culture who live, function and interpret life and living by means of a wholly distinct 
conceptual scheme.  
 
Benhabib maintains that the idea of incommensurability between conceptual schemes and 
worldviews is incoherent.  If two worldviews really were incommensurable we would not 
be able to know this because the nature of the incommensurability could not be stated.
15
  
But even if Benhabib is right about the absence of that kind of incommensurability, there 
are different types of incommensurability which may prejudice the likelihood of 
achieving deliberative democratic outcomes and which, thus, present a critical difficulty 
for deliberative democracy.  Benhabib’s defence relates to the commensurability or 
otherwise of meaning.  Famously, Alasdair MacIntyre describes a kind of 
incommensurability at the start of After Virtue
16
 but it is not the same as Benhabib’s.  
MacIntyre describes a dialogue of the deaf in which the arguments of two disputants are 
mutually understandable but there is no commonly acceptable notion of justice or 
rationality that can resolve the dispute to both disputants’ satisfaction.  This is an 
incommensurability of truth, justice or rationality.  And there might be a further distinct 
type of incommensurability still which deliberative democracy has to cope with:  the 
incommensurability of moral values – the value pluralism of Berlin, Bernard Williams 
and others – the belief that the moral universe is inhabited by many qualitatively diverse 
goods and values which are not amenable to any utilitarian or universal calculus.
17
  In a 
morally pluralist world, different discussants are likely to attach different weight to 
                                           
15
 Claims p.135 & pp.24-48 (chapter 2).  Benhabib’s account is akin to a summary of Donald Davidson’s 
argument in Donald Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,’ Proceedings and Addresses of 
the American Philosophical Association Vol 47 (1973-74) pp.5-20.
 
16
 Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (3
rd
 ed.) (London: Duckworth, 2007) see esp. pp.6-10. 
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different values which appear relevant to any matter-in-hand.  Value pluralism has it that 
there is not necessarily any particular or specifiable weight to be attached to these values 
in any particular situation.  There are no arguments that can be advanced that are capable 
of demonstratively satisfying all participants in the discourse that one position or another 
is better. 
 
Benhabib does seem to recognise the incommensurability of truth, justice or rationality.  
She writes, ‘[m]ore often than not […] we are aware that some of our beliefs may be 
mutually exclusive and contradictory with those held by our fellow citizens [my 
emphasis]’.18  Yet she does not seem to perceive this to be the problem it is for 
deliberative democracy.  She refers, by way of example, to the conflict between 
creationists and evolutionists as an example of a deep division.  Nevertheless, her 
assertion by way of response, that ‘as epistemic contemporaries in liberal democracies, 
we have to learn to live with each other and cooperate on school boards as well as on 
library committees’,19 is no answer at all.  ‘Learning to live together’, i.e. being obliged 
to tolerate the presence and involvement of another party, is demonstrably not what 
deliberative democrats mean when they imagine a process of deliberation.  The 
creationist/evolutionist divide exhibits just the kind of incommensurability of justification 
and rationality that is likely to confound the deliberative democratic faith in the 
deliberative process. 
                                                                                                                             
17
 See my comments on value pluralism in my chapter 2. 
18
 Claims p.135. 
19
 Ibid.  The term ‘epistemic contemporary’ is used to distinguish typical conflicts of beliefs between those 
who at least exist in the same knowledge environment from those conflicts that exist where one group lacks 
the knowledge or experience of the other e.g. between governments and indigenous tribes, who lack 
exposure to, and understanding of, modern industrial and technological existence.  
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In an earlier essay, Benhabib states that she assumes the reality of value pluralism.
20
  She 
deploys that assumption as a further ground in support of deliberative democracy.  She 
maintains that a procedural theory (i.e. democracy) will be more acceptable to those 
endorsing different value systems than a theory which offers a set of substantive moral 
propositions.  Democratic procedures can lead to a revising of beliefs.  Again, this 
response seems wholly inadequate.  Benhabib admits that the diversity of values is a 
feature of the moral universe.  She rightly indicates that such diversity will lead to 
conflict.  She fails to explain why dialogue and deliberation would be likely to address 
that problem successfully.  The point of incommensurable values is that no amount of 
reasoning can produce a reasoned reconciliation with which all should concur. 
 
But, even if Benhabib had argued convincingly against the existence of 
incommensurabilities of truth, justice and rationality and against the existence of 
Berlinian value pluralism (an attempt she does not make in The Claims of Culture), she 
and deliberative democracy still have a problem.  The problem is this:  even if, 
ultimately, it turns out that incommensurability does not exist in a way that is likely to 
preclude agreement in many situations, lots of people are persuaded that many disputes 
are intractable.  Many serious thinkers have been persuaded that values can be 
incommensurable;  they consider that there are credible arguments to support such a 
notion and that experience is consistent with the idea.  And, away from the academy, the 
experience of most people is that certain disputes are insoluble.  They may put this down 
to a lack of goodwill on the part of another disputant rather than Berlinian value 
                                           
20
 ‘Towards’ p.73. 
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pluralism but they despair of reaching a reasoned agreement.  This creates a negative 
feedback:  if agreement is not expected, discussants will throw in the towel rather than 
engage.  Why should they commit themselves to a lengthy dialogue when they feel that 
agreement is neither inevitable nor even probable?  So, it would not be enough to be able 
to undermine notions of incommensurability analytically.  Even if there is no value 
incommensurability, we might say that there is often the appearance of 
incommensurability or that there is almost incommensurability or pragmatic 
incommensurability.  Resolving value disputes is, in practice, so difficult that many are 
persuaded that resolution is impossible.  This seriously undermines the practice of 
deliberative democracy in any real-world situation:  there will be a pressure for 
discussants to give up on the deliberative process either because agreement seems so far 
off or so unlikely or because they become persuaded that it is impossible.  Whether an 
agreement founded on ethical considerations is technically impossible in the face of 
competing views may be neither here nor there. 
 
Benhabib’s example involving American aboriginals points to clear practical barriers to 
consensus.  Consider the deliberative difficulties if the Gitxsan people had argued that 
their oral histories demonstrated that the Gitxsan gods had endowed the Gitxsan  with the 
land in perpetuity and that the word of the gods should be final and authoritative in 
matters of Canadian law.
21
  (I hasten to add that I have no knowledge of the religious 
beliefs of the Gitxsan and the parameters of this thought experiment are fictitious.)  
Could such metaphysical claims have amounted to a reason to accept Gitxsan land 
                                           
21
 This example is not, perhaps, so very far away from arguments advanced by some protagonists in the 
Middle East. 
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claims?  On the face of it, other participants are likely to reject such a reason.  
(Conceivably, other participants could conclude that the claim to divine endowment was 
indicative of some long association of the Gitxsan with the land in question but the bald 
assertion itself is not likely to amount to a reason acceptable to all.)  As such a reason is 
not one that could reasonably have been acceptable to other deliberators who do not share 
Gitxsan religious beliefs, it should probably not be considered to be a valid reason in the 
deliberative exercise.  Be that as it may, a party to a dispute cannot be forced to play by 
the rules of deliberative democracy and it is quite conceivable that a group will not be 
prepared to compromise their metaphysical preconceptions.  The Gitxsan could respond 
by adapting their rationale.  They might suggest that they would like to persuade other 
parties to the deliberation that there are good grounds to conclude that the Gitxsan gods 
are real entities who have the right to decide upon land ownership in North America and 
that all Canadians should defer to the gods for moral and prudential reasons.  Such a 
revised rationale is, perhaps, theoretically acceptable to all and can perhaps form part of 
the deliberative process.  It is not clear that the precepts of deliberative democracy 
necessarily exclude metaphysical claims.
22
  Alternatively, consider the problem if the 
land the Gitxsan claimed had included the city of Vancouver and its environs.  In both 
cases – the metaphysical claims and the claim for hugely valuable land ‘owned’ by many 
non-aboriginal individuals and corporations – it is difficult to see that a process of 
deliberation will lead to an agreed resolution.  Native Americans might be reluctant to 
foreswear their religious beliefs or ancestral homelands;  other participants are unlikely, 
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 It is not clear to what extent the requirement to give public reasons and the demands of reciprocity mean 
that certain types of reason are precluded.  Is the fact that it is unlikely that metaphysical claims will be 
accepted sufficient to bar those claims from  the proper deliberative exercise or does the fact that it is not 
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perhaps, to convert to the Gitxsan religion or perceive the loss of their land assets as 
reasonable.  In such examples as these, rather than a deliberative consensus, the best we 
can normally expect is some kind of compromise and, over time, perhaps, some 
improvement in mutual understanding.  It should be noted that in Benhabib’s particular 
example, we do not see a deliberative consensus;  we see the outcome of a court case.  
The fact that the court reached a judgment means that the parties necessarily had failed to 
reach any agreement.  If the parties had agreed, the action would have been withdrawn or 
the case settled. 
 
Stability 
As already noted, if deliberative democracy is to function as a political theory, it must 
foster stability.  In effect, stability means that holders of diverse worldviews will be 
prepared to accept the legitimacy of deliberative democracy notwithstanding that 
outcomes in a deliberatively democratic state may conflict with imperatives of their own 
worldviews.  Is that likely?  In order to answer that question, it is necessary to consider 
the basis upon which legitimacy is claimed for deliberative democracy.  Is deliberative 
democracy justified because its legitimate practices generate legitimate norms and 
outcomes?  Or is it justified simply because of its legitimate practices?  Put another way, 
does it matter for the purposes of its legitimacy whether deliberative democracy ever 
generates any properly deliberative outcomes?  Is it enough that deliberative democracy 
is properly practised?  Deliberative democrats are not of one mind.  Bohman gives a 
useful synopsis of the disagreements when he writes that – 
                                                                                                                             
impossible that such claims would be accepted – it is not impossible that they are objectively true – mean 
that such speech is acceptable in the discourse? 
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One need not think of the correct decision as a truth “out there”, somehow 
independent of the processes and procedures that discover it.  In fact, there are 
many different accounts of such outcomes and procedures:  some concern the 
common good; for others it is the rational or unanimous character of the 
agreement of consensus; for some it is the impartial viewpoint constructed by all 
in the process of deliberation. Some deliberative theorists defend the claim that 
procedural ideals, rather than outcomes, constitute the decisive parameters for 
democratic legitimacy.  Others emphasize that deliberation either constructs or 
discovers the common good.
23
  
 
Benhabib appears to swing one way when she writes that, ‘There is no presumption that 
moral and political dialogues will produce normative consensus’24 but she also states that, 
‘It is fundamental to autonomy [a moral principle of discourse ethics upon which 
deliberative democracy is based] that the collective practices in which we participate may 
be seen as the outcomes of our legitimate processes of deliberation.’25  This seems to 
suggest that there is a significant requirement that certain outcomes (i.e. our collective 
practices) are properly deliberative, at least some of the time.  This in turn suggests that if 
deliberative democracy fails to deliver any significant level of normative consensus (i.e. 
properly deliberative outcomes), then the legitimacy of a deliberatively democratic 
system will be undermined.  Dryzek seems to take a different line.  He writes, 
‘Deliberative democracy itself began (even if it did not end) as a theory for which 
democratic legitimacy depends on the ability of all those subject to a decision to 
participate in authentic deliberation’.26  The development in deliberative democracy that 
Dryzek implicitly alludes to is, presumably, the compromising of the requirement for 
every citizen to be involved in deliberation.  My concern here is not with the directness 
and immediacy of citizen involvement but upon whether simple participation in the 
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 Public Deliberation p.6. 
24
 Claims p.115. 
25
 Ibid. p.114. 
26
 Op. cit. p.85. 
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practice of deliberative democracy is enough for legitimacy.  Later, as already quoted 
above, Dryzek writes ‘[i]n a pluralistic world, consensus is unattainable, unnecessary and 
undesirable.  More feasible and attractive are workable agreements in which participants 
agree on a course of action, but for different reasons.’27  It appears that, for Dryzek, 
legitimacy is based upon participation alone.  We need to consider, though, what Dryzek 
means by participation.  In the first quote, Dryzek refers to participation ‘in authentic 
deliberation’28 and earlier he writes that, ‘democratic legitimacy came to be seen in terms 
of the ability or opportunity to participate in effective deliberation on the part of those 
subject to collective decisions.  […]  Thus claims on behalf of or against such decisions 
have to be justified to these people in terms that, on reflection, they are capable of 
accepting.’29  So, participation is more than simply being allowed to contribute to the 
debate.  A person can only participate where there is proper reciprocity; where their 
presence affects the way in which other contributors offer their communications.  It 
appears, then, that participation is not a unilateral happening.  A participant is only a 
participant if they are accorded a certain deliberative respect by other participants.  Even 
if a normative consensus is not forthcoming, participants have been afforded that respect 
in the process of deliberation.
30
  Be that as it may, even with that expansive idea of 
participation, it is doubtful that participation alone (i.e. a deliberative democracy without 
the promise of properly deliberative outcomes) would be sufficiently attractive to citizens 
who hold comprehensive worldviews.  Is the idea of deliberative democracy really so 
powerful that holders of comprehensive worldviews who enter into the deliberative 
                                           
27
 Ibid. p.170. 
28
 Ibid. p.85. 
29
 Ibid. p.1. 
30
 Benhabib describes a similar tangential benefit.  See quote in n.36 below. 
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process but who find that they are never able to agree to outcomes, will still recognise the 
legitimacy of those outcomes?  That would seem to beggar belief.   
 
However, what I take to be the Benhabib position – that there must be properly 
deliberative outcomes some of the time – is also problematic and that view, too, calls into 
question the likelihood that holders of comprehensive worldviews would be prepared to 
accept deliberative democracy as a political theory.  First, it is noted, once more, that for 
accounts of deliberative democracy we are, theoretically, starting from an ideal discursive 
situation; but the world is not ideal.  In practice, deliberative democracy will always be a 
matter of degree:  ‘[t[he normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the 
degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes 
and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes’, states Young.31  Both a ‘purist’ 
such as Dryzek and a ‘pragmatist’ such as Bohman agree:  outcomes will be more or less 
valid depending upon the extent to which the process by which they have been arrived 
has been properly deliberatively democratic.  Bohman writes ‘the quality of the 
deliberation is crucial to determining the reasonableness of the outcome or a decision’.32  
That being so, it seems to follow that it is not possible to place a specified, determinative, 
value on a particular outcome (whether it be electoral or arrived at by some other means).  
We may be able to point to deliberation that preceded that outcome which makes the 
outcome more valuable than it would otherwise have been.  We may be able to identify 
failures of deliberation that render the outcome less valuable that it might otherwise have 
been.  What we cannot do, though, is specify the absolute value of the outcome.  That this 
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 Op. cit. pp.6-7. 
32
 Public Deliberation p.6. 
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is the case is borne out by another aspect of accounts of deliberative democracy:  
deliberative democracy takes a critical stance.
33
  Dryzek, for instance, maintains that 
deliberative democracy should remain critical of the oppressive forces at work in 
capitalist, liberal-democratic, states; deliberative accounts should not be adjusted to fit 
with the institutions of the liberal-democratic state.  Bohman concludes that 
‘[d]eliberative democracy is still in large part a critical and oppositional ideal […]’.34  
The implication of that critical stance is that deliberative democratic accounts will refrain 
from endorsing any existing mechanisms for arriving at outcomes – including existing 
electoral democratic procedures.  There are, then, both analytical and attitudinal reasons 
why deliberative democracy cannot judge outcomes to be democratically valid (in the 
deliberatively democratic sense).  In short, deliberative democrats are committed to a 
process of democratisation
35
 and that is deeply problematic for a would-be political 
theory.  The concern is that Benhabib and others offer no account of the point at which 
outcomes become sufficiently deliberatively democratic for there to be legitimacy. 
 
Secondly, putting that to one side for one moment, any putative deliberative democracy 
would have to be likely to produce at least some outcomes that looked reasonably 
deliberatively democratic.  It is necessary to show that something approaching consensus 
is practically achievable at least some of the time and that that would be often enough for 
holders of different comprehensive worldviews to endorse deliberative democracy.  
                                           
33
 Indeed, one might say a ‘big C’ Critical stance.  Most writers see the Habermasian developments in 
Critical Theory as the foundations of deliberative democracy.  [Dryzek argues that Habermas’s democratic 
theory, though, is no longer fully Critical.  See op. cit. pp.20-27.] 
34
 [‘The Coming of Age’ p.423].  In similar vein, Elstub argues that ‘if deliberative democracy … comes to 
resemble the current institutional frameworks too closely, [it] will cease to be a critical theory that offers a 
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Deliberative democracy needs to work – it needs to deliver the goods – to be able to 
function as a political theory.  If it does not work, disparate individuals and groups of 
individuals holding to different worldviews will not sign up to it.  I have already explored 
some of the reasons why consensus is unlikely to be achieved in many cases. 
 
All of this is deeply problematic for a putative political theory.  There seems to be a lack 
of good reasons why holders of comprehensive doctrines should endorse deliberative 
democracy as a political theory.  Deliberative democracy does not promise to provide 
necessarily legitimate outcomes.  Neither Dryzek’s nor Benhabib’s account of legitimacy 
offers an assurance that decisions and outcomes in a putatively deliberatively democratic 
state will be consistently legitimate deliberatively democratic outcomes.  By this 
measure, deliberative democracy does not compare favourably with either Rawlsian 
political liberalism, which sets out a whole host of politically liberal outcomes, or 
procedural accounts of electoral democracy, where outcomes are necessarily legitimate if 
the legitimating procedure has been properly applied.  As we have seen, the nature of 
deliberative democracy is to provide an ideal standard of legitimacy against which real-
life outcomes can be compared and, even with that standard, it is very difficult to tell just 
how legitimate an outcome is.  We might say that the deliberative-democratic quality of 
an outcome is opaque.  This means that any attempt to compare the deliberatively 
democratic value of a political outcome with say the liberal value of its substance (or its 
value in some other comprehensive account) will be difficult – not because of any 
question of incommensurability, but simply because deliberative democracy does not 
                                                                                                                             
radical alternative to liberal democracy, and the distinct features of the deliberative model will be lost’ 
[op.cit. p.305].   
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provide a clear measure by which a political outcome can be reliably judged.  In reality, it 
might be suspected that the clarity of the imperatives of a comprehensive doctrine will 
exert a significantly greater pull than the attractions of a political theory, deliberative 
democracy, which delivers outcomes the deliberative democratic credentials of which are 
unclear. 
 
I do not mean to raise the bar too high.  It is quite conceivable that holders of 
comprehensive worldviews would be prepared to endorse a political theory because, from 
their standpoint, it provided a justification for state legitimacy notwithstanding a failure 
to provide consistently politically-legitimate outcomes.
36
  Holders of comprehensive 
worldviews with some sympathy for a political theory are likely to perceive two types of 
legitimacy.  Particular outcomes will be legitimate or illegitimate.  (In the case of 
deliberative democracy, decisions will be more legitimate or less legitimate in so far as 
they are or are not the result of a proper process of deliberation.)  Beyond that, adherents 
to comprehensive doctrines are likely to think in terms of a second-order legitimacy 
where, in the round, the decisions of a state are viewed as sufficiently legitimate (i.e. in 
quantity and quality) to legitimate the state.  An overall account of legitimacy (i.e. 
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 Dryzek p.29. 
36
 Where there has been no agreement, that may have been due to the failure of a party or parties to act in 
keeping with deliberative democratic norms or it may be an instance of all (or most) parties acting 
appropriately but where some have not been persuaded by the reasons of others.  In the latter case, where 
agreement is not reached, it should be noted that there might be some wider deliberative benefit.  As 
Benhabib puts it: 
[I]t is assumed that even when [moral and political dialogues fail to produce normative consensus] 
and we must resort to law to redraw the boundaries of co-existence, societies in which such 
multicultural dialogues take place in the public sphere will articulate a civic point of view and a 
civic perspective of ‘enlarged mentality’.  The process of ‘giving good reasons in public’ will not 
only determine the legitimacy of the norms followed; it will enhance the civic virtues of 
democratic citizenship by cultivating the habits of mind of public reasoning and exchange [Claims 
p.115]. 
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second-order legitimacy) will not assume or demand that a state will, at all times, produce 
those outcomes or act in line with those procedures, which are the basis of its legitimacy.  
It is not credible to offer an account which has it that a state oscillates between legitimacy 
and illegitimacy from week to week depending on its performance as against the accepted 
standard of the political theory.  There must be a ‘margin of grace’.  Presumably, though, 
only a certain margin of grace will be acceptable to those who hold a particular 
comprehensive view.  There will come a point at which so few decisions and outcomes 
match the accepted standard of first-order legitimacy that those who adhere to a particular 
comprehensive worldview will no longer consider the state to have second-order 
legitimacy.  It is not easy to see, though, why holders of comprehensive worldviews 
should be prepared to credit a deliberatively-democratic system with such a second-order 
legitimacy because it will not be possible to arrive at a clear view as to the extent of the 
margin of grace that will be demanded of that comprehensive doctrine given the 
difficulties in judging the first-order legitimacy of outcomes. 
 
Holders of comprehensive worldviews are not merely going to be concerned about the 
likelihood that properly deliberatively democratic decisions will be forthcoming;  they 
will be just as concerned, if not more so, about what happens when deliberative 
democratic outcomes are not forthcoming.  What sort of non-deliberative outcomes will 
be forthcoming?  Will these be outcomes that are satisfactory from their perspective or 
will those who hold to that particular worldview always be ‘on the receiving end’ 
suffering decisions that conflict with their comprehensive doctrine? 
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Conclusion 
Deliberative democracy cannot amount to a political theory.  It fails as a procedural 
theory since deliberative democrats have not demonstrated that the deliberative process 
will be consistently fair.  The inarticulate and the marginalised are unlikely to be able to 
take a proper part in the process.  In any event, there are good reasons to think that proper 
deliberative outcomes will not be readily achievable.  Further, deliberative democracy as 
a political theory is unlikely to be stable; holders of different comprehensive doctrines 
would be unlikely to endorse deliberative democracy because of uncertainties about the 
status and nature of the outcomes that would actually be delivered.  
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have been an exclusionary exercise – excluding the possibility of 
procedural and deliberative accounts of democracy as bases for a political theory of 
democracy.  In chapter 6, I turn to instrumental accounts of democracy. 
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Chapter 6 
Democracy as an Instrumental Theory 
Thus far I have sought to show that there can be no credible procedural or intrinsic or 
deliberative political theory of democracy.  If this position is persuasive, we are left with 
the possibility of an instrumental or outcome political theory of democracy.
1
  In this 
chapter, I make some preliminary observations about the kind of outcome theory that is 
most likely to function as a political theory before moving on to consider the outcome 
                                           
1
 I think that the distinction between procedural and instrumental defences of democracy should be quite 
clear.  Vernon, though, offers an unusual distinction between different democratic theories.  Vernon argues 
that the distinction is between ‘an “aggregative” conception, valuing democracy on the grounds that its 
outcomes give expression to voters’ demands and preferences’ and ‘a “procedural” conception, which 
values democracy as an expression, in its mode of operation, of some basic value, typically that of equality’ 
[Vernon p.3].  My approach, and I think it is the approach that most writers about democracy have in mind, 
elides Vernon’s two conceptions into one:  the procedural account.  An instrumental, outcome, theory is 
something different again.  In truth, what Vernon calls a procedural theory comes close to being vacuous.  
He characterises such theories as embodying the idea that ‘[n]o judgments need be made about outcomes, 
[…;] democracy is valuable because, by its very nature, it embodies equality’ [Ibid. p.4].  Presumably what 
Vernon has in mind is the thought that electoral democracy, in affording one vote of ostensibly equal 
weight to each citizen, makes an important declaratory statement about the value a democratic polity places 
upon each individual.  But it is not clear that Vernon’s assertion makes sense:  if democracy is valuable, 
what else can that mean other than democratic outcomes are, accordingly, judged to be valuable?  How 
could one value democracy but not attribute value to democratic outcomes?  To value democracy is to 
value its outcomes.  By way of example:  an outcome theory may value democracy because it generally 
produces good outcomes.  The theory is unlikely to argue that each and every democratic outcome is right 
or valuable.  Such a position would be incredible.  But that does not mean that the some decisions are 
legitimate and some are not.  The theory provides for legitimacy for all democratic decisions.  It is not 
clear, in any event, that such a limited account of proceduralism really would express equality.  Surely, 
there has to be some substance:  there is only meaningful equality if something of value is divided equally.  
If there were frequent elections in a country but these were merely plebiscites on the colour of the tie that a 
despot would wear, that would be a very inadequate expression of equality.  There needs to be a substantive 
account of what citizens get from democracy before it can be said that democracy meaningfully embodies 
anything.  What Vernon calls his ‘aggregative’ conception is simply that aspect of a procedural theory that 
does seek to explain why the procedure is valuable:  it seeks to explain why the process is fair and thus why 
the outcomes of such a process are valuable.  There are, perhaps, two versions of the aggregative aspect of 
a procedural account which produce two quite different types of procedural theory.  Perhaps the more 
orthodox one, which I have responded to in earlier chapters, has it that a decision is valuable if the process 
by which it was arrived at was properly democratic but recognises that such an outcome may not be a good 
outcome by the measure of some moral theory.  Such dissonances between fair, legitimating, procedure and 
morally bad outcome can and do occur.  Quite conceivably, a properly democratic outcome may be 
illiberal.  The more extreme, perhaps heterodox, view has it that a properly democratic outcome is thereby 
a good outcome.  Some deliberative democrats appear to take this line.  Young, for instance, writes ‘[w]hat 
counts as a just result is what participants would arrive at under ideal conditions of inclusion, equality, 
reasonableness and publicity’ [op. cit. p.31].  In other words, where there is what she understands to be a 
fully democratic process, the outcome will be necessarily just.  What I class as an outcome theory, though, 
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benefits of democracy.  Having considered the instrumental benefits of democracy, I ask 
whether an instrumental defence of democracy would allow democracy to function as a 
political theory.  I conclude that if democracy is only justified because of its instrumental 
benefits, democracy cannot realistically function as a political theory. 
 
It may be helpful to distinguish an orthodox outcome theory of democracy from a 
political outcome theory of democracy.  An orthodox outcome theory of democracy 
might be defined in the following terms: such an outcome theory is a theory that a 
democratic system in any polity will [or is more likely to] produce better outcomes than 
any non-democratic system in that polity over a reasonable period of time.
2
  The 
inclusion of ‘over a reasonable period of time’, imprecise though it is, is necessary to take 
into account the fact that outcome theories will have to concede that democracies produce 
bad outcomes from time to time and so, at any one moment, it may be hard to maintain 
that the democracy is producing better outcomes.  The claim of an orthodox outcome 
theory is that, over a sufficiently long period of time, average ‘performance’ will reveal 
that democracy is the best system of governance.  Critically, democracy is only justified 
if it trumps all other alternative governmental systems.
3
  Although ‘better’ in such a 
                                                                                                                             
is neither of these things:  it is a theory that democratic procedures produce good outcomes – that is, good 
outcomes by the measure of some account of the good, independent of democracy. 
2
 Some alteration in the definition (such as ‘will generally [or normally ] produce better outcomes …’) 
would be needed if we wish to include outcome theories which incorporate some provisos – circumstances 
in which democracy may not produce the best outcomes.  One conceivable proviso might be save in time of 
war.  In other words, the outcome-democrat believes that democracy produces better outcomes generally 
but not necessarily in the extreme circumstances existing in time of war. 
3
 Comparisons with other governmental systems must be made and these comparisons may be problematic; 
... indeed, highly problematic.  How can the goods created and protected by democracy be compared with 
the goods created and protected by other forms of government?  The value pluralist is likely to recognise 
commensurability issues here.  How, for instance, can one compare the control of corruption that might be 
a benefit of democracy with its failure, due to political gridlock, to implement ostensibly necessary and 
unpalatable measures to prevent some catastrophe? 
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definition must mean better as understood by some particular group(s), religion(s), 
worldview(s) etc (i.e. by some measure(s) external to democracy itself) that may not be 
spelt out.  The defender of such an outcome theory must implicitly be making one of two 
distinct claims:  either that democratic outcomes are better by the measure of a particular 
worldview or that they are better by the measure of a number of worldviews.  In the first 
case, the defence of democracy can only be understood through the understanding of that 
particular worldview.  Converts to democracy must first be converted to that worldview.  
The alternative claim is that the fact that democracy produces better outcomes will be 
recognised widely by adherents of different comprehensive doctrines.  Presumably, in 
this case, the outcomes appealed to must relate to certain basic or minimum 
understandings of human (political) flourishing that are thought to be common across 
different comprehensive views.  Whichever claim is being made, and be that explicit or 
implicit, there would be a need not just to show that democracy produces good outcomes 
but also a need to explicate the relative demerits of other conceivable systems of 
government.  However, a political outcome theory would be justified in a distinct way.  A 
political outcome theory of democracy does not have to show that democracy produces 
better outcomes than all other systems.  Of course, it has to show that democracy 
produces good outcomes from the perspective of different comprehensive doctrines but 
not the best outcomes.  The distinctive feature of a political theory is that it is endorsed 
across a sufficiently wide range of comprehensive worldviews so that it offers a stable 
system of government.  Consider a polity with two distinct people groups each with its 
own predominant worldview.  Group A believes that governmental system X produces 
the best outcomes but recognises that democracy produces some good outcomes albeit 
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inferior outcomes to X.  Group B believes that governmental system Y produces the best 
outcomes but recognises that democracy produces some good outcomes albeit inferior 
outcomes to Y.  Group A places little or no value on Y; B places little or no value on X.  
Democracy can function as a political outcome theory notwithstanding that neither 
significant grouping within society believes that democracy produces the best outcomes.  
Democracy may be the only governmental system that both X and Y recognise as 
producing good political outcomes. 
 
It is conceivable that in a particular polity there may be more than one possible political 
outcome theory – that there are governmental systems other than democracy which 
produce some good outcomes and which are recognised by a sufficiently wide range of 
comprehensive worldviews.  Comparisons between such theories and the governmental 
systems they propose are likely to be contested.  There is no position without the 
worldviews of those in the polity to adjudge which system would be the best political 
system.  There can be no escape from the perspective of one or more comprehensive 
worldviews.  Any value of an outcome can only be judged by the measures provided by 
comprehensive worldviews.  That being so, the best we may be able to do is to identify 
whether democracy is capable of functioning as a political theory.  It is not possible to 
argue that democracy is the best possible system in all polities, in all places, at all times.  
We may, though, note a lack of other viable political theories in actual polities and thus 
might conclude that democracy may be, in many cases, the only (and thus the best out of 
a field of one) political theory. 
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Richard Arneson offers two alternative standards of justification for an orthodox 
outcome, instrumental, theory of governance on the basis of two senses in which a 
governmental system produces better outcomes.  He offers a correctness standard and a 
best results standard.  An example of a correctness standard would hold ‘that a procedure 
for reaching political decisions is morally legitimate just in case it more reliably reaches 
the morally best among the alternative policies over the long haul than would any 
alternative feasible procedure that might be instituted instead’.4  A best results standard 
would hold ‘that a political decision procedure is morally legitimate just in case over the 
long haul it gives rise to results that are morally superior to the results that any feasible 
alternative procedure would produce’.  Arneson argues that a best results standard is a 
better standard of justification because it is broader, allowing all the benefits of 
democracy to be factored in.  It is conceivable, he points out, that, in certain 
circumstances, some kind of benign autocracy might produce better policy outcomes than 
a democracy but such a correctness standard fails to take account of the wider benefits 
that democracy offers.
5
  Historically, a best results standard has been utilised in the many 
outcome theories of democracy.  Democracy has been justified in terms of the wider 
benefits that democracy offers, such as protection from tyranny and the control of 
corruption.  It is the more modern accounts of deliberative democracy and theories of 
epistemic advantage (see below) that may be based on a correctness standard.  Now, 
while Arneson is pursuing an appropriate justification for an orthodox outcome theory of 
                                           
4
 Richard Arneson, ‘Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy’, Journal of 
Political Philosophy Vol.11 No.1 (March 2003) pp.122-132 at p.123.   I prefer ‘over a reasonable period of 
time’ (see above) rather than ‘over the long haul’.  ‘Over the long haul’ could be too long a period;  the 
theory does have to be, in principle, testable and thus, judgments have to be made;  there must be some 
limit to the length of time over which bad outcomes can reasonably be expected to be tolerated (i.e. without 
properly concluding that better outcomes have not been forthcoming).  
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democracy and this is an investigation of democracy as a political theory, Arneson’s two 
different standards highlight the different kinds of outcomes that might be relevant to 
those judging whether democracy produces valuable outcomes.  Arneson is right to argue 
that the broader view of benefits is most relevant.  Indeed, there are no good reasons for 
limiting the recognition of good outcomes to particular policy outcomes.  Henceforth, 
where necessary, I will distinguish ‘particular outcomes’ (i.e. particular political 
decisions or policy decisions made directly or indirectly by a democratic process – i.e. 
made following a referendum or by elected legislatures or executives) from ‘wider 
outcome benefits’.  Both types of outcome will be relevant when adjudging whether 
democracy produces good outcomes. 
 
Any political theory accepts that citizens hold diverse comprehensive moral doctrines and 
worldviews.  A political theory is a moral theory of limited range.  Holders of different 
comprehensive theories are expected to endorse the limited political theory.  We might 
suspect that an instrumental political theory is likely to be based on the ability of 
democracy to provide wider outcome benefits rather than good particular outcomes.  
Different comprehensive doctrines offer different accounts of the good and are likely to 
offer different accounts of what constitutes a good policy outcome in different situations.  
It is hard to imagine the intellectual space for a political theory that purports to explain 
why democracy will offer particular good outcomes – by which measure will they be 
good? – given that all relevant comprehensive theories will have their own measure of the 
good.  However, we might expect a greater degree of commonality and agreement about 
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 Ibid. 
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what constitutes a wider outcome benefit of a political system:  many different 
worldviews may recognise the benefits of peace and stability and the control of 
corruption for example. 
  
The Prevention of Tyranny and Bad Governance – ‘The Protective Argument’ 
It is a commonplace that governments represent both a solution to the Hobbesian problem 
of insecurity and oppression and a cause of insecurity and oppression.  Governments may 
bring order, stability and protection from threat of harm imposed arbitrarily by others but 
they may themselves be a source of arbitrary harm and injury.  As Locke pointed out, an 
absolute monarch may represent no improvement over a Hobbesian state of nature and 
history is littered with tyrants.  Of course, all governments behave in ways that many 
citizens disapprove of and in ways that, by some measures, are against the interests of 
many citizens:  all governments coerce to a greater or lesser extent.  Governments cannot 
please all of the people all of the time.  There is, though, a scale of offence.  At one 
extreme we might place governments which carry on acts of arbitrary violence against 
citizens.  We might have in mind Stalinist or Maoist regimes that assault citizens as a 
mechanism for engendering terror and, thus, for controlling dissent or that assault them 
simply on the whim of a paranoid autocrat.  At the other extreme, we would place 
governments which issue few directives, albeit ones that necessarily coerce some citizens 
(i.e. those citizens who would not willingly abide by such a demand).  In between these 
poles, we can place both real and imagined regimes in some order on this scale.  Working 
downwards from the most oppressive, we might add totalitarian regimes where coercive 
power is all pervasive but is applied consistently so that injury can be avoided by 
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consistently playing by the rules.  Further down the scale we might place states with vast 
self-perpetuating bureaucracies as imagined by Mill.
6
  The government in such cases may 
not be deliberately totalitarian but the functions of government have become so expanded 
that government sets the parameters for the lives of citizens to a very considerable extent.  
Lower still, we might place modern Western liberal democracies.  Government is large 
and complex but that is recognised and to some extent constrained by bills of rights and 
fairly interventionist judiciaries. 
 
I do not mean to offer any exhaustive or definitive gradation of political systems on the 
basis of the degree of governmental imposition.  I merely wish to emphasise that there is 
such a scale and that that scale might be borne in mind when considering whether 
democracy might be instrumentally valuable because of its ability to control or protect 
against various possible impositions that are considered unreasonable or unwarranted.  
There are other spectra of governmental performance that might also be borne mind when 
considering the efficacy of democracy as a prophylactic against oppressive or otherwise 
bad government.  Governments could be rated in terms of the extent of corruption and 
nepotism.  More, positively, governments could be rated in respect of the extent to which 
they protect citizens from non-governmental threats (i.e. from internal lawlessness and 
external aggressors).
7
 
 
                                           
6
 See On Liberty p.181-183. 
7
 The World Bank has sponsored a ‘Worldwide Governance Indicator’ which assesses countries and their 
governments according to six indicators:  ‘voice and accountability’, ‘political stability’, ‘government 
effectiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘control of corruption’. See 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp> [accessed 14 March 2011]. 
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What electoral democracy purports to offer is a mechanism for ejecting bad or poor 
governments and would-be tyrants from office and replacing them with new 
governments.  Such an ability/facility is only valuable to the extent that it is likely to be 
utilised to throw out oppressive or corrupt regimes (and replace them with something 
better) or to the extent that the existence of a democratic mechanism for ejecting 
oppressive governments moderates the behaviour of governments.  It is reasonable to 
think that, in many cases, democracy would be likely to lead to the expulsion of a 
government that was violently tyrannical or hopelessly corrupt.  The unpopularity of 
communists and former communists in free elections in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 
suggests that the oppressive pro-Soviet regimes would not have survived for as long as 
they did, or in the form they did, had they been subject to electoral democracy.
8
  It is also 
reasonable to conclude that the real threat of democratic elections would curtail the 
offensive activities of a government by a process of self-moderation because, if thrown 
out of office, the expelled government would be subject to the new government and the 
possibility of retribution for any conduct while it was in power considered offensive by 
the new government. 
 
Democracy, though, may not lead to the removal of an offensive government or restrain 
that government if the offence is against a minority and a majority considers that offence 
is justified or, more likely, the majority is not persuaded that there is any offence.  Thus, 
                                           
8
 For instances, in the face of a deep economic crisis and labour unrest, at Round Table talks in early 1989, 
the Polish Communist government agreed to partially free elections for a revised legislature.  35% of the 
Sejm (lower house) would be elected by free elections and all 100 seats of the new Senat (upper chamber).  
The elections revealed that public support for the communists was almost wholly lacking.  In the elections 
in June 1989, Solidarity won all seats contested in the Sejm and all bar one in the Senat.  [See Victor 
Sebestyen, Revolution 1989 (London: Phoenix, 2010) pp.287-292.] 
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the instrumentalist argument that democracy prevents tyranny seems credible when the 
offending government (or putatively offending government) is acting (or intends to act) 
in the interests of some minority (e.g. a religious group, a tribe or even an extended 
family) but not when it is acting in the interests of a majority and that majority is fully 
engaged in or supports the offence against a minority.  Indeed, democracy may not 
merely fail to control an offence against a minority, it may facilitate such an offence by 
giving power to an oppressive majority – or, more accurately, to some demagogue or 
group pursuing a populist agenda.
9
  This is Mill’s fear of the ‘tyranny of the majority’.  
Further, democracy does not just allow oppressive majority rule, it can often be used to 
lend a specious legitimacy to that oppression.  This concern has been rarely or more 
neatly expressed than by Madison in The Federalist Papers.
10
  He wrote, 
To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such faction 
[i.e. a majority faction], and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of 
popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed:  
Let me add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of 
government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long 
laboured, and can be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
11
 
 
Democracy can act as a restraint.  But democracy can empower the demagogue and allow 
or legitimise oppression of minorities.  Democracy can sweep away corrupt politicians 
and officials.  But democracy can leave the corruption and nepotism of an entrenched 
majority unhindered.  I do not, of course, mean to suggest that there is a necessary 
equivalence here such that, on balance, democracy makes things neither better nor worse:  
                                           
9
 In his deeply contentious Democracy in Europe, Luciano Canfora points out that the words demokratia 
and demokrator in the Greek political language of ancient Rome can mean rule over the people [ibid. p.5].  
He asserts that this points to the closeness of dictatorship and democracy – at least forms of democracy to 
which he is antagonistic.  {Reviews: Dylan Riley, ‘Freedom’s Triumph’, New Left Review 56 (Mar-Apr 
2009) <http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2770> [accessed 14 March 2011] (supportive) and Adam 
Krzeminski, ‘Canfora’s Scandalous History of Democracy’, trans. Abby Darcy Signandsight.com 
<http://www.signandsight.com/features/669.html> [accessed 14 March 2011] (critical).} 
10
 Op. cit. 
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the positive and negative impacts of democracy will not be felt in the same state.  The 
restraining effect of democracy may offer a powerful defence of democracy in many 
states if not the vast majority of states.  In an increasingly diverse and plural world, it 
may be that there are fewer and fewer states where democracy could be used to facilitate 
a tyranny of the majority. 
 
The Madisonian answer was a constitutional settlement that limited the power of 
representatives elected democratically, by a separation of powers.  Such a model is now 
commonplace in the post-War Western democracies and even in the UK, which lacks an 
entrenched constitution, but where, following the European Communities Act 1972, the 
whole body of what is now EU Law trumps the desires of the UK legislature and 
executive.
12
 
 
But if various constraints might be considered appropriate to control the potentially 
abusive power of a majority, or rather of the majority’s representative(s), that raises the 
question of whether, at least for liberals, a liberal constitutional settlement could dispense 
with democracy altogether and, thus, whether democracy might be a less than attractive 
political theory for liberals.  (As I noted above, the value that one comprehensive theory 
puts on democracy is not necessarily determinative of whether democracy can function as 
a political theory.  Liberals might see more value in a non-democratic polity but 
recognise that democracy has value and that that value is recognised more broadly than 
                                                                                                                             
11
 The Federalist No.10 [Ibid. p.43]. 
12
 It might also be noted that the UK’s membership of the Council of Europe and its consequent acceptance 
of the European Convention on Human Rights acts as a de facto restraint on the democratically-elected UK 
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the value of any system liberals might prefer.)  From the liberal perspective, it might be 
thought that a wholly juridical form of government would produce better outcomes than a 
democracy.  It may be less likely that adherents of other comprehensive doctrines would 
find a wholly juridical (and presumably liberal) form of government as attractive but, 
even for non-liberals, it offers the rule of law and perhaps some certainty about particular 
future outcomes.  Albert Weale explores the merits of this kind of government at some 
length.  He points out that courts can only respond to problems after the fact, whereas 
legislatures can makes rules that avoid problems.  Weale concludes that ‘[a]lthough we 
can imagine a form of polity that dispensed with a legislative function in respect of 
resolutions of the disputes between individuals, it would by its nature be incapable of 
satisfactorily resolving the collective problems to which any system of interactive choice 
[market system of exchange] gave rise.’13  He argues that the ‘institutional preconditions 
for economic and social life’ and the consequences of such activity, including 
environmental degradation, need to be regulated legislatively.  Weale must be right:  the 
argument against wholly juridical government on the grounds of practicality, in the 
complex modern world, is overwhelming.  There is, though, a further argument against a 
wholly juridical system:  such a system may be peculiarly poor at restraining oppressive 
conduct by a minority and poor at controlling bad governance generally.  A wholly 
juridical system dispenses with a legislature but it cannot dispense with a bureaucracy.  
Government involves administrative functions as well as judicial ones.  While, in 
principle, the judicature can control the administrative arm of government, there would 
be no prospect of a new government with a ‘new broom’.  The particular form of 
                                                                                                                             
government – given the limited powers of derogation and the political difficulties associated with 
withdrawal. 
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bureaucracy would be entrenched in a way that it is not generally entrenched in 
democracies.  This would be fertile ground for poor, inefficient and corrupt 
administration.  Perhaps, more importantly, it seems unlikely that a juridical system 
would be robust in the face of attempts to subvert it deliberately and determinedly or 
would be able to withstand a more gradual and subtle undermining of its integrity over 
time by particular interests in a society.  It is a pretence to imagine that judges act 
apolitically when dealing with what are essentially political issues.
14
  Further, judges 
need to be appointed by someone and it is not clear how an appointments process could 
be rendered consistently apolitical.  In a letter to the Marquis of Mirabeau (26 July 1767), 
Rousseau wrote: 
This is, as I used to see it, the great problem of politics, which I compare to that of 
squaring the circle in geometry and [the problem] of longitude in astronomy:  to 
find a form of government that puts the laws above man.  If such a form can be 
found, let us find it and try to establish it …  If unfortunately it cannot be found – 
and I confess frankly that I believe that it is not to be found – I believe we must 
pass to the other extreme, and immediately put man as far as possible above the 
law; to establish, therefore, arbitrary despotism, and the most arbitrary possible.
15
 
 
While Rousseau was responding to the ‘legal despotism’ of de la Rivière and the 
physiocrats, not responding to the possibility of a wholly juridical system,
16
 and while 
noting that his alternative seems unattractive to say the least, Rousseau’s criticism of 
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 Op. cit. pp.61-62. 
14
 That being so, it might be unwise to bet against the US Supreme Court dividing politically [i.e. 5 to 4] 
over the constitutionality of President Obama’s health care reforms when an appropriate case finally 
reaches the Court.  5 to 4 because the political make-up of the court is generally considered to be 4 
conservatives, 4 liberals with Justice Kennedy as the swing voter.  See David Cole, ‘Is Health Care Reform 
Unconstitutional?’, New York Review of Books Vol. 58 No.3 (February 24 – March 9, 2011) pp.9-11.  Cole 
is responding to the December 2010 decision of a federal judge in Virginia that rules the reforms 
unconstitutional on the basis that the constitution denies the federal government the power to legislate in 
such matters. 
15
 Quoted in John Mason, The Indispensable Rousseau (London: Quartet, 1979) p.280 and referred to in 
Canfora p.5. 
16
 The legal despotism of the physiocrats might not be so different from a wholly juridical liberal state.  For 
a description of the political proposals of the physiocrats see, for instance, David McNally, Political 
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legal despotism represents a general insight into the working of government.  No 
governmental system can consistently operate apolitically on the basis of legally-
interpreted principle alone.   
 
Non-democratic systems will often involve some entrenchment of power
17
 – an 
entrenchment of power that may be more arbitrary in its exercise than would be the case 
for the hypothetical juridical state discussed above.  Entrenchment means that one 
important self-interested incentive to consider the opinions and preferences of the 
population is absent.  There is no forthcoming election when power may be lost as a 
result of unpopular actions taken while in power.  Entrenchment can lead to corruption 
both moral and epistemic – epistemic because there will be a significant risk of an 
intellectual monoculture developing, perhaps because of patronage and cronyism, in 
which important other voices and opinions will not be heard, leading to a gradual 
debasement of the quality of decision-making.  But, of course, democracy can also lead 
to the entrenchment of power in the event that an essentially univocal grouping within a 
state is in a permanent majority.  Pre-direct rule Northern Ireland offers an example of 
such entrenchment.
18
 
 
                                                                                                                             
Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1990) pp.121-129. 
17
 A proto-democratic state with a limited franchise, does not so much entrench power – there may be a real 
and vigorous contest to win the votes of those who are enfranchised, with real uncertainty as to the outcome 
of elections – as ‘entrench’ the exclusion of the disenfranchised.  In such proto-democracies different 
problems exist:  particularly a lack of incentive to take into account the interests of the disenfranchised. 
18
 The Ulster Unionist Party won majorities in the Northern Ireland House of Commons in all 12 general 
elections between 1921 and 1969, including the elections in 1921 and 1925 held under the STV electoral 
system. 
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The protective argument for democracy, then, is of arguable weight – or at least, it has a 
weight which varies situationally.  A constitutionally unconstrained democracy is likely 
to have efficacy in preventing oppression by minorities but will not prevent oppression 
by a majority (i.e. oppression in the eyes of a minority or minorities).  An extreme 
juridical liberal regime might at first sight prevent oppression (i.e. any conduct perceived 
as oppressive by liberals) but is impractical and may not be resilient, failing to prevent 
oppression over the longer-term.  Benign autocracies and other systems that entrench 
power are only contingently benign and may have a tendency towards moral corruption 
and intellectual debasement over time.  Democracy constrained by constitutional 
safeguards may offer a viable protective solution, maintaining wider outcome benefits 
recognised as valuable by those adhering to diverse comprehensive doctrines. 
 
Epistemic Benefits 
Relying on insights of Frederick Barnard and Adam Przeworski, Vernon argues that 
democracies can be distinguished from other systems by the fact that the particular 
outcomes of a democracy are contingent.
19
  It is not possible to know in advance what an 
outcome will be:  no party can rely on winning; no party can be certain of defeat.
20
  
                                           
19
 Op cit. p.38 [Barnard]; ibid. p.39 [Przeworski]. 
20
 I do not read Vernon as suggesting that the fact of contingency amounts, itself, to a justification for 
democracy.  Rather, he deploys the point as he builds his case for the epistemic benefit of democracy.  
Indeed, it is not easy to see how the mere creation of contingency could amount to such a justification (save 
in so far as the need for such contingency is an inherent part of the protective argument set out above).  
Adherents of each comprehensive view would want, presumably, in their ideal world, to see their 
preferences pursued on each and every occasion.  However, recognizing the existence of different 
worldviews, there may be recognition of the need for compromise.  However, compromise on the basis that 
we win sometimes, you win on other occasions, seems to be a poor arrangement.  It seems to make the 
endorsement of a political settlement a kind of gamble – over what issues does a group within society think 
it will succeed and what is the likelihood of that success?  Contingency would be unattractive to a group 
that thinks it will probably lose on all the issues that it considers important.  Elections are not lotteries.  
Elections depend upon the demographics of the polity and the opinions of the population.  In many cases 
the contingency, may be more theoretical and than actual. 
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While one might reasonably point out that there is no real contingency in some 
democratic polities, as was the case for pre-direct rule Northern Ireland, it is true that 
democracy commonly involves some contingency. 
 
Building on the foundation of democracy’s contingency, Vernon offers a ‘processual’ 
justification for democracy.  If there is real contingency, if the outcome is really in the 
balance, that provides an incentive for political actors to persuade others and the best way 
to do that is make arguments in terms that will appeal to as many as possible; as Vernon 
puts it, ‘you must generalize the interests that you appeal to and problematize the appeals 
made by your opponents’21.  Echoing to a considerable extent ideas in deliberative 
accounts of democracy, Vernon writes: 
The need to convince others … creates pressure to root out special pleading from 
one’s own case, to generalize one’s principles, and to learn what others find 
important.  The need to respond to others makes one consider unanticipated 
objections, develop new grounds for favoured but contested proposals, and extend 
initially attractive principles to new and more difficult cases.
22
 
 
The value of this process is, apparently, in the epistemic benefit to the individual 
reasoner.  Vernon continues, ‘If we respect people as bearers of critical reason, we will 
think it important that they should have a political environment in which their access to 
others’ arguments, to the reach of their own principles, and to publicly useful evidence is 
maximized.’23  Democracy has created a ‘whole body of argument and evidence that 
mutual critique has generated’24.  When reaching a conclusion on that body of argument 
and evidence, though, the minority is just as likely to support the better option as the 
                                           
21
 Op. cit. p.49. 
22
 Ibid. p.68. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. p.69. 
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majority, if indeed there is a better option.  Vernon writes, ‘The vote is no more than a 
registration of the number of people who think it inclines one way rather than another.  
There is no reason to think that the outcome of the vote better represents the outcome of 
the discussion than minority views do.’25  He avers that no claim should be made for the 
quality of particular democratic outcomes – ‘no normative weight attaches to the majority 
vote’26. 
 
Vernon’s argument is muddled and, at root, contradictory.  Vernon’s argument relies on 
there being value in the ‘whole body of argument and evidence that mutual critique has 
generated’ in the course of the broader electoral process i.e. in the course of campaigning 
and debating.  Given that Vernon mentions the benefit to individuals in having access to 
better arguments and in having their own arguments tested, it may look as if the 
processual benefit Vernon envisages is a psychological or existential benefit for citizens 
unrelated to the quality of political outcomes (i.e. citizens better understand what they 
want and what they believe in even though they are no more likely to achieve it).
27
  But 
that would surely be a weak argument for democracy – and Vernon himself admits as 
much.
28
  That being so, this body of understanding and critique must have some other 
instrumental value.  The most obvious value is that it helps to better inform decision-
making so that public decisions are improved.  And if it should lead to improved 
                                           
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. p.70. 
27
 Indeed, for some people, at certain times and in certain places, a clearer and heightened view of what 
would be the right outcome may not increase satisfaction but rather increase frustration and distress if the 
right outcome does not transpire. 
28
 Op. cit. pp.47-48.  At this point in the text Vernon is in the middle of setting out in detail and at length 
the account of Brennan and Lomasky [op. cit. pp.167-198 Ch.11] – an account he does not agree with.  
However, it is clear that, on this point, the inadequacy of relying on a psychic benefit, he follows Brennan 
and Lomasky. 
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decisions, why should the particular election or referendum be excluded from the benefit 
of that body of knowledge?  Surely, with the testing of evidence and arguments in an 
election campaign, there is some possibility that the outcome of that election campaign 
will be better.  But Vernon expressly denies this and, if an election will not benefit from 
the deliberative process in the run up to that election, why should any decision taken after 
the deliberation be improved?  Vernon’s argument turns out to be ultimately vacuous.  He 
has failed to explain what value there is in the process of deliberation he lauds.
29
 
 
Vernon is correct about one thing though.  He has good reason to doubt the epistemic 
superiority of the view of the majority over that of the minority.
30
  To assert that a 
majority has reached, or will reach, a better decision than a minority must be incorrect.  
                                           
29
 Vernon argues that the epistemic benefit provides a moral reason for people to vote or even a duty to vote 
so as to contribute to the gaining of the epistemic benefits [op. cit. pp.49-50].  He argues that the gain (the 
epistemic benefit) is made in the process of deliberation that occurs in the attempt to persuade voters;  
voting does not lead to any epistemic gain in that election (deliberation has already been concluded by the 
stage of the actual ballot) rather, if I understand Vernon correctly, the duty to vote arises because a good 
turnout at an election will encourage those actively engaged in reflective political debate to engage in that 
process once again at the next election because they will believe that all those votes will be up for grabs at 
that next election. 
This strikes me as another peculiarly weak argument.  Why should any particular number of voters affect 
the vigour with which those seeking votes engage in argumentation and deliberation?  There is no reason to 
think that better or more credible arguments will be advanced because 30 million rather than 20 million 
citizens are, on past evidence, likely to take part in a forthcoming election.  [Vernon cannot appeal to the 
actual outcome of a previous election as providing a peculiar incentive say to engage with some group 
within society that apparently engaged in great numbers in the last election:  election results, themselves 
have no significance.]  Indeed, a low turnout in an earlier election might be just as motivating.  A political 
party may see a group of non-voters as a potential source of new votes.  Further, in the face of previous low 
turnout, political parties may enrich the intellectual environment by attempting to appeal to previous non-
voters (with new arguments) as well as appealing to previous voters. 
There is a particularly striking inconsistency in Vernon’s account.  When discussing the alleged 
inconsequentiality of a single vote, he refers to Anthony Downs’s attempt to find a value in voting in a duty 
to uphold the democratic system – if no one voted the system might collapse.  Vernon endorses Brian 
Barry’s response:  if one vote has a vanishingly small chance of affecting the outcome of an election how 
will it have anything other than a vanishingly small chance of having a bearing on whether the democratic 
system survives.  With regard to the matter in hand, one might add that if a single vote cannot realistically 
affect the outcome of an election, why should one vote have any impact on the strength of engagement in 
the deliberative process by those seeking votes? 
30
 Cf. Benhabib’s position set out in my chapter 4.  She suggests that the decision of a majority ‘has a 
presumptive claim to being rational until shown to be otherwise’ [‘Toward’ p.72]. 
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Such deference to the majority only makes sense if I have no opinion.  As soon as I have 
an opinion, then what I consider to be the better outcome is, as far as I am concerned, that 
better outcome whether I am in the majority or in the minority.  Nobody can reasonably 
conclude that the opinion of a majority of the general population will be better than that 
of any minority by reason simply that it is the reason of the majority.  (Of course, the 
majority may hold the better view but not because it is a majority.) 
 
Admittedly, there may be some limited cases when it is reasonable to accept that a 
majority is more likely to be right but these are not, perhaps, democratic situations.  On a 
matter involving technical expertise that I lack, I may reasonably conclude that the 
majority of experts, say, are more likely to be correct than the minority.  My acceptance 
of the reality of man-made global warming might be a case in point.  Even here it will not 
be reasonable to reach such a conclusion if I believe I have become aware of some 
erroneous bias that would explain the majority’s (erroneous) conclusion and the majority 
of experts is unable to answer satisfactorily that charge of bias.  In the case of democracy, 
though, we are not dealing with a limited electorate of experts; we are considering the 
whole citizenry, the members of which generally lack an expertise to which I should 
sensibly defer.
31
 
 
Nevertheless, Vernon has overlooked the fact that the quality of the deliberation can 
surely lead to some improvement in the outcome of the vote:  if a group has been obliged 
to analyse, test and communicate the reasons for a preference that may lead to some 
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change on its part.  It may resile from some preference and, if that preference was already 
considered noxious by other groups, there is now no prospect of that preference being 
adopted.  Vernon, of course, cannot recognise this without undermining his argument.  So 
while Vernon has done his best to undermine the attraction of an argument for democracy 
based on its epistemic benefits, there is something here.  What should be recognised, 
though, is that the strength of any epistemic benefit is highly contingent on the particular 
circumstances existing in the polity at the time of the election campaign.  In some 
situations, campaigns will be shrill and obfuscatory; but, on other occasions, there may be 
a high quality of argument which impacts positively upon electoral outcomes and other 
future decision-making.  Further, there may be some personal benefit arising from the 
deliberative process involved in election campaigns.  Andrew Smith sets out an account 
of how deliberation offers a personal epistemic benefit.
32
  First, there is a psychological 
benefit, engaging in public deliberation is a means by which ‘tension, agitation and even 
doubt’33 can be replaced by ‘settled doxastic states’.  Secondly, as per Mill, a collision 
with error creates a clearer impression of truth.  Even so, by itself this surely rates as little 
more than a fringe benefit for democracy.  These epistemic benefits are modest and they 
do not by themselves amount to strong grounds for an outcome theory of democracy; but 
they are grist to the mill.  We can add them to the democratic side of the scales and they 
may help to explain why democratic governance is to be preferred. 
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 I do not mean to be contemptuous of the electorate in general.  I may reasonably, expect other electors to 
be no better and no worse qualified than me to reach a conclusion – although, of course, I still think I’m 
right! 
32
 Andrew Smith, ‘On the Epistemic Incentives to Deliberate Publicly’, Journal of Social Philosophy 
Vol.41 No.4 (Winter 2010) pp.454-467. 
33
 Ibid. p.455 
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Further Epistemic Benefits 
There is, though, a more expansive account of the epistemic benefit of democracy:  that it 
is appropriate for all individuals and groups to place greater credibility on democratic 
outcomes than on their own conclusions.  The line of reasoning is broadly that 
individuals or groups cannot be certain of the validity of their own views.  Democratic 
outcomes are based upon a variety of arguments coming from different sources and 
perspectives.  It is only right that our own conclusions should defer to conclusions based 
upon wider perspectives and investigation.  Clearly, this heightened account of the 
epistemic benefit of democracy is related to ideas and themes within deliberative 
democratic theory.  Mathew Humphrey puts it like this: 
None of us, as individuals, knows with certainty which values humanity should 
live by, or which policies might best realise those values, so there is no place for 
an Aristotelian “wise man”;  the best we can hope for is that many heads are more 
likely to come to a wise decision.
34
 
 
Referring to a dispute between environmental philosophers Bryan Norton and Laura 
Westra – Westra expresses doubt that democracies are capable of responding adequately 
to environmental threats
35
 – Humphrey continues, 
Norton also holds that Westra’s anti-democratic arguments reflect far too much 
confidence in her chosen principles; furthermore to claim that such fundamental 
principles are entirely non-negotiable is to place yourself beyond the conventions 
of public discourse …, and to claim an epistemological privilege over your fellow 
human beings.
36
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 Mathew Humphrey, ‘Democratic Legitimacy, Public Justification and Environmental Direct Action’, 
Political Studies Vol.54 No.2 (June 2006) pp.310-327 at p.319. 
35
 Laura Westra, Living in Integrity: A Global Ethic to Restore a Fragmented Earth (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) p.16. 
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 Op. cit. p.319 referring to Brian Norton, ‘Democracy and Environmentalism: Foundations and 
Justifications in Environmental Policy’, in Democracy and the Claims of Nature: Critical Perspectives for 
a New Century eds. Ben Minteer & Bob Pepperman Taylor (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield) pp.11-
32 at pp.24-26. 
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When faced with a divergence between their personal view or preference, on the one 
hand, and a democratic decision, on the other, most reasonable individuals and groups 
will reprise the details of the arguments for and against.  The democratic outcome poses 
the question afresh as it were:  am I right or is the democratic decision right?  In response 
to that question, the conscientious individual (or group) will ask ‘How strong are my own 
arguments?  Have I weighed the evidence appropriately?  Have I overlooked a personal 
bias that would skew my conclusion?’  If the individual or group continues to dissent 
from the democratic outcome, that dissent is likely to be of a strength ranging from total 
conviction about the error of the democratic outcome to an on balance view that the 
outcome is wrong.  (This strength of opinion may be a factor in deciding how the 
individual or group responds to the unfavoured outcome.)  That is a reasonable response 
but to defer, on principle, to an opinion which is not one’s own would be quite odd.  
However, even if the individual (or group) accepts that, in theory, a democratic decision 
on the matter in hand should be preferred because of its epistemic superiority, then, in 
any real world situation, the individual (or group) will surely ask how democratic the 
decision was.  The epistemic superiority of the decision is supposedly based upon the 
quality and quantity of the exchange of reasons that takes place in the course of the 
democratic process.  If, though, the democratic outcome has been the result of some 
measure of procedural irregularity or has been made quickly with limited debate 
following an outcry by tabloid newspaper editors, then surely the individual or group will 
need to weigh this inadequacy before concluding whether or not to defer to the 
democratic outcome i.e. whether to afford it epistemic priority.  Thus, those arguing for a 
deference to democratic decisions on epistemic grounds succeed only in substituting a 
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procedural doubt for a substantive doubt about the legitimacy of a democratic decision.  
This line of reasoning simply replaces one question with another:  instead of analysing 
whether the majority is substantively right, I now worry whether the majority has arrived 
at its decision by a proper process of open exchange of reasons.  In practice, it remains 
unclear whether I am justified in maintaining my own position. 
 
In any event, such deference to majority decisions is a dubious strategy.  It is one thing to 
cultivate an open-mindedness and to scrutinise one’s own biases and predilections – to 
set a high bar for reaching conclusions about important moral and political issues.  It is 
quite another to seek to neuter the ethical weight of one’s own judgments.  Further, the 
proponents of this theory of personal epistemic doubt have, perhaps, overlooked the irony 
of their own position.  Until such time as there is a broad consensus supporting this 
theory, should they not defer to those who contest their position?  Their own theory 
provides reasons for doubting its validity.  A hundred years ago, G.K. Chesterton neatly 
criticised this kind of humility about convictions: 
… what we suffer from today is humility in the wrong place.  Modesty has moved 
from the organ of ambition.  Modesty has settled upon the organ of conviction; 
where it was never meant to be. … 
At any street corner we may meet a man who utters the frantic and blasphemous 
statement that he may be wrong.  Every day one comes across somebody who 
says that of course his view may not be the right one.  Of course his view must be 
the right one, or it is not his view.  We are on the road to producing a race of men 
too mentally modest to believe in the multiplication table.  We are in danger of 
seeing philosophers who doubt the law of gravity as being a mere fancy of their 
own.  Scoffers of old time were too proud to be convinced; but these are too 
humble to be convinced.  The meek do inherit the earth; but the modern sceptics 
are too meek even to claim their inheritance.
37
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 G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996) p.37-8. 
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Citizen Engagement 
In chapter 3, I sought to show that there was no procedural argument for democracy.  
However, I did argue that individual voters are sometimes able to contribute to 
democratic outcomes i.e. those that vote for the winning candidate or the winning 
proposal in a referendum.  Further, even those voters that vote for a losing candidate or 
proposition have had the opportunity to contribute to the total number of votes obtained 
by that losing candidate.  Such an opportunity may involve some benefit to the 
contributing voter albeit not a value that can be equal to the benefit to those that voted for 
the winning candidate or proposition.  One might distinguish between votes that count 
(i.e. votes for the winning candidate or proposal) and votes that are merely counted (i.e. 
all other votes). 
 
In the case of those voting for a losing candidate, there may be a significant benefit.  
Perhaps, a new party fighting elections for the first time has lost but has won 25% of the 
popular vote.  That party is now identified as a significant political player – a party that is 
potentially electable.  More might vote for this party in subsequent elections than would 
have been the case if the party had attracted just a few percent of the popular vote.  On 
the other hand, a vote for a candidate who attracted a derisory number of votes may have 
little value.  The outcome has merely demonstrated how unpopular and unelectable that 
candidate is.  So there may be benefits but these are of different qualities, are not shared 
out fairly and those benefits may well not extend to all voters.  The benefit of 
contributing is likely to depend upon the number of voters voting that way, or probably 
more accurately, the percentage of voters voting that way.  This chance to contribute to 
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the election of a winning candidate or to contribute to broader electoral outcomes (i.e. 
outcomes other than winning) may constitute a wider outcome benefit of democracy.  
Some voters are able to contribute to the influence that certain voices and opinions will 
have in a polity.  However, this opportunity to contribute should not be overstated.  Any 
benefit to particular voters from being able to contribute to some broader aspect of the 
outcome (e.g. by demonstrating that a particular idea or candidate commands significant 
support) may be overwhelmed by the demerits associated with the election of an 
unfavoured candidate who supports laws which will be viewed as oppressive or deeply 
inimical to the interests of those voters. 
 
It is sometimes suggested that there is also a distinct expressivist value to democracy.  
Essentially, all adult citizens are given the opportunity to express a preference.
38
  Such 
arguments are not tenable.  It might first be noted that it is hard to see what benefit there 
could be in a private expression of preference in the course of casting a vote itself in a 
secret ballot.
39
  Indeed, there would seem to be something oxymoronic about the idea of a 
private expression of preference.  I know what I think whether I vote or do not vote.  Any 
expressive benefit materialises only when the vote is counted and can only, then, 
represent a contribution to whatever expressive statement has been made by the totality 
of votes for the candidate or proposal.  The value, or lack of it, of such a collective 
expression is in the political efficacy or lack of efficacy of that statement in the ways I 
                                           
38
 See Brennan and Lomasky [op. cit.] who suggest that democracy is akin to cheering rather than choosing. 
For a recent popular example:  Matthew Parris, ‘Opinion’, The Times 26 February 2011 p.23 – discussing 
the relative merits of FPTP and AV on the basis of which electoral system allowed voters the fuller 
opportunity to express their preferences. 
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outlined above:  will it assist the party or agenda that was supported?  There is no distinct 
expressivist benefit beyond the opportunity to contribute to various broader electoral 
outcomes.  This is clear if we consider what expressive value a voter would place on their 
vote when they had voted for a candidate that has just obtained less than 1% of the 
popular vote.  Is this something that they would proudly tell their friends or brag about 
down the pub? 
 
Overall, a possibly substantial majority of voters are given an opportunity to contribute to 
some aspect of the election in a fashion that might be adjudged to be valuable.  Citizens 
are involved to a greater or lesser extent in the political decisions that shape their lives.  It 
is difficult to place a particular value on that possibility of involvement.  Different 
comprehensive theories will place quite different weights on that involvement or no 
weight.  That involvement is, of course, involvement in a collective activity.  Some 
worldviews may be more concerned with the exercise of individual autonomy than with 
involvement in shared endeavours.  Adherents to such worldviews may derive little 
benefit or satisfaction from their involvement in electoral democracy; their focus is upon 
the ways in which they lack personal control over aspects of their own lives. 
 
Related to the question of citizen engagement is the fact that democracy can allow for 
citizen recognition or at least for the recognition of groups to which citizens belong or 
associate themselves with.  Democracy may also give a voice (if not power), in the form 
of elected representatives, to a variety of different interests and groups in society – 
                                                                                                                             
39
 David Estlund makes essentially this point in David Estlund, ‘Review of Geoffrey Brennan and Loren 
Lomaskys’ Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference’, Economics and 
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especially in democracies with PR electoral systems.  That voice, and the apparent 
recognition that having a voice may imply, may be considered to be of significant value 
to those that are afforded that voice and risks associated with the exclusion and alienation 
of minority communities may be lessened. 
 
A Collective Exercise 
I have earlier made it clear that electoral democracy fundamentally represents a contest 
between competing endeavours.  The alternative approach of deliberative democracy 
which, in effect, suggests that democracy is a collective exercise aimed at arriving at an 
agreed outcome is not persuasive.  Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to deny that there 
cannot be any collective aspect to democracy.  People sometimes vote not because they 
have a clear preference but because they perceive voting to represent some kind of civic 
duty.  Such voters clearly imagine that electoral democracy represents some kind of 
practice which is valuable in itself.  Thus, voting may represent a commitment to the 
polity and be indicative of a sense of belonging to the broader community of the polity.  
Conceivably electoral democracy may actually engender or encourage commitment to the 
polity but this should not be overstated.  It may well be that voting is indicative of 
attitudes already held rather than a means by which attitudes are moulded.  Further, the 
attitudes encouraged by a person’s comprehensive beliefs may be far more weighty than 
any attitude fostered by democracy and, in certain circumstances, it seems probable that 
voting may not express any sense of the corporeity of the polity as a whole – Northern 
Ireland is again the example that comes to mind. 
                                                                                                                             
Philosophy Vol.12 No.1 (April 1996) pp.113-119 at p.116.   
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A Forum for Negotiation:  A Vehicle for Consent 
Whatever view is held as to the proper form of government – be that democracy or any 
other system – to endorse the idea and goal of proper governance is to recognise the need 
for reaching political decisions.  To be committed to the idea of governance is to reject 
the anarchist argument that it is best not to make political decisions.  Implicitly, a theory 
of good or right governance must hold that decisions need to be taken whether they are 
right or wrong.  To be committed to the idea of governance is to believe that a failure to 
make any decisions will generally be worse than making decisions, even if those 
decisions are erroneous – the alternative is anarchy.  That, of course, is not to claim that 
making a particular decision will always be better than making no decision in that 
situation.  There may be a great many cases where individuals holding a particular 
comprehensive doctrine would view no decision as far better than the decision that is 
made.  However, government cannot be turned off and then turned back on again.  The 
choice is between anarchy on the one hand and a government on the other that makes 
decisions some of which will be approved of by those holding a particular comprehensive 
worldview and some which will attract their disapprobation. 
 
It seems reasonable to believe that it is better to negotiate outcomes than to have them 
imposed, even if I or my group are doing the imposing:  consent is valuable.  Negotiation 
is generally a two (or more)-stage process:  first, the negotiating process must be agreed 
(this itself may involve negotiation) and then negotiations about substantive outcomes 
can proceed.  Negotiations in good faith will aim at an agreed outcome.  An agreed 
outcome offers consent and thereby legitimacy.  Thus, there are reasons for expecting 
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that the agreed outcome will be implemented because individuals who need to act in 
order to implement the decision are motivated to do so.  Consent and legitimacy also 
reduce the possibility that policies and political arrangements will be undermined or 
subverted. 
 
Democracy may be viewed as offering a system and mechanism for discussion and 
negotiation and for then reaching political decisions – a system that may be practical and 
appropriate.  Democratic governance offers both a set of rules for the discussion and 
negotiation and a means of decisively terminating the negotiation.  It provides a 
procedure and structure for negotiation.  It limits both the terms of the negotiation and the 
extent of the negotiation over time.  Negotiation can be seen to continue through the 
process of electing representatives and then on into the legislative body but negotiation is 
punctuated by elections which are determinative and by legislation and executive action 
which is determinative.  Different forms of electoral democracy provide different rules 
for negotiation, allowing negotiation to a greater or lesser extent.  FPTP systems tend to 
limit post-election negotiation by restricting the diversity of opinions to be heard in the 
legislative body.  Forms of PR will tend to lead to a greater diversity of opinions being 
heard in the legislative body and require negotiation in the matter of government 
formation.
40
 
 
 
 
                                           
40
 Other factors will also affect the nature and extent of negotiations – inter alia, the education of the 
population, the political culture of the state and the nature of the media. 
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Democracy as an Instrumentalist Political Theory – Difficulties 
Can these various outcome benefits amount to a viable outcome political theory of 
democracy?  We should not, perhaps, be too confident that they can.  We might expect an 
outcome political theory to propose outcomes that will be widely perceived to be 
demonstrably weighty and overriding.  In the case of democracy, though, while the 
various outcome benefits of democracy discussed above may each be substantial, it is not 
clear that any one such outcome benefit nor, for that matter, all (consistent) outcome 
benefits cumulatively are sufficiently weighty to form the basis of a persuasive political 
theory of democracy.  Roland Pennock in his Democratic Political Theory
41
 admits 
The argument [in favour of democracy – Pennock has offered human worth, 
autonomy, freedom, distributive justice, equality and the rejection of tyranny] has 
relied at various points upon presumptions, upon “burdens of proof” and upon 
probabilities.  The latter, moreover, have included assumptions about the probable 
nature of nondemocratic regimes.  I think these various assumptions are well 
founded; […] they do not pretend to have the certainty of logical demonstration.42 
 
Pennock deployed various arguments both intrinsic and instrumental but seems to 
equivocate about the overall strength of the collective argument for democracy.  An 
outcome theory which, by definition, forswears any intrinsic justification, must present a 
still weaker defence of democracy.  Weale, who also deploys a smorgasbord of 
arguments in his defence of democracy, says this about his approach to justifying 
democracy: 
I shall offer […] a pluralistic line of argument for justifying democracy.  It begins 
with an instrumentalist approach in the sense that the practices of democracy are 
seen to be justified because of their role in protecting or advancing certain 
interests, in particular certain common or public interests.  The instrumentalist 
justification needs to be supplemented, however, by the principle of political 
equality, understood as respect for the dignity of persons.  Even with that 
                                           
41
 Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
42
 Ibid. p.158.  See also Weale’s reference to Pennock:  op. cit. p.49. 
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supplementary assumption, we cannot justify democracy unless we also adopt an 
assumption of fallibilism […]43 
 
Weale considers that instrumental arguments need to be bolstered by intrinsic, 
procedural, arguments.  If, however, procedural arguments are unmeritorious, as I have 
argued, where does that leave his justification for democracy and any justification based 
on the wider outcome benefits of democracy alone?  While, there are a number of 
outcome benefits of electoral democracy that are significant, it is may be doubtful that 
these aggregate so as to provide a justification that will do for a political theory.  There 
are, though, clearer reasons for rejecting the possibility of an outcome political theory of 
democracy. 
 
There will always be clashes between the imperatives generated by democracy as a 
political theory and the imperatives of comprehensive theories.  For a political theory to 
work, holders of comprehensive views must continue to accept the legitimacy of the 
political theory despite those clashes.  This demand is harder for a purely instrumental 
political theory to satisfy.  As an instrumental theory, the acceptability of democracy to 
different comprehensive doctrines might be significantly more fragile than would be the 
case for a procedurally-justified democratic political theory, such as Rawls’s political 
liberalism (assuming it was coherent and justifiable).  In the case of a procedural or 
intrinsically-justified political theory, the adherent of a comprehensive theory is expected 
to endorse the reasons why an outcome consistent with the political theory (call this ‘a 
political outcome’) is right.  That rightness will carry moral weight for the adherent we 
have in mind because that adherent accepts the political theory.  There will undoubtedly 
                                           
43
 Ibid. p.50. 
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be clashes between political outcomes and the moral imperatives and prescriptions of the 
comprehensive theory but, in accepting the political theory, our adherent is reconciled to 
the existence of those clashes and, presumably, already has reasons to accept the priority 
of political outcomes:  on what other basis could the political theory have been accepted?  
Presumably, though, there would come a point where, notwithstanding the reasons for 
acceptance of the political theory, a particular political outcome or series of political 
outcomes would be so repugnant from the perspective of the comprehensive doctrine that 
the political theory would be foresworn.  How likely is it that that line will be crossed?  
The fact that a political theory is a theory of the right would make it less likely that the 
line will be crossed.  The fact that the political theory is a theory of the right makes it 
more robust and makes it less likely that citizens will secede from their commitment 
because of the demands of their comprehensive beliefs.  Where the political theory is a 
theory of the right, the clashes will tend to be hard to resolve, comparisons will not be 
easy to make:  a political outcome may be repugnant from the perspective of a particular 
comprehensive doctrine but the demand of the right remains.  The difficulty (or, possibly, 
the impossibility) of rationally resolving the clash introduces a further drag.  The 
repugnant political outcome may be accepted not because it is positively endorsed but 
because it cannot be unambiguously rejected.  Consider, though, an instrumental political 
theory.  The theory is accepted because of the good outcomes it offers.  When what is 
perceived to be a bad political outcome transpires this may not simply be a clash with the 
dictates of the comprehensive doctrine.  The political outcome may not be good from the 
perspective of the political theory either.  The bad political outcome may be an example 
of the built-in problem for instrumental political theories:  a real political settlement is 
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unlikely to be able to generate consistently good outcomes:  an instrumental political 
theory must include a recognition that the political settlement will not always deliver the 
good political outcomes that justify the political settlement.  This is a backdrop which 
places less restraint on those who, seeing the political outcome clash with their 
comprehensive worldview may be tempted to deny the legitimacy of the outcome, 
rejecting the authority of the political theory and possibly the whole political settlement.  
The offensive political outcome may well constitute a failure of the political theory to 
deliver what was claimed for it.  The particular outcome may seem to cast doubt on the 
ability of the political theory to deliver what was claimed for it.  However, even if the bad 
political outcome does not amount to a failure to deliver the goods claimed for the 
instrumental political theory, it will still be more straight-forward to compare the 
repugnant particular outcome with the projected outcome benefits of democracy than 
with the imperatives of a procedural political theory.  That being so, such a comparison 
involving an outcome political theory is more likely to be resolved in favour of the 
comprehensive worldview than would a comparison with a procedural political theory.  
In other words, a democratic state operating on the basis of an outcome political theory 
will be delegitimised at different points for people holding different comprehensive 
worldviews and the legitimacy of particular democratic outcomes may vary from person 
to person.  Thus, an instrumental political theory appears to be just too fragile; it is 
unlikely to provide the stability expected of a political theory. 
 
This likely difference in response to the demands of instrumental and procedural political 
theories in the face of a political outcome which is repugnant to a comprehensive doctrine 
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is indicative of a different overall relationship that citizens holding different 
comprehensive beliefs would likely have to instrumental and procedural political 
theories.  In the case of a procedural theory, it is expected that all will endorse the 
account of what is procedurally right.  It is also likely that the primary reasons for 
endorsing the theory will be the same.  Where the theory of democracy is a theory of the 
right, that theory provides its own reasons for its acceptance.  The arguments contained 
within the theory are believed and endorsed.  It is almost inconceivable that different 
individuals will uphold the theory on the basis of different arguments.  However, it may 
be the case that certain facts upon which the theory is based may be believed or accepted 
for different reasons.  It is also possible that the reason/argument for the theory will seem 
persuasive for different reasons.  (We might say that ‘higher-order reasons’ may differ.)  
Nevertheless, there is an argumentative core which must be accepted for essentially the 
same reasons.  There may also be common reasons why those holding different 
comprehensive doctrines would endorse an instrumental political theory:  in the case of 
democracy, it may be a bulwark against tyranny; it may offer political consent, peace and 
security.  There is, though, no necessity for shared reasons.  Democracy might be 
endorsed for different outcome reasons.  In a sense, adherents of different worldviews 
will hold different outcome theories.  There is no argument that stands apart from the 
comprehensive doctrines for an outcome theory of democracy, in the way that a 
procedural argument does.  Undoubtedly, the strength of any particular reason will vary 
from adherents of one comprehensive doctrine to adherents of another.  This is all the 
more the case because of the relative ease of comparison between particular preferred 
outcomes of a comprehensive doctrine and the outcome benefits of the instrumental 
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political theory.  The comparison is between two accounts of the good and, thus, the 
strength of the commitment to the political theory may, perhaps, more readily vary from 
adherent of one worldview to another than would be the case for a procedural theory. 
 
There is a further reason, perhaps, why democracy may not succeed as a political theory.  
There are many different versions of electoral democracy (i.e. FPTP and various forms of 
proportional representation).  A political theory, of course, has to be capable of attracting 
the endorsement of those committed to diverse comprehensive worldviews.  In order to 
achieve that endorsement, it might be thought that those holding diverse comprehensive 
commitments would have to coalesce around a particular version of electoral democracy, 
given that different forms of electoral democracy may be thought to offer different 
outcome benefits.  A putative political theory will not work if some favour one version of 
electoral democracy while others see no merit in that version and can only endorse a 
different variant.  It is not clear that there are any reasons to think that one particular 
version of electoral democracy will be capable of endorsement by those holding different 
comprehensive views i.e. whether the outcome benefits recognised by those adhering to 
different comprehensive doctrines will all point towards the same form of electoral 
democracy. 
 
When considering the possibility of an outcome, political, theory of democracy, these 
factors together – the uncertainty that the outcome arguments together amount to a 
sufficiently weighty argument for an outcome theory of democracy, the potential fragility 
of the commitment to a political outcome theory, the fact that different comprehensive 
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theories may recognise different outcome benefits and value those outcome benefits to 
different extents, together with the possibility that an outcome theory  would  founder 
upon the diversity of different expressions of electoral democracy – seem to render the 
prospect unrealistic, stretching the idea of a political outcome theory of democracy 
beyond breaking-point. 
 
Summary 
I have shown, though, that democracy offers a number of outcome benefits that may be 
recognised across a diverse citizenry.  However, an outcome theory of democracy is not 
the kind of justification for democracy that would mean that democracy could be 
understood as functioning as a political theory. 
 
Be that as it may, it is clear that democracy does appear to play a significant role in many 
states.  If democracy is not to be understood as a political outcome theory, is there 
another viable understanding of its role? 
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Chapter 7 
The Idea of a Modus Vivendi 
Perhaps, while continuing to recognise democracy’s outcome benefits – particularly those 
benefits that holders of different comprehensive doctrines are likely to recognise as 
valuable in common – it may be better to view democracy as forming (or as being 
capable of forming) part of political settlements that amount to modi vivendi, than as a 
self-contained political theory.  The idea of a political modus vivendi is associated with 
the growing realist school of political theory.  In order to address the association between 
democracy and modus vivendi, I need to say something about political realism and 
explicate the concept of a modus vivendi.  
 
Attempts to delineate ‘political realism’ will necessarily be tentative, given that in many 
respects it constitutes, first and foremost, a critique of liberalism rather than a distinct 
school of political theory.
1
  In the search for distinguishing principles of realist thought, a 
number of writers have taken up an idea in Williams’s posthumous In the Beginning was 
the Deed:  Realism and Moralism in Political Argument.
2
  On this account, realist 
theories are distinguished by the nature of their relationship with morality.  Non-realist 
theories commonly exhibit ‘political moralism’ (‘the priority of the moral over the 
political’3).  Williams suggests that even Rawls’s political liberalism, with its narrow 
focus on achieving an overlapping consensus between those holding a variety of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, is an example of political moralism.  Rawls’s moral 
                                           
1
 See Richard North, ‘Political Realism: Introduction’, European Journal of Political Theory Vol.9 No.4 
(October 2010) pp.381-384. 
2
 See, for example, William Galston, ‘Realism in Political Theory’, European Journal of Political Theory 
Vol.9 No.4 (October 2010) pp.385-411at p.387. 
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conception of justice is at the root of his political prescription.  Realist theory is not, 
according to Williams, founded upon external moral premisses.  Galston clarifies this 
point:  ‘This is not meant to imply that politics is amoral or immoral; rather, appropriate 
standards of evaluation arise from within politics rather than from an external moral 
standpoint.’4  Some kind of morality is uncovered within the very practice of politics 
itself.  I now consider Williams’s argument – his claim to have developed a non-
externally-moralist theory. 
 
Williams argues that the primary political question is the Hobbesian one:  how is order 
and security to be ensured?  A state which claims to be legitimate must answer this 
question successfully and to answer the question satisfactorily must mean that the 
solution offers something better than the pre-political circumstances of violence and 
insecurity.  ‘The situation of one lot of people terrorizing another lot of people is not per 
se a political situation:  it is, rather, the situation which the existence of the political is in 
the first place supposed to alleviate (replace).’5  In this context, Williams offers his ‘Basic 
Legitimation Demand’ [BLD] as a foundational realist principle.  He states that ‘Meeting 
the BLD can be equated with there being an “acceptable” solution to the first political 
question’6.  Williams’s claim, then, is that his BLD is derived from the nature of the 
political endeavour only:  ‘it is “inherent in there being such a thing as politics;”’.7  
Williams states that meeting his BLD implies that the state can justify its power to each 
                                                                                                                             
3
 Williams Deed p.8. 
4
 ‘Realism’ p.388. 
5
 Deed p.5 [also quoted in Matt Sleat, ‘Bernard Williams and the Possibility of a Realist Political Theory’, 
European Journal of Political Theory Vol.9 No.4 (October 2010) pp.485-503 p.487]. 
6
 Deed p.4. 
7
 Ibid. p.5 [also quoted in Sleat p.487] . 
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subject.
8
  He goes on to argue that in conditions of modernity only a liberal state will be 
legitimate, or as he puts it ‘LEG + Modernity = Liberalism’9. 
 
There is a considerable ambiguity at this point in Williams’s argument.  Matt Sleat argues 
that Williams’s equation, LEG + Modernity = Liberalism, amounts to the assertion that 
‘[t]hough any legitimate state must necessarily pass the BLD (and so be LEG) it must 
also meet the specific and unique demands of the context (modernity) …’.10  Sleat is 
suggesting that Williams offers a two-stage test of legitimacy:  (i) satisfying the BLD, 
and (ii) being an appropriate response to modernity.  I take it that Sleat is relying on these 
observations by Williams: 
It is important, first, to distinguish between the idea of a state meeting the BLD, 
and its having further political virtues (e.g., its being a liberal state).  I mean that 
these are two different ideas, and in fact I think there manifestly have been, and 
perhaps are, LEG non-liberal states.  However, this does not exclude the 
possibility that there might be circumstances in which the only way to be LEG 
involved being liberal.  This relates to the question of extra conditions on LEG, 
[...].
11
 
 
This reference to ‘extra conditions’ does seem to imply that meeting the satisfaction of 
the BLD might not be enough for legitimacy.  However, this reading is somewhat 
troubling in that legitimacy is here used to mean two different things.  A state is 
legitimate (LEG) if the BLD is satisfied but it may only be legitimate, in another sense, if 
                                           
8
 This seems to imply that the legitimation actually exists when all subjects are satisfied by the account 
given by the state.  Does that mean that subjects are (subjectively!) the judge of the adequacy of the 
response?  Presumably not.  Williams’s invocation of Hobbes’s ‘first’ question suggests an objective 
standard of whether a satisfactory justification has been offered to each citizen.  Williams confirms this 
when he returns to the BLD in another essay much later in his book [Deed p.135-136]:  some may 
unreasonably refuse to be satisfied.  That later passage, though, raises fresh questions.  Williams writes 
‘Who has to be satisfied that the BLD has been met … is a good question, and it depends on circumstances’ 
[ibid. p.136].  Here Williams must be talking about realpolitik.  
9
 Ibid. p.9. 
10
 Sleat p.487. 
11
 Deed p.4. 
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it is LEG and some further conditions are met.  An alternative reading of Williams avoids 
this difficulty.  It assumes that there is only one conception of legitimacy (LEG) and that, 
as Williams states, ‘Meeting the BLD is what distinguishes a LEG from an ILLEG 
state.’12  We should then understand Williams to mean that, in conditions of modernity, 
the only answer to the BLD is a liberal one.  This reading makes sense of Williams’s 
observation that ‘non-liberal states do not now in general meet the BLD’.13 
 
Using his narrower construction of Williams’s BLD (i.e. the answering of which 
constitutes only the first stage of a two-stage test of legitimacy and, thus, does not need to 
respond to modernity), Sleat argues that the BLD does depend upon an external moral 
understanding.
14
  (Of course, Sleat’s construction is likely, if anything, to flatter 
Williams’s position.  Surely, it would be even harder to show that the alternative, thicker, 
understanding of the BLD relies only on principles that are derived exclusively from an 
understanding of the political.)  Sleat’s move is to challenge the consistency of 
Williams’s assertion that ‘the idea of meeting the BLD implies a sense in which the state 
has to offer a justification for its power to each subject’ with the overall argument that the 
BLD does not involve reliance on any external moral resource.
15
  Sleat argues that an 
assertion that all humans deserve to be taken into account, to be given reasons for the 
state’s power, cannot be derived from the purely political.  He claims that Williams 
relies, tacitly, on a liberal belief in the equal worth of human beings.  He writes ‘why 
does the BLD require that sufficient reasons be offered to all persons subject to state 
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 Sleat pp.494-498. 
15
 Deed p.4. 
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power?  Why should we care about the plight of the tyrannized, weak and powerless?’16  
Having located what he believes to be the intrusion of this external moral precept into 
Williams’s theory and in, presumably, his desire to maintain what he sees as realist 
rigour, Sleat argues that Williams’s BLD can be restated making it clear that the 
justification need not be made to all.  The BLD is met where the political order is 
justified to some people.  That is the necessary condition.  There is no politics as such 
without the meeting of the BLD but the question to whom the political order must be 
justified is cut loose from the BLD.  An answer to that question becomes a sufficient 
condition for legitimacy and is an historically contingent matter.  External morality 
comes into play here but the BLD itself is quarantined from that infection.  This allows 
Sleat to claim that today a state which does not justify its power to the entire population 
will be illegitimate but that states, in previous eras, that ignored parts of their populations 
may have been legitimate in their day.  Such a strategy may have the attraction of 
avoiding placing anachronistic demands upon the ancients but it fails to rescue 
Williams’s attempt to avoid political moralism.  Sleat’s move is, in effect, to isolate the 
form of a legimitation demand from its moral content but such a demarcation cannot be 
significant.  What good is a BLD isolated from the realities of all actual polities?  Sleat, 
himself, admits that ‘[in keeping external moral considerations distinct] it … has the 
advantage of clarifying the nature and extent of politics’ autonomy from the moral, albeit 
in such a way that might suggest that the space for the independence of the political is 
more limited than a theory of realism might desire [my emphasis]’17.  I would say:  more 
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 Ibid. p.497. 
214 
 
limited than such a theory of realism, which claims to exclude political moralism, 
requires. 
 
In fact, Sleat was not quite right to assert that Williams’s BLD required sufficient reasons 
be given ‘to all persons subject to state power’, to all ‘the tyrannized, weak and 
powerless’ if that is to be understood as everyone.  Williams argues that reasons only 
have to be offered to those that are to be included in the polity as subjects.  There may be 
those who live within the geographical boundaries of the state who are not treated as 
subjects at all.  Their existence is akin to being enemies of the state.  The attitude of the 
state to such is one of ‘internal warfare’.18  The political concerns only the relationship 
between state and subjects (or between subjects).  Could this line of reasoning by 
Williams have allowed him to respond to Sleat’s criticism?  If everyone is necessarily 
entitled to make a BLD, which the state must answer sufficiently if it is to be legitimate, 
it is unavoidable that when we ask ‘why everyone?’, we find ourselves doing so in terms 
of some moral, egalitarian, extra-political, commitment.  However, consider if a class of 
person is distinguished:  those that are required by the state to obey the state’s precepts 
(i.e. subjects) and, as such, are entitled to make a BLD, which must be answered for there 
is to be legitimacy.  Has the group been defined politically rather than morally?  The 
argument requires that the category of person ‘required to obey the state’ is clarified.  
Presumably, all are required, in one sense, to obey the state and its officials.  The 
distinction is between, on the one hand, those who must, in practice, obey the state 
because of the power of the state to impose whatever requirements it wishes on such 
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people and, on the other hand, those who the state claims are under some kind of moral or 
legal obligation to obey its demands.  With regard to the former, there is no suggestion of 
obligation:  the state does not claim an obligation:  both the state and those who are under 
its control recognise that the relationship is one of brute force and threat.  Such people are 
in no position to make a BLD; the state does not hold itself out as being in a relationship 
with those inhabitants such that a BLD would make any sense.  However, if the state 
claims that there are reasons (beyond the prudential avoidance of state-sponsored 
violence) why an individual should obey the state, then a BLD by way of response 
becomes explicable.  In modern liberal-democratic states, it may be that everyone is 
entitled to make a BLD because all are viewed as subjects.
19
  In truth, though, recognition 
of the distinction Williams draws achieves nothing.  If a distinction is drawn between 
subjects and internal enemies, on what basis is that drawn?  If everyone is deliberately 
viewed as a subject, on what basis is that recognition?  The distinction must be a moral 
one and thus morality has found its way into the BLD.  I conclude that Sleat’s criticism of 
Williams is valid but that his own attempt to utilise the concept of a BLD to avoid 
political moralism fails.  Sleat’s strategy would not have been available at all if he had 
accepted the thicker, and perhaps preferable, construction of Williams’s idea of 
legitimacy. 
 
Any practical judgment about legitimacy will rely upon some external moral belief:  that 
is unavoidable.  We see that in Williams’s account though it is denied.20  The point is not, 
as Sleat would have it, that existing realist theories have, so far, failed to avoid moralist 
                                           
19
 Even foreign nationals, who are not subjects in a legal sense, are expected to be subject to the laws of the 
land.  
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foundations but rather that moralist underpinnings are unavoidable for any account of 
legitimacy.  Indeed, we should, perhaps, note what an extraordinary claim it is that 
Williams makes:  that political legitimation can be derived without any reliance on 
morality.  Given that Williams argues that in conditions of modernity only liberal states 
are likely to be legitimate, we might have been suspicious, with good reason, that 
external moral principles must have wheedled their way, somehow, into Williams’s 
scheme.  Williams’s claim that he avoids political moralism is invalid.  Whatever the 
breadth of person entitled to make a BLD, an external morality is invoked.  Any 
substantive account of legitimacy requires external moral resources.  Further, the fact that 
a BLD can be made and that legitimacy requires that an answer be given to that demand 
tells us nothing about the nature and acceptability of any answer.  External morality is 
required to address the question of acceptability.  Why, for instance, is only liberalism an 
acceptable answer to the BLD in conditions of modernity?  The brute reality of the 
political provides no answer.  Further still, Williams’s first Hobbesian question is a 
loaded question.  It is loaded with a particular account of morality (albeit a limited 
morality that few might take issue with).  Williams’s own rehearsal of the issues shows 
that the Hobbesian question might be posed in different ways – different in terms of the 
minimum that is morally demanded of a state.  He ‘identify[ies] the “first” political 
question in Hobbesian terms as the securing of order, protection, safety, trust and the 
conditions of cooperation’.21  That seems more extensive account of the Hobbesian state 
than is strictly necessary.  Just over the page, Williams implicitly offers a more limited 
account when he writes that ‘[e]ven Hobbes […] did not think that a LEG state could be 
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 We also see it in Gray’s account of modus vivendi.  See my note 29 below. 
21
 Deed p.3. 
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identical to a reign of terror; the whole point was to save people from terror’.22  The 
precise requirements of a minimum Hobbesian state are themselves a matter of dispute 
and it has not been shown that that dispute is resolved without reference to moral matters. 
 
It is possible to imagine Williams’s invocation of Hobbes’s ‘first’ question being 
disentangled from his account of the BLD.  There is simply no necessary link between 
the two.  It is conceivable that a different ‘first’ political question could be asked:  how is 
human flourishing to be facilitated?  Arguably, this is a more basic ‘first’ question.  The 
BLD would now demand an acceptable answer to that question.  As this is a political 
question, the answer would have to offer something beyond the pre-political possibilities 
offered to atomised individuals or to clans.  It is not impossible to imagine a militaristic 
society which answered that question and claimed legitimacy on the basis that although 
its citizens would almost certainly suffer horrific, painful and early deaths on the 
battlefield those deaths would be glorious and would properly represent the highest 
human calling. 
 
Given that Williams fails to explain how legitimacy can be derived without an external 
morality, it is not surprising that his attempt to show that a liberal state may be the only 
legitimate state in conditions of modernity, without recourse to any external morality, is 
lacking.  Williams asserts that the standard for legitimacy (i.e. for meeting the BLD) will 
be raised as views about what constitutes unacceptable disadvantage to subjects develop 
over time.  In this way, negating the Hobbesian threats of ‘coercion, pain, torture, 
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 Ibid. p.4. 
218 
 
humiliation, suffering and death’ is no longer enough to meet the BLD.  But, surely, such 
an extension of accounts of unacceptable disadvantage is a moral move.  Further, when 
Williams points out that ‘rationalisations of disadvantage in terms of race and gender’23 
are likely to be excluded from acceptable answers to the BLD, that is surely on the basis 
of moral understandings that cannot be uncovered from an account of the political.  
Williams, and Sleat for that matter, have failed to elucidate a theory that does not rely on 
moral understandings that are external to the political endeavour.
24
  I have not 
demonstrated that the possibility of a theory that is ‘non-moralist’ can be excluded but 
Williams and Sleat do not offer any good grounds for optimism that such a theory can be 
found.  We may wonder, though, why an acceptable account of political realism has to be 
defined in such terms. 
 
Modi Vivendi 
John Horton’s realist approach and specifically his account of a modus vivendi are not 
prefaced on the assertion that realism avoids an external morality.  Horton writes, 
A modus vivendi can be arrived at by drawing on whatever resources – moral, 
intellectual, cultural, pragmatic etc., as well as self-interest – are available in 
helping the parties to reach it.  A modus vivendi is not [...] simply [...] a balance 
of political forces.  A modus vivendi is a practical accommodation that can be 
built around any number of factors and be accepted for a variety of reasons by 
those who are parties to it.
25
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 Ibid. p.7. 
24
 Interestingly, Williams states that ‘…I agree – it is a manifest fact – that some kind of democracy, 
participatory politics at some level, is a feature of LEG for the modern world’ [ibid. p.15].  Like other 
liberals, he fails to explain how the demands of democracy and liberal imperatives fit together in a 
legitimate state. 
25
 John Horton, ‘Realism, Liberal Moralism and a Political Theory of Modus Vivendi’, European Journal 
of Political Theory Vol.9 No.4 (October 2010) pp.431-448 at pp.439-440. 
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Horton goes on to make some interesting observations about legitimacy.  ‘The idea of a 
modus vivendi […] carries with it the sense that the arrangements are to some extent 
accepted as legitimate by the various parties to it, even if that acceptance is, as it often 
will be, to varying degrees reluctant, grudging and qualified’.26  The ‘to some extent’ in 
Horton’s explanation is probably best viewed as a reference to the degree of 
grudgingness of the assent, not to the breadth of the assent.  Acceptance of the legitimacy 
of a sufficient political settlement is a yes/no matter.  It is either accepted or it is not.  
However, while the political settlement is accepted, that acceptance may be whole-
hearted or half-hearted; a particular group within society may enthusiastically endorse the 
settlement with little question; another group, may only accept the settlement on balance, 
noting many unsatisfactory aspects of the settlement.   
 
Horton is recognising that the realist account of political legitimacy is distinct from other 
accounts.  The liberal account, for instance, has it that legitimacy must be recognised by 
all or, at least, that it should not be unreasonably rejected by any.  Thus, legitimacy 
becomes an objective characteristic that applies to all and legitimacy can, as it were, be 
used as an intellectual stick to beat the recalcitrant, or the potentially recalcitrant, with:  if 
a state is legitimate, its citizens must toe the line.
27
  Horton goes on:  ‘Such an 
                                           
26
 Ibid. pp. 442-443. 
27
 Allen Buchanan offers an interesting, if ultimately liberal and orthodox (i.e. non-realist), account of 
legitimacy in Allen Buchanan, ‘Political Legitimacy and Democracy’, Ethics Vol.112 No.4 (July 2002) 
pp.689-719.  He distinguishes political legitimacy, which exists where some entity (usually a government) 
is entitled to exercise exclusive political power, from political authority the right of that entity to be obeyed 
(i.e. with citizens under a duty to obey it).  Legitimacy is primary and may exist without authority.  He then 
reconnects these curiously separated concepts by asserting that in a democracy there is an obligation to 
fellow citizens to obey government and further, where democracy can exist, legitimacy demands 
democracy.   
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understanding would “relativize” acceptance in an attractive way, …’28  Legitimacy is no 
longer in the form of a moral demand placed upon holders of particular comprehensive 
doctrines by the state or, in effect, by some dominant grouping within it; the existence of 
legitimacy is a subjective judgment made by adherents of each comprehensive doctrine; it 
is something that is recognised (or not recognised) by each group.  The point at which 
legitimacy is lost will be different for different groups because different groups adjudged 
legitimacy to exist on the basis of their own reasons.
29
  The stability of the overall modus 
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 Horton p.443. 
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 Galston challenges realists:  ‘… if realists want to maintain “legitimacy” as the dividing-line between 
acceptable and unacceptable regimes, they will have to say more about the kinds of public claims that count 
as satisfying this criterion.’ [‘Realism’ p.408]  But it seems to me that Horton is deploying the idea of 
legitimacy in a wholly different way.  It is not that a modus vivendi is, in Galston’s terms, legitimate.  There 
is no Archimedean stand-point from which to adjudge whether there is that kind of legitimacy.  A modus 
vivendi exists where citizens adhering to different comprehensive doctrines recognise the modus vivendi as 
legitimate.  But it would be misleading to go on to describe a modus vivendi as legitimate unless such an 
assertion is wholly equivalent to asserting simply that there is a modus vivendi. 
Gray does seem to want to maintain ‘legitimacy’ as an objective criterion but this can only be achieved by 
smuggling universalist standards back into an account which was founded on the assertion of strong value 
pluralism and the robustness of cultural diversity.  Gray writes that:  ‘The terms of such modi vivendi will 
be constrained by a universal minimum morality that specifies a range of generically human goods and 
bads’  [John Gray, ‘Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company’, in Pluralism – The Philosophy and 
Politics of Diversity eds. Maria Bagramian & Atracta Ingram (London: Routledge, 2000) pp.85-102 at 
p.87.] and that  ‘In both cases the test that value-pluralists apply is how regimes promote and protect 
valuable ways of life and ensure a modus vivendi among them.’ [ibid. p.86].  Gray, thus, imagines two 
standards:  first, that a basic minimum universal morality is maintained; and, secondly, that valuable ways 
of life are protected.  He must have in mind some objective standpoint that can adjudge whether a way of 
life is valuable. 
I deny that there are or could be any universal standards for a modus vivendi.  There is no necessary 
universal minimum morality – for Gray, this ‘[marks] the boundary conditions beyond which worthwhile 
human lives cannot be lived’ [ibid. p.91].  Understandings of such a minimum are derived from particular 
worldviews.  The minimum is not agreed across all worldviews.  Some militaristic cultures may glorify 
violent, sacrificial, death, for instance.  Many have defended slavery.  There is, though, no need to go down 
the path of specifying minimum standards for modi vivendi.  [I do not deny that almost any conceivable 
modus vivendi will include a basic minimum morality but this will be the case not because it is a minimum 
universal standard but because all groups in the state may happen to share such a minimum morality or 
because those that do have such a minimum standard will not agree to a modus vivendi under an 
circumstances where such a minimum standard is lacking.] 
As for the assertion that modi vivendi protects valuable ways of life, it seems to me that Gray is conflating 
two different forms of value pluralism.  At the start of his paper, he distinguished the pluralism of 
individual life-plans (to which imperfectionist forms of liberalism are a response) and the 
incommensurabilities of whole ways of life – ways of life that are incomparable (to which liberalism 
cannot successfully respond).  If different ways of life are to be recognised as valuable, we seem to have 
the former kind of pluralism in mind.  Here it may be possible to recognise different valuable life choices, 
albeit choices that are exclusive in the sense that to pursue one is necessarily to forego another.  However, 
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vivendi will depend upon the strength of the commitment of different groups to the 
political settlement and the fragility of that commitment in the face of new or developing 
political circumstances. 
 
Horton points out that a theory of modi vivendi is not without difficulty.
30
  Horton notes 
that the conditions for the existence of a modus vivendi are not necessarily clear.  The 
converse of this is that it is not clear at what point we should envisage the loss or end of a 
modus vivendi.  Undoubtedly, any modus vivendi will have ceased to exist when there is 
no longer an accommodation and we can say that a group is no longer part of an 
accommodation when the group concludes that the settlement has lost legitimacy.  Of 
itself, though, this does not allow us to specify whether a real political arrangement is, or 
is not, at any moment, a modus vivendi.  The question of whether we do or do not have a 
modus vivendi involves two distinct problems:  first, how should we understand 
legitimacy and the loss of legitimacy bearing in mind that this is a status designated 
independently by each group within the polity?  and, secondly, must the accommodation 
                                                                                                                             
it is hard to see why a way of life pursued by one community should necessarily be recognised as valuable 
by another.  Gray’s account does justify retention of ‘legitimacy’ as an objective quality. 
However, there may be much to commend the subjectivisation of the idea of ‘legitimacy’ and its excision 
from discourse about acceptable political settlements.  The fact that there is a modus vivendi should not 
imply that, by any particular measure, it is a good modus vivendi or the best possible political settlement.  
To label it legitimate is to attribute to it a specious status. 
If the designation of a political settlement or a state as legitimate is seen as a badge of acceptability, then 
dissatisfaction with the state or political settlement will be expressed in attempts to delegitimise it 
[Williams Deed pp.7 & 9].  Given the orthodox understanding of legitimacy that Williams offers in In the 
Beginning, he is forced to address the question of the legitimacy or otherwise of states in the past.  (He is 
prepared to excuse their non-liberal character.)   But if legitimacy should now be understood differently, as 
Horton implies, talk about the legitimacy of the regimes of the past becomes almost meaningless.  Of 
course, there is nothing to prevent consideration of the merits of a past political settlement – the extent to 
which it was justified by various measures recognised by different comprehensive doctrines.  We can 
consider whether the settlement represented a modus vivendi or simply a form of tyranny.  What we should 
not do – and, indeed, there is no need to – is speculate about the legitimacy of such a settlement. 
30
 Horton pp.442-446. 
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include all groups or can it still be said to exist notwithstanding the withdrawal of 
legitimacy by one or more groups? 
 
There is a continuum of support for and antipathy towards a political settlement, ranging 
from full-blooded endorsement, through tacit acceptance, through what might be called 
non-defiant antagonism to active, subversive, antipathy.  By tacit agreement, I imagine 
that the settlement is seen as having little to commend it but it is believed that there is no 
prospect of achieving a better settlement;  those who tacitly agree continue to comply 
with (rather than seek to undermine) the terms of the political settlement.  Thus, tacit 
agreement seems to amount to a grudging acceptance of the political settlement and 
continuing acceptance of the legitimacy of the arrangements for government.  Legitimacy 
is presumably withdrawn when a group starts to subvert the political arrangements in a 
polity.
31
  When a group considers that legitimacy is lost, then, as far as that group is 
concerned, the political settlement has become an imposition by others on that group.  
(An imposition that may appear to be wholly justified from another’s perspective.) 
 
Further, if we do, indeed, want a modus vivendi to be more than a theoretical idea and we 
want to distinguish real states according to whether they are or are not modi vivendi, we 
would probably not want the existence of a modus vivendi to depend upon the acceptance 
of legitimacy by the entire adult population i.e. every group within the society.  The fact 
that Bob and his dozen or so survivalist mates in their wilderness hideout are plotting the 
downfall of central government could not be determinative.  Quite what might constitute 
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an acceptable margin of malcontent is not obvious, though.   It cannot be the point at 
which political arrangements are significantly disrupted by subversion.  Such subversion 
may well be an indicator of the breakdown of the political settlement but the absence of 
subversion does not necessarily indicate that there is consent and that there is widespread 
acceptance of legitimacy.  A majority might be using an oppressive state apparatus to 
stifle dissent. 
 
It may be that modus vivendi can be thought of as an essentially contested concept.
32
  I do 
not mean by this that there is necessarily any confusion or disagreement about the idea of 
a modus vivendi:  a modus vivendi exists where there is widespread consent to the 
political settlement – where consent is given by the different cultural, ethnic and religious 
groups within the state.  However, we  have an essentially contested concept where the  
concept in issue – here, being a modus vivendi – has an internal complexity and where 
the  concept is not constituted by some definitive combination of its components.
33
  In the 
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 Arguably, this may not always be the case.  Can a group attempt to subvert around the edges of the 
political settlement while recognizing the overall legitimacy of the political settlement?  Matters may be 
clearer if there is an overt disavowal of the political settlement. 
32
 This is W.B. Gallie’s idea.  He offers a definition in W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol.56 (1955-56) pp.167-198 at pp.171-172.  Gray suggests that 
‘freedom’ should be viewed as such a concept – see Liberalisms p.45. 
33
 I am aware that Newey has challenged the claim that essential contestability can explain political 
disagreement.  [See op. cit. pp.36-56.]  I understand Newey to be criticising the development of Gallie’s 
original idea - essential contestability now being seen to arise from different interpretations of a concept.  
Indeed, Newey offers a less detailed definition of an essentially contested concept than does Gallie [ibid. 
p.39] which opens the door to sources of essential contestability that go beyond those envisaged by Gallie.  
I am content to stick with Gallie’s original definition which concentrates upon the problems that arise from 
the internal complexity of a concept, notwithstanding agreement as to how the concept and each its 
component parts or features should be understood.  {It seems to me that in Gallie’s original exposition, the 
contestability he envisages arises only from disputes about the relative importance and weighting of 
component features of the concept not from any dispute about whether each component is a constituent part 
of the overall concept or from any broader interpretative disputes.  See his discussion of his “artificial 
example” [adjudging the best team in some game or sport] where he writes ‘some importance, however 
slight, must, in practice, be attached to each of these factors [by all appraisers]’ [op. cit. p.173].  I think this 
is also clear from his discussions of ‘Art’ [ibid. p.182] and ‘democracy’ [ibid. pp.184-185].  I suspect that 
some of the difficulties subsequently explored by a number of critics flow not from Gallie’s original 
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case of modi vivendi, in deciding whether there is the widespread consent that defines a 
modus vivendi, judgments need to be made about what consent looks like, whether a 
variety of different groups are consenting, the fragility of their consent and about whether 
there is a sufficient breadth of consent across the state.  That being so, dispute and doubt 
about whether the concept exists in particular situations is always possible and potentially 
intractable.
34
  In fact, this is similar to the difficulties and doubts we have about ascribing 
the quality ‘liberal’ to states.  We have, perhaps, a good idea of those features that 
constitute a liberal society.  However, when we come to a particular society which has 
some liberal features but lacks others and, where it has liberal features, has these to a 
greater or lesser extent, overall opinions may differ.  One person may take the view, for 
instance, that the introduction of ID cards is such an affront that all other liberal features 
of a society are overwhelmed and the society no longer warrants the label ‘liberal’.  
Another may make gay rights the effective benchmark of a liberal society.  And so on.  
Before designating a state a modus vivendi, we might expect most to accept the 
legitimacy of the state but we are in no position to specify a percentage (of the population 
or of the number of distinct groups within the state); we have some view about what 
constitutes an acceptance of legitimacy but with some uncertainty about where a line is to 
                                                                                                                             
exposition but from broader accounts and definitions of essential contestability.  I suspect, too, that these 
broader definitions may have taken root in a misreading of Gallie where he refers to ‘[criticising] one’s 
own use or interpretation of the concept in question [my emphasis]’ [ibid. p.193].  See William Connolly, 
The Terms of Political Discourse (2
nd
 ed.) (Oxford: Robertson, 1983) p.11.  For another detailed discussion 
of essentially contested concepts see John Gray, ‘On Liberty, Liberalisms and Essential Contestability’, 
British Journal of Political Science Vol.8 No.4 (October 1978) pp.385-402. 
34
 It should also be borne in mind that there is no Archimedean position from which to adjudge whether a 
political settlement constitutes a modus vivendi.  Those that might reach  judgments as to whether a 
settlement is a modus vivendi are always, in one sense or another, ‘players’ themselves and bring their own 
distinct perspectives to the evaluative exercise.  Even if those making judgments are looking in from 
outside (i.e. are not residents of the state that is being analysed), they will almost certainly be 
citizens/subjects of some other state and will have a perspective influenced by their understanding of their 
own relationship with their state.  {This is in line with Gallie’s explication of an essentially contested 
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be drawn.  It is not difficult to see that designating real arrangements as being or not 
being a modus vivendi may be unavoidably contested but that does not mean that the 
concept lacks utility or it is meaningless to describe a state as being a modus vivendi.
35
 
 
Horton briefly introduces the question of whether the idea of a modus vivendi is purely 
descriptive and, if not, the extent of its normative and prescriptive element.  He suggests 
that on any account (i.e. even one that emphasises the descriptive aspect of the theory) 
there must be an ‘ineliminable normative dimension’.36  (Given that a modus vivendi is an 
accommodation between those holding different moralities rather than an overarching 
political morality of its own, if there is a normative element this will have an effect as the 
recognition of a modus vivendi offers understandings and insights which will interact 
with and adapt the normative and prescriptive elements of the worldviews that are in 
play.)  Horton feels that much more work is needed in this area.  I agree.  I suspect the 
answer may be somewhat opaque and complicated by the fact that those who are attracted 
by the concept of a modus vivendi may hold quite different political and moral views.   It 
may be that what is  normatively and prescriptively significant for adherents of particular 
comprehensive views in a modus vivendi may come not from an account of modus 
vivendi itself but from understandings that have been accepted or discarded in the process 
of arriving at the modus vivendi.  For instance, even if democracy is properly understood 
as a part of a modus vivendi, – I go on to consider this below – any normative judgments 
                                                                                                                             
concept:  in his terms, “to use an essentially contested concept means to use it both aggressively and 
defensively” [ibid. p.172].} 
35
 It may be highly questionable whether the American political settlement represented a modus vivendi 
throughout its history.  The constitutional settlement was undoubtedly an imposition on the enslaved black, 
antebellum, population and, quite reasonably, can be construed as remaining so after emancipation.  
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about democracy may come from elsewhere rather than from any shared understanding of 
what a modus vivendi must look like – and those judgments may differ for adherents of 
different worldviews.  Perhaps, a group has consented to democracy as part of the modus 
vivendi because it has come to see democracy as fair.  Another group, though, may 
consider that there is no intrinsic justification for democracy and,  implicitly, that 
democracy cannot function as a political theory.  They, though, consent to the democratic 
system because they see that there will be instrumental benefits from democracy. 
 
The normative and prescriptive significance of much realist work may be  in the 
undermining of monist liberal accounts rather than in the creation of a normative account 
of modus vivendi.  For some exotics who never were liberals, a theory of modi vivendi 
may seem like the blindingly obvious and have little normative significance. 
 
Modi Vivendi and Democracy 
Horton’s account of a modus vivendi is a more straightforward account of political 
realism, unencumbered by any need to demonstrate a lack of political moralism.  If we 
accept it, we can see how the various outcome benefits of democracy could provide the 
reasons for adherents of comprehensive worldviews to adopt or support democracy as 
part of a political settlement that would be a modus vivendi.  The reality of pluralism is 
hard-wired into any account of modi vivendi.  Adherents of each different comprehensive 
worldview can endorse democracy for different reasons – even poor reasons:  the 
widespread, but false, belief that democracy is fair as between individuals may appeal to 
                                                                                                                             
Arrangements with the aboriginal population could not be categorised as consistently consensual.  The 
Union itself was, for a significant period of time, an imposition upon the states of the South. 
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adherents of some comprehensive views.  Curiously, indeed, if democracy is to be 
viewed first and foremost as a part of modi vivendi, we may be as interested in 
democracy’s plausibility for adherents of various comprehensive worldviews as with its 
credibility.
37
 
 
For a political theory of democracy, it would be democracy alone that was the 
fundamental part of the political settlement in a plural society.  Democracy would be that 
which bound the society together.  In a modus vivendi, though, democracy can be just one 
aspect of the political settlement and the form of democracy can be adapted to play the 
role needed to allow for the political accommodation.  A modus vivendi which 
incorporated democracy could, and would, perhaps, be likely to involve various 
constitutional arrangements, placing limits on acceptable democratic outcomes.  The 
modus vivendi approach is all about ‘horses for courses’; no particular democratic 
settlement can be prescribed. 
 
A modus vivendi must have a measure of stability.  If a settlement lacks stability that 
implies that it lacks the meaningful accommodation that is constitutive of a modus 
vivendi.  Clearly the achievement of a new modus vivendi where there has been an 
absence of a consensual political settlement and the maintenance of an existing modus 
vivendi are two quite different things and democracy’s role may be different in each.  In 
the case of the development of a new political settlement, there are many reasons why 
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 Horton p.445. 
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 It may be that sociologist Peter Berger’s work on plausibility and ‘plausibility structures’ will be seen to 
be relevant to investigations of the workings and long-term stability of modi vivendi.  See for instance, 
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political actors in such a situation might be encouraged to embrace some form of 
democracy (along with various liberal freedoms, perhaps) but we have no basis to insist 
that legitimacy can only ever be achieved by means of the inclusion of democracy in the 
modus vivendi:  we do not know what kinds of comprehensive worldviews will be held 
by individuals and groups within that polity;  we cannot tell what role democracy might 
play.  Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances where insistence on democracy 
– at least certain expressions of democracy – might undermine the prospects for 
achieving a modus vivendi:  circumstances where democracy would amount to little more 
than an ethnic head-count used by the majority to impose a political settlement which 
oppresses the minority.  I suggest that in the forming of a new democratic modus vivendi 
timing is everything.  If democracy is introduced too early in the process and is used to 
determine the structure of the political settlement, then there is a risk that a majority 
community will claim a specious legitimacy for its preferences and cease to pursue a 
mutually acceptable accommodation.  Democracy, though, can readily form part of the 
agreed settlement (i.e. it plays its role after the modus vivendi has been negotiated).  The 
key wider outcome benefit that makes democracy an attractive component of a new 
modus vivendi, which I discussed in chapter 6, is that democracy provides a forum for 
ongoing negotiation in a state and a mechanism for retaining consent when particular 
‘negotiations’ are terminated. 
 
I note that certain forms of electoral democracy might be unattractive when 
contemplating the possibility of a new modus vivendi e.g. in the course of nation-
                                                                                                                             
Peter Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation (London: 
Collins, 1980). 
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building.  A ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) system which elects representatives on achieving 
a plurality,
38
 but probably a minority, of the vote in voting districts is likely to elect 
representatives of different parties in quite different proportions to the proportions of 
citizens who support those parties.  Indeed, as has been commonly the case in the UK, in 
a FPTP election, a party with well under 50% of the vote will win a majority of 
representatives and then have largely unrestrained power to make laws of its own 
choosing.  On the other hand, electoral systems that are proportional may make a decisive 
outcome (in the form of a majority government) unlikely and create a need for ongoing 
negotiation and coalition-building.  Such proportional electoral systems may include 
some in the political process that would otherwise be excluded.  It may well be that in a 
fragile political situation where there is a danger that some groups will reject the political 
process, a proportional electoral system is clearly preferable.  This has, of course, been 
recognised in Ireland once again in deciding upon the form of elections to the post-Good 
Friday Agreement Northern Ireland Assembly. 
 
The position and the role of democracy within existing political settlements are quite 
different to that in new political settlements.  In addition to what other reasons there are 
for endorsing democracy, democracy and the political settlement as a whole may develop 
a mythic status.  A ‘democratic faith’ may have grown up39 which has become, in itself, 
an important bulwark against threats to the existing modus vivendi. 
 
 
                                           
38
 This would be particularly unattractive where there are a plethora of small parties finding their feet.  In 
such circumstances, a representative could be elected on a tiny percentage of the vote. 
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Summary 
Having previously argued that democracy cannot function as a political theory in the 
Rawlsian sense, in this chapter I have introduced the idea of consensual political 
settlements as modi vivendi and considered whether democracy can be viewed as a 
constituent of modi vivendi.  I noted that the idea of a modus vivendi is associated with 
the developing realist tendency of political thought.  However, I showed that realist 
attempts to derive political legitimacy without reliance on an external morality had not 
succeeded and I suggested that it seemed unlikely that such a project would succeed.  A 
modus vivendi is not realist in the sense that it is not reliant upon a political morality.  
The realism of modi vivendi derives from a recognition of diversity and that political 
settlements should be seen, fundamentally, as either impositions or accommodations 
rather than as grand normative projects.  Indeed, I suggested recognition of political 
settlements as being modi vivendi (or as failing to amount to modi vivendi) meant 
eschewing typical understandings of the legitimacy of political settlements.  I questioned, 
too, whether there is any normative element within the concept of a modus vivendi.  I 
claimed that while the concept of a modus vivendi was clear, the identification of a 
particular political settlement as a modus vivendi might be a matter of considerable, 
possibly intractable, dispute given the various judgments involved in making such an 
assessment. 
 
I ended the chapter by suggesting that democracy might be a key part of modi vivendi – 
the part that gave political settlements the consent and stability constitutive of modi 
                                                                                                                             
39
 See Patrick Deneen’s entertaining arguments in Democratic Faith. 
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vivendi.  In the next chapter, I consider the role of democracy in existing political 
settlements in more depth.  It turns out that while democracy can play a crucial role in 
encouraging consent, it can conceivably undermine modi vivendi.    
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Chapter 8 
Can Democracy Provide Stability for a Modus Vivendi? 
I have argued that democracy can be justified to those holding different comprehensive 
worldviews on the basis of its wider outcome benefits.  The outcome benefits of 
democracy are significant and may well appeal to adherents of many different 
comprehensive doctrines.  However, it is quite possible that democracy will appear to be 
justified to diverse individuals and groups, adhering to different worldviews, because of 
different perceived outcome benefits (and invalid procedural ones and for mythic 
reasons).  What we have is not a political theory but rather the possibility of an account of 
democracy as part of modi vivendi.  The wide appeal and the hegemonic status of the idea 
of democracy mean that it is reasonable to posit that democracy is likely to play a 
significant part in many modi vivendi.  But that will only be the case if accommodations 
involving democracy are likely to be perceived as legitimate over the longer term i.e. if 
democracy fosters, rather than undermines, the stability of modi vivendi.  In this chapter, I 
consider whether democracy provides stability for political settlements. 
 
Democracy may be thought to regulate conflict by providing a non-violent outlet for 
conflict but elections do appear, at times, to encourage conflict and dispute.
1
  
Undoubtedly in some societies there is a correlation between elections and conflict and 
violence.  Such a correlation would probably be apparent in Iraq or Zimbabwe, say.  
Sometimes the violence (as in Zimbabwe) may reflect a lack of democracy – a lack of 
free and fair elections – indeed, a probable lack of a democratic modus vivendi.  (Such 
                                           
1
 For alleged contemporary examples of the destructive impact of electoral democracy see Humphrey 
Hawksley, Democracy Kills (London: Macmillan, 2009).  
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examples may underline the point I made at the end of the previous chapter:  that in 
certain circumstances democracy could undermine the creation of a modus vivendi rather 
than encourage it.)  Sometimes, though, in an existing modus vivendi, democracy is 
utilised by one group to pursue an agenda which other groups find deeply offensive.  
Instead of any attempt at negotiation, the group that aims to win intends to rely on the 
legitimacy of the democratic outcome to impose its view.  This may provoke a group that 
anticipates losing.  The stability and resilience of the modus vivendi will depend upon the 
reaction of groups that are offended by democratic outcomes and that is what I go on to 
consider here. 
 
In an existing democratic modus vivendi,
2
 every outcome-democrat political actor (i.e. an 
individual, community or group that supports democracy because of the valuable benefits 
which make it a significant part of the political settlement) is presented with a conundrum 
when democracy is seen to produce what they conclude to be bad outcomes.  Having 
endorsed democracy for outcome reasons, they believe that democracy will generate 
good outcomes but bad outcomes are issuing at present.  What is the appropriate or likely 
response?  Of course, practically speaking, the political actor may have no viable option 
but to accept and submit to the bad outcomes – in other words to go on accepting the 
political settlement.  This will particularly be the case for individuals.  In the case of 
communities or groups, depending upon their size and the resources at their disposal, 
these may conceivably consider actions and strategies to subvert the bad outcomes, 
legally or illegally, and this may constitute the end of the modus vivendi.  Whether it does 
                                           
2
 I do not discount the possibility of non-democratic modi vivendi (see above – chapter 7). 
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definitively represent the end of the modus vivendi may hinge on the extent of the action 
taken and strategies pursued to subvert the offensive democratic outcomes and the time 
over which such actions are taken or strategies pursued. 
 
The response to repugnant outcomes will, of course, vary according to the identity of the 
political actor and the basis upon which democracy was endorsed by that political actor.  
Further, it is necessary to distinguish between bad outcomes that are bad particular 
outcomes (judged according to the comprehensive doctrine) or bad wider outcomes, 
representing a failure to deliver the expected wider outcome benefits (that were valued by 
that comprehensive doctrine).  In the case of the former, the political actor may have 
factored in a considerable quantity of adverse particular outcomes and still accept 
democracy because of its wider outcome benefits.  If, though, democracy ceases to 
produce the expected wider outcome benefits (e.g. corruption or violence becomes rife), 
the political actor’s commitment to democracy may be tested to a greater extent.3 
 
When either hoped for, or anticipated, particular outcomes or wider outcome benefits do 
not materialise, the hitherto democratic commitment of the political actor may be 
challenged and the political actor may, one might have thought, take what is in the nature 
of either an act-consequentialist-type or a rule-consequentialist-type approach to the new 
                                           
3
 Of course, the political settlement that is the modus vivendi may already include and detail the 
institutionalised, and, critically, agreed, circumstances in which democratic outcomes will lose their 
legitimacy and will be overturned by reference to a constitution or bill of rights and by a process of judicial 
review.  What I wish to explore is what happens when there is a lack of agreed institutional arrangements 
for overturning repugnant democratic outcomes or where those arrangements do not apply to the case in 
question. 
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circumstances.
4
  The act-consequentialist-type response is to attempt to unpack and 
analyse all relevant outcomes, both immediate and future:  the political actor had 
expected good outcomes from democracy overall but, now, the outcomes that have 
materialised are neither expected nor good:  the act-consequentialist-type response will 
be to continue to endorse the legitimacy of the democratic system as part of the modus 
vivendi (and the legitimacy of the bad outcomes themselves if they are particular 
outcomes) if that support is likely to produce the best outcomes overall over time:  if 
acting democratically (i.e. accepting continuing democratic legitimacy) at this moment is 
unlikely to produce the best aggregate outcomes, an act-consequentialist-type response 
would be to do what is possible to subvert the bad outcomes, and thus the democratic 
process, at least as far as is necessary to produce the best outcomes overall.  The rule-
consequentialist-type approach would be to proceed on the basis that, although 
democracy has no justification for it except that it produces good (or rather, the best) 
outcomes and that in this case it has produced one or more bad outcomes, overall it is 
better to proceed on the conviction that the best outcomes over time will accrue from 
continuing to support democratic decisions and to act in support of them.  It is 
questionable, though, whether the commitment to democracy as part of a modus vivendi 
because of its good results would ever be such that a political actor would proceed on the 
basis of a true rule-consequentialist approach.  To consider this further, we might look at 
the response of proceduralists (i.e. more doctrinaire democrats) to repugnant outcomes; 
the kind of dilemma faced by a supporter of democracy when it fails to deliver its 
                                           
4
 I do not mean to suggest that all political actors are consequentialists through and through.  I simply mean 
that if democracy is supported on the basis of its outcomes (i.e. consequences), then a consequentialist 
approach is likely to be applied to this particular issue.  [Those who believe in democracy for mistaken 
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expected good outcomes is much the same as the conundrum facing all but the strongest 
procedural democrats.  (An arch-proceduralist considers that an outcome is right because 
it is the result of a democratic process.  However destructive or harmful that outcome 
might be, it remains validated by the procedure that brought it about.  So validated, it is 
authoritative.
5
)  Most proceduralists are likely to recognise that the nature and quality of 
                                                                                                                             
procedural reasons or accept a myth or tradition of democracy will be balancing different factors when 
confronted with repugnant democratic decisions.  I comment on the proceduralist response in n.5 below.] 
5
 For a strong defence of the legitimacy of democratic outcomes even when what is in issue are 
fundamental rights of citizens see Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999).  
See also Bellamy op.cit. 
One attempt by a proceduralist to prescribe the limits of democratic legitimacy is by Corey Brettschneider
 – 
see Corey Brettschneider, ‘Balancing Procedures and Outcomes Within Democratic Theory: Core Values 
and Judicial Review’, Political Studies Vol.53 No.2 (June 2005) pp.423-441.  In essence, he proposes that 
while democratic outcomes must always be legitimised to some extent because they are so produced, the 
outcome may be delegitimised if the substance of the outcome in some way undermines or is harmful to 
democracy or democratic values.  An example might be some democratically arrived at outcome which 
limits freedom of speech or association, requirements commonly considered necessary for a proper 
functioning democracy.  (Even on a non-deliberative understanding of democracy, the publicity of grounds 
for choosing one democratic option rather than another, is an important feature of free and fair elections.)  
Brettschneider posits that in this type of situation there is an irremediable loss.  If the decision is allowed to 
stand then the infringement of democratic values arising from the outcome remains; alternatively, if the 
outcome is overturned, then there is a demonstrable loss because a democratic outcome has been 
overturned non-democratically.  He proposes a balancing of these losses:  if the loss to democracy is less if 
the single decision is overturned, then it should be overturned. 
Brettschneider has responded to the dilemma that arises when outcomes which are right because they are 
democratic are ethically bad according to some moral doctrine.  Offensive democratic decisions can be 
impugned on democratic grounds.  Brettschneider has seemingly resolved the dilemma; there is now an 
intellectual mechanism and, theoretically, a practical mechanism – such decisions balancing democratic 
losses could be made by a supreme court.  His approach, though, seems to succeed only by ignoring or 
playing-down the need to respond to heinous democratic decisions.  He hopes, perhaps, that heinous 
decisions will always be offensive on democratic grounds, providing a justification for their repudiation:  
deciding to massacre some minority population will most definitely impair their ability to vote!  Indeed, to 
be fair to Brettschneider, he takes a broad view of democratic values.  He writes, ‘[w]hen democratic 
procedures greatly threaten the status of democratic citizens as free and equal, they are rightly overridden 
by the process of judicial review in the name of democracy’ [ibid. p.425.]  It is not obvious, though, why 
bad particular outcomes should always be undemocratic.  Galston argues that it is ‘deeply implausible’ that 
‘all individual claims that deserve serious consideration’ are protected as goods which are integral to the 
democratic process or at least democratically necessary to ensure that citizens can take part in politics 
[Liberal Pluralism p.83].  Galston points out that Robert Dahl, long-time defender of democracy, is unable 
to show that all properly inviolable rights are protected by democracy.  [See ibid. p.83 referring to Robert 
Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989) pp.182-183.] 
This remains, then, a clear and weighty criticism of Brettschneider’s approach:  why is it that only 
particular outcomes – those that are bad for democracy – may be overturned legitimately?  Why should the 
protection of democratic values/goods be prioritised?  Should there not be a weighing of bad outcomes in 
general against the procedural legitimacy of the decision?  Brettschneider seems to be providing an 
analogous schema to that of Rawls’s political liberalism.  For the later Rawls of political (non-ethical, 
imperfectionist) liberalism, liberal rights are prioritised over any ethical goods.  The only reason for 
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the outcome cannot be wholly overlooked.  What if the outcome is, in some sense, 
undemocratic or antidemocratic itself?  What is an appropriate response if a democratic 
outcome tramples over some foundational nostrum of liberal society or the outcome 
represents some heinous abuse of a minority community?  Most proceduralists will 
recognise these occurrences as dilemmas; they may try to prescribe strategies to resolve 
the clash between, on the one hand, the apparent legitimacy of even a bad democratic 
outcome (and the obligation that creates to accept it) and, on the other hand, the offence 
of those bad particular outcomes.  Proceduralists may propose some rules or guidance as 
to when (and how) democratic outcomes should be overturned.  They may attempt to 
categorise types of bad outcome that warrant intervention and the degree of badness that 
would warrant intervention in an attempt to devise rules as to when the quality and 
quantity of badness is such as to delegitimise a democratic outcome.  If their rules are 
adopted, then they can effectively form part of the modus vivendi.  If no such rules are in 
place, the proceduralist will have to resolve the dilemma and may conclude that 
democratic legitimacy has been lost.  There is, though, a significant difference between 
the dilemma facing the proceduralist and the person committed to democracy only on the 
basis of the outcomes it is likely to produce:  the proceduralist feels some ethical 
commitment to decisions that are democratically generated; when democracy produces a 
demonstratively bad particular outcome, the proceduralist is faced with a fundamental 
ethical dilemma between competing ethical imperatives – abiding by the decision given 
its democratic status (deontological) and challenging the offensive decision (offensive 
perhaps on consequentialist or distinct deontological grounds).  On the other hand, the 
                                                                                                                             
limiting one politically liberal right is because it conflicts with another politically liberal right.  For 
Brettschneider, democratic considerations are the sole measure of legitimacy.  The only challenge to the 
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outcome democrat has no inherent commitment to the decisions that they consider bad.  
The outcome democrat is rather considering a trade-off between the damage, ill or 
offence caused by the bad outcome and the broader damage that may be caused if, in 
attempting to subvert the particular noxious decision, democracy is damaged and, thus, 
its propensity to bring about good outcomes in future (which is generally to be expected 
of democracy) is prejudiced. 
 
For the proceduralist, there is always loss if a democratic decision is overturned or 
subverted.
6
  For the non-proceduralist outcome democrat, there is only loss if 
democracy’s ongoing ability to produce good outcomes is prejudiced by the overturning 
or subversion of the democratic decision in question.  If it can be shown that the 
particular bad democratic outcome can be overturned or subverted without compromising 
democracy’s general ability to produce good wider outcome benefits, then there will be 
no loss.  If an individual or group is in a position to subvert unfavourable decisions 
without undermining democracy and its generally good wide outcome benefits, then, 
subject to what the individual’s (or group’s) morality and worldview will allow, there is 
no reason not to pursue a programme of subversion.  If an individual or group can get 
away with subverting some democratic outcome or process by, for example, some form 
of ballot-rigging or gerrymandering or manipulation of the electoral roll which is likely to 
escape detection, why not do it?  If the fraud is not detected, no one will be any the wiser 
and the general acceptance of democratic outcomes in that society will not be 
                                                                                                                             
legitimacy of a democratic decision is that it is undemocratic.
 
6
 That does not, of course, mean that it is wrong to overturn or subvert a particular decision.  Brettschneider 
[see previous note] proposes a legal means for so doing.  Other proceduralists will go further accepting that 
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compromised.  That being so, a rule-consequentialist-type approach may be unattractive 
and hard to sustain. 
 
Further, democracy is multi-faceted.  A commitment to democracy is not analogous to 
something like a commitment to promise-keeping.  The outcome democrat political actor 
confronted with a bad decision (or the likely prospect of a bad decision) is not faced with 
a simple dilemma:  it is not a matter of choosing between keeping a particular promise 
and breaking that promise, say.  Rather, there are a multitude of possible responses.  The 
political actor may attempt to subvert the adverse decision in a variety of ways, 
transparent or clandestine, legal or illegal.  The act of subversion might take place before 
or after the offensive decision is taken.  In attempting to subvert the democratic process, 
the outcome-democrat risks undermining the democratic system but she or it may 
consider that they can act in such a way as to avoid, or minimise the risk of, undermining 
the system.  The political actor may say one thing and do another:  they may act in a way 
which subverts the particular democratic decision while ostensibly still supporting 
democratic process.  They may, with justification, believe that the particular offensive 
decision or decisions can be undermined or overturned without loss, without undermining 
the political settlement. 
 
Some particular outcomes will be so bad that on any measure of relative benefit, the 
political actor will prefer to contest or subvert the bad outcome in some anti-democratic 
fashion.  Possible outcomes would be the democratic rise of the Nazis in the early 1930s 
                                                                                                                             
the moral response to the democratic decision may involve a balancing of competing losses and that, on 
occasion, a democratic outcome may be so offensive that it losses legitimacy regardless of its legality.  
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or a decision democratically-taken to launch an aggressive war of conquest.  And if it is 
conceded that, from certain stand-points, subversion of a particular democratic outcome 
may be reasonable, then the rule demanding acceptance of/submission to a democratic 
outcome must be abandoned or at least re-cast to make allowance for the exceptions.  
Quite how such a rule could be recast is far from clear.  Precisely how bad does an 
outcome have to be?  What kinds of wrong or offence are so gross as to override a 
general commitment to democratic outcomes?  The difficulty in answering such 
questions indicates that a rule-consequentialist-type approach is probably unrealistic. 
 
To Subvert or Not to Subvert 
In the face of some offensive outcome, then, the choice the outcome-democrat political 
actor will make is likely to depend upon their relative valuations of the importance of 
subverting the particular bad outcome(s) as against the generally good outcomes they 
may expect from the democratic system.  It may also depend upon calculations of risk 
and the chances of success.  What are the chances that the general goods from democracy 
will be undermined or prejudiced?  What are the chances the bad outcome can be 
subverted while leaving the democratic system (i.e. the political settlement) intact – i.e. 
without negatively impacting upon its future propensity to produce good outcomes?  
Further, it will also depend upon their particular conception of the good and of morality.  
Are dishonest or manipulative actions excusable in order to achieve some greater good? 
 
But where does this leave us?  The extent and nature of the support for particular 
democratic decisions based on its outcome benefits is contingent upon a number of 
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factors, including the strength of commitment to democracy (i.e. the strength in the belief 
that good outcomes will generally out from the democratic process), the degree of 
offence felt about the bad outcome and the offended party’s own moral framework.  
Those belonging to different people groups, cultures and religions will reach different 
decisions, draw lines in different places, tolerate different things and pursue different 
tactics in the face of outcomes they consider abhorrent.  It is quite impossible to contrive 
rules about the circumstances in which democratic decisions would no longer be binding 
– giving reasons which would be explicable and justifiable to all individuals and groups – 
to which all could properly be expected to accede.
7
 
 
Any bad particular outcome that transpires exists against a back-drop of wider outcome 
benefits.  So if an ethnic or religious group (say) which accepts democratic legitimacy for 
outcome reasons considers that it is on the receiving end of a whole host of bad particular 
outcomes, it does not follow that that group will have a good reason to subvert the 
democratic process.  The group will no doubt consider whether the risk of losing or 
diminishing all the other gains from democracy and the modus vivendi (a liberal society?) 
which they recognise outweighs the benefit of challenging the bad particular outcomes in 
some extra-democratic fashion.  How far a political actor or some group within society is 
prepared to subvert and manipulate democratic processes and outcomes is likely to a 
matter of fine judgment – balancing likely, possible and conceivable benefits against 
likely, possible and conceivable losses.  One reason which a number of commentators 
have latched upon for abiding by democratic outcomes is that democracy itself provides a 
                                           
7
 If an agreement is signed by different parties to a political settlement not to subvert democracy, it would 
merely recast the problem:  the question now becomes, ‘Is the particular democratic outcome so repugnant 
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way to overturn the offensive outcome.
8
  The offended individual or group may feel that 
they should continue to play the game in the hope that, at some point in the future, the 
issue in question will be revisited in some vote or ballot and a more amenable outcome 
will ensue.  Clearly this is a factor that outcome democrats may take into account when 
responding to adverse democratic outcomes. 
 
If the breaking (or corruption) of the rules of the democratic system will be obvious or 
there is a risk it will become apparent (if an attempt has been made to hide the 
subversion), then the tolerance of other parties to that breaking (or corrupting) of the 
rules must be assessed.  The discovery of subversive activity by political opponents may 
lead to a great number of demerits and that may be a risk which the political actor 
adjudges too great to run.  A number of factors will probably come into play: 
 The gravity of the issue in the eyes of the political actor and his/her ‘constituency’ 
or group; 
 The gravity of the issue in the eyes of political opponents; 
 The commitment of those other groups to democracy and the democratic process.  
This could cut in a number of different ways:  if the commitment is weak, then the 
discovery of the act of subversion, may undermine still further the opponent’s 
commitment to abiding by democratic outcomes;  if the commitment is strong, 
then the sense of offence created on discovery of the act of subversion may be 
very great and may lead to some kind of political ‘reprisal’;  alternatively, if the 
                                                                                                                             
that I should break the agreement?’ 
8
 See for instance, Vernon [op.cit.]. 
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commitment is strong, there may be a reluctance to take ‘retaliatory’ action for 
fear of undermining the democratic process; 
 The fragility of the political settlement; 
 The loss of trust between groups; 
 The likelihood that such conduct will be reciprocated in due course; 
 Political embarrassment if discovered and the possibility of the disenchantment of 
the electorate or sections of the electorate. 
 
Sedition 
It would seem likely that much of the time the scales will be very much tilted against any 
seditionist activity – activity constituting an unequivocal and total repudiation of an 
existing democratic political settlement – be that, for instance, full-scale civil war, an 
attempted coup, a campaign of terrorism or mass civil disobedience.  [Such a repudiation 
may well mean that the political settlement can no longer be considered to be a modus 
vivendi.]  The potential losses of such a repudiation may be very high.  The disruption 
(and injury and loss of life) is likely to be felt not only by perceived oppressors but by 
that constituency the seditionists believe themselves to be representing.  However, it is 
foreseeable that there may be circumstances existing within a democracy such that an 
alienated or deeply offended group comes to believe (for, in their terms, apparently 
coherent reasons) that sedition and revolt offers the best way forward, that it offers the 
best chance of good outcomes overall. 
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I do not want to overstate the likelihood that any group proposing to act in a seditionist 
way is acting in a sensible or logical way – even on the basis of their own worldview, 
religion or ethical standpoint.  Irrational feelings of anger, offence and hostility, possibly 
based on tradition and historical enmities, may be (and most probably generally are) the 
drivers of sedition.  However, it is at least conceivable that a group will be so injured and 
so desperate as a result of a series of particular democratic outcomes that, for coherent 
reasons, they conclude that acts of sedition are appropriate.  They may reasonably, from 
their perspective, conclude that all of the losses associated with sedition – the loss of 
wider outcome benefits and, perhaps, the running of the risk of civil war and further 
oppression against their group – are outweighed by the possibility of subverting the 
particular democratic outcomes which they consider so offensive and oppressive by 
means of sedition. 
 
In circumstances of extreme poverty, oppression and/or perceived hopelessness, the 
oppressed group may consider that the balance of advantage has switched.  And in such 
circumstances, along with much other opprobrium heaped upon them, the potential 
seditionists will be condemned for behaving in an anti-democratic fashion.  That, though, 
is an accusation which, in the light of my findings, carries little weight.  In the absence of 
a procedural justification for democracy, criticism cannot be based on an appeal to 
democracy per se.  The actions of the seditionists must be criticised on the basis of the 
merits of the modus vivendi, any common moral norms that it encompasses or on the 
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basis of the moral norms of the seditionists themselves (i.e. showing that their actions are 
inconsistent with their own ethics and thus immoral in their own terms).
9
 
 
Out and out sedition may be considered something of an extreme example.  However, the 
legitimacy of democracy has been questioned in the context of the threat of global 
environmental catastrophe.  As noted in the previous chapter, some environmental 
philosophers, including Westra, have queried the adequacy of democracy in the face of 
the threat of global warming, the threat to biodiversity etc. – indeed they have rather 
more than queried it.  Westra writes, 
To achieve [ecological sustainability] requires individual and aggregate restraints 
the like of which have not been seen in most of the northwestern world.  For this 
reason, it is doubtful that persons will freely embrace the choices that would 
severely curtail their usual freedoms and rights […] 
The only hope for real change now lies in the emergence of global regulatory 
institutions willing to act paternalistically on our behalf […] 
The “top-down” regulatory and public policy aspect will have to be prescribed by 
an interdisciplinary team of biologists, ecologists, political scientists, medical 
specialists and philosophers with a strong traditional moral basis.  Such a team 
would take the role of the “wise man” of Aristotelian doctrine.10 
 
At the risk of being labelled eco-fascist or eco-authoritarian
11
, they have wondered what 
might be an appropriate response if electorates and their representatives continue to vote 
against policies considered vital for ecological security.  Others have responded by 
                                           
9
 Even proceduralists are in difficulty when it comes to advancing an argument that the sedition of 
democratic governments is illegitimate (for procedural reasons) under any circumstances.  Acts of sedition 
often flow from disputes about the proper domain of the polity itself.  Ulster is the classic example.  
Republicans committed to the ‘armed struggle’ may well have claimed that they were procedural democrats 
committed to a majoritarian principle for democratic decision-making!  Their dispute, though, was more 
fundamental:  what is the extent of the community/polity?  They claimed it should be all of the island of 
Ireland and not just ‘the north’.  Paul Gilbert makes this point in Paul Gilbert, Terrorism, Security & 
Nationality (London: Routledge, 1994) pp.94-95. 
10
 Op. cit. pp.198-199. 
11
 Humphrey describes the passage quoted above as ‘… redolent of the “eco-authoritarian” literature of the 
early 1970s …’ [op. cit. p.314]. 
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defending democracy, arguing that it is possible to give due weight to environmental 
imperatives within democratic systems.
12
 
 
                                           
12
 In the context of environmental threat, Humphrey considers whether direct (undemocratic) action to 
protect sites from development can be justified [ibid.].  He rehearses various responses by 
environmentalists who favour wholly democratic responses – those who argue that environmental 
protections can be entrenched as part of a ‘thin’ pre-democratic settlement and those that argue that 
democracy is always likely to provide the best environmental outcomes.  In the end, though, he argues that, 
from the perspective of certain comprehensive ethical stand-points, direct (non/anti-democratic) action 
designed to subvert democratic outcomes (i.e. planning decisions) may be justified to prevent certain 
irreversible environmental losses.  Further, he argues that such action can be legitimated within a broader 
democratic theory.  For Humphrey it is the irreversible features of democratic decisions affecting the 
environment that may justify direct action.  He draws a distinction with other democratic decisions which 
offended individuals and groups should tolerate because those decisions are provisional and always open in 
one way or another to reversal.
 
Humphrey fixes upon the reversibility or otherwise of the democratic outcome in question.  But this 
attempt to formulate a rule based on reversibility must fail.  Humphrey’s argument is one derived from the 
concept of deliberative democracy.  I am very doubtful that his position is tenable even for deliberative 
democrats.
 
Humphrey’s use of the idea of reversibility flows from his view of democratic legitimacy.  He endorses a 
deliberative democratic theory.  He suggests that it is the sincere commitment to the giving of ‘public 
reasons’ for decisions that makes those decisions/outcomes legitimate [ibid. p.311].  He then quotes a 
number of deliberative democratic writers in support of the idea that reversibility is a key feature of 
deliberative democratic process and sine qua non of democratic legitimacy.  In this way, he can argue that 
in the absence of reversibility, a ‘democratic outcome’ lacks democratic legitimacy and can then be 
justifiably subverted by non-democratic means. 
In an earlier chapter, I have set out criticisms of deliberative democracy and for those reasons I think 
Humphrey’s argument is based on the most dubious of foundations.  In any event, though, his claim that 
reversibility is an axiomatic feature of deliberative democracy appears questionable.  His case is based 
upon a series of quotes from deliberative democrat writers which seem to fall short of a clear argument by 
any of them that reversibility is a key feature of deliberative democrat outcomes.  On the basis of the quotes 
offered by Humphreys, it seems quite possible that each of the writers he quotes is using or appealing to the 
idea of reversibility to slightly different ends.  Indeed, it would be rather odd if reversibility were to be a 
key feature:  reversibility is surely only a concession to the inadequacy of certain discourses and 
deliberations.  If the deliberation is of sufficient length and of such a form as to allow all opinions and 
viewpoints to be considered, then the outcome should be final (subject to any changes in the facts and 
variables that were being considered). 
However, from the position of an outcome democrat, it will not do.  Reversibility is not a yes/no, either/or 
variable.  A bad outcome is likely to have some deleterious effect, even if it is later overturned.  The 
amount of suffering or injury or prejudice may be limited by a later decision to overturn the offensive 
outcome, but rarely will the offence be completely undone.  At one point, Humphrey argues that many 
decisions (but not generally decisions affecting the environment) can be undone because of the possibility 
of monetary recompense.  That seems a most dubious assertion.  Quite why money should be an adequate 
recompense is not explained.  And as a matter of fact, one wonders how often democratic outcomes (e.g. 
changes in the law) are accompanied by compensatory payments to those who were disadvantaged under an 
old law as compared to the new law. 
In short, why should illegal action (such as criminal damage to plant and machinery) to prevent the 
building of a new superstore on a site of special scientific interest be justified (subverting a particular 
democratic decision to approve the development) while direct illegal action (such as acts of sabotage 
247 
 
Conclusion 
The account of democracy as part of modi vivendi is appropriate (rather than an account 
of democracy as a political theory) because there is no overarching, universally 
legitimating, account of democracy.  Adherents to different worldviews will endorse 
democratic systems for different reasons.  Modi vivendi which incorporate democracy 
may exhibit particular stability and resilience given that the outcome benefits of 
democracy may be widely recognised, alongside mistaken beliefs in democracy’s 
fairness.  Of course, any political settlement may be more attractive than the possibility of 
armed hostilities but a modus vivendi incorporating democracy offers wider outcome 
benefits which political actors may not be prepared to risk even in the face of adverse 
particular democratic outcomes.  But two important points have been noted.  First, while 
democracy may commonly represent an entrenched and ongoing form of negotiation that 
moderates and lessens conflict and that mediates agreement and consent in a state, it can 
be used to impose deeply offensive or oppressive policies.  In extreme situations, holders 
of particular worldviews may reasonably (i.e. in their terms, legitimately) subvert the 
democratic process or even carry out acts of sedition.  Thus, democracy may be more 
fragile than we might wish.  While democracy may have swept a great deal before it 
since the War and particularly over the last 30 years, 80 years ago democracy in Western 
Europe came close to extinction.  We would be unwise and myopic to imagine that there 
are no circumstances in which the tide of democracy might not ebb or even be reversed.  
Secondly, almost perversely, the general resilience of democratic modi vivendi may make 
acting subversively more attractive.  It may be easier and less risky to get away with 
                                                                                                                             
against army supplies and logistics) to hamper the prosecution of an aggressive war (democratically 
approved) be illegitimate? 
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bending or subverting democratic norms than we might wish in established democratic 
modi vivendi.  Those inclined to play fast and loose with the democratic system may 
adjudge that this can be done without provoking those that lose out – without provoking 
them to the point where the wider outcome benefits of democracy are seriously 
prejudiced.   
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Chapter  9 
Concluding Observations 
In the modern world, states contain groups of adherents of many different comprehensive 
worldviews.  The world is inescapably pluralist and Rawls was right to highlight the 
resilience of different worldviews.  Save for peculiarly unlikely circumstances where 
adherents of different groups find that their particular political prescriptions fortuitously 
happen to coincide, every regime will either be an oppressive imposition by some or 
represent some kind of agreed political settlement.  Political settlements that do not rely 
on oppression and are not impositions are best understood as either settlements based 
upon a political theory or as modi vivendi.  It is not clear, though, that any persuasive 
account of a political theory has yet been offered.
1
  I have argued that democracy does 
not operate as political theory.  A political theory of democracy might have been credible 
if democracy could be justified on intrinsic, procedural, grounds.  I argued, in chapter 3, 
that when democracy is properly understood to be about collective endeavours rather than 
about the individual’s right to vote and to influence the political process, proceduralist 
arguments for democracy could not be sustained.  In the absence of such a defence of 
democracy, it is difficult to view democracy as capable of amounting to a political theory.  
I have argued that a political theory must be understood and be justified in the same way 
by those holding different comprehensive worldviews, albeit that their motivations or 
‘higher-order’ reasons might diverge.  A political theory should also offer political 
structures and outcomes that are resilient in the face of the different moral imperatives 
held by those adhering to different worldviews.  An outcome theory of democracy fails in 
                                           
1
 Current offerings, such as those of Rawls and Larmore, are versions of liberalism.  For the reasons given 
by Gray [see Pluralists] and others, these accounts are unpersuasive. 
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both these respects.  First, holders of different comprehensive theories may consider that 
democracy is justified for different outcome reasons.  Secondly, there are grounds to 
think that a theory of democracy will not be robust when it produces outcomes that are 
viewed as repugnant by holders of particular worldviews. 
 
A modus vivendi is simply a political settlement to which diverse groups agree rather than 
a settlement that is imposed.  Their reasons for agreeing may be common or wholly 
distinct or, perhaps more likely, similar in some respects and distinct in others.  There can 
be no external standards which define the terms of a modus vivendi.  All the intellectual 
and motivational resources for the settlement come from within the various 
comprehensive worldviews in the mix.  However, as a modus vivendi becomes 
increasingly established that may create a further reason for its acceptance.  As the modus 
vivendi becomes the way-we-do-things-around-here, it may take on a mythic quality 
which creates something of a self-sustaining circle (perhaps even a virtuous circle from 
some perspectives).  As citizens increasingly come to value the modus vivendi as ‘our 
way of doing things’, this encourages stability which in turn encourages further 
commitment to the modus vivendi.
2
 
 
                                           
2
 The stability of the American constitutional settlement has had may be best understood as arising from a 
combination of the mythic belief in its rightness with the fact that, in large measure, it has been perceived 
to work.  I do not for one moment want to suggest that it has ‘worked’ in some objective sense for the 
whole population of the US throughout US history.  There has, though, been a significant body of the 
population that thought it the best political settlement – some of whom, perhaps, thought that, even though 
outrageous injustices subsisted, the constitutional settlement was the best way of achieving what they 
sought. 
The liberal accounts of Rawls, Dworkin and others may, as many have argued, be misconceived but they 
do provide further pseudo-justifications for American constitutionalism which bolsters that settlement. 
251 
 
Democracy may, and commonly does, form a significant part of a modus vivendi.  In such 
a settlement, democracy may be valued differently by different political actors adhering 
to different comprehensive doctrines, although it may be that those adhering to different 
comprehensive worldviews will value democracy for some similar reasons.  The outcome 
reasons set out in chapter 6 may be accepted, to a greater or lesser extent, by many 
holding different comprehensive doctrines.  Indeed, there may be significant agreement 
about human flourishing and, thus, the importance of certain basic goods.  There may be 
agreement that democracy contributes to the provision of those basic goods.  Procedural 
reasons to support democracy may also be believed to exist, albeit for reasons which, I 
have argued, are not coherent whatever worldview is held.  An important wider outcome 
benefit of democracy that is particularly significant in explaining why democracy may be 
a key part of modi vivendi is that democracy represents and facilitates an ongoing process 
of negotiation within the state that is consistent with the settled and stable functioning of 
a state.  Democracy can allow voices from adherents of different comprehensive 
worldviews to be heard; it allows for debate and deliberation; it terminates debate and 
deliberation in a fashion that encourages consent; it allows for renewed debate.  
Democracy may also be well-placed to act as the basis for modi vivendi because it seems 
to have widely achieved the kind of mythic character discussed above – a mythic 
character that is recognised to a various extent across many comprehensive doctrines.
3
    
That mythic character reinforces the stability of the modus vivendi. 
                                           
3
 We see an expression of this widely held mythic character of democracy in the use of ‘democratic’ as an 
adjective meaning essentially ‘politically good’ or ‘politically right’ or as an intensifier. 
An appeal to the idea of democracy seems to require no further explanation or justification – again 
suggesting that democracy is a myth or article of faith that requires little further elucidation.  Consider 
arguments about the future composition of the House of Lords.  All political actors argue that their 
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The conclusion that democracy cannot operate as a political theory means that arguments 
for democracy as part of a modus vivendi cannot take place from an agreed, overarching, 
political, standpoint but must be made within each comprehensive doctrine or between 
comprehensive doctrines.  It is commonly claimed that only a democratic state is a 
legitimate state.  Such an unqualified view may be thought to be coherent and meaningful 
within a particular worldview (albeit, dubiously, if I am right about the lack of a 
proceduralist justification for democracy and the complications that arise from a wholly 
outcome justification that I set out in chapters 8 and 9).  However, as an address to the 
world in general, with its resilient diversity of worldviews, it is inadequate.  Those who 
come from a different perspective may not share the same account of legitimacy.  If one 
stands outside a particular comprehensive worldview there are only two possible 
argumentative strategies for justifying democracy in a particular state:  either (i) 
democracy is shown to be valuable according to the values and precepts of that 
comprehensive doctrine, or less attractively because the strategy is likely to be less 
persuasive given the likely resilience of the worldview (ii) the comprehensive doctrine is 
shown to be flawed or inadequate so that, when that comprehensive doctrine is revised or 
                                                                                                                             
proposals are more democratic.  Perhaps the arguments are so limited (and so intractable) because 
democracy is simply believed in rather than understood and justified. 
On the one hand, those who favour an elected second chamber argue that this is demonstratively more 
democratic – law-makers must be elected.  This argument is rarely expanded upon.  It could be an 
outcome-based argument but there is little hint that the proposition is based on the belief that an elected 
second chamber would produce better particular outcomes or better wider outcome benefits.  What would 
these be?  Perhaps, there is a proceduralist argument lurking below the surface but it is not articulated save 
for some unspecific appeal to ‘fairness’.  Overall, it seems to amount to little more than an assertion that 
democracy is good, therefore, more democracy is better. 
On the other hand, there are those who argue for an appointed second chamber.  Here the ‘democratic’ 
argument is that an appointed second chamber is more democratic because the position of the elected 
primary chamber, the House of Commons, will be maintained because it will not be in competition with 
another elected chamber.  [Those in favour of an appointed chamber do advance a non-democratic (or a-
democratic) outcome argument on the back of their democratic case – although, I detect, a little sheepishly:  
that an appointed chamber will be a more diverse chamber containing greater expertise in a number of areas 
and thus will carry out its functions better.] 
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discarded, the value of democracy can be properly recognised.  There are good reasons to 
think that the first strategy may often be successful.  The outcome arguments for 
democracy are considerable and weighty.  There are reasons to believe that democracy 
can be broadly recognised as being, commonly, critical to the establishment and stability 
of peaceful political settlements. 
 
Given a non-proceduralist defence of democracy, arguments for (and against) democracy 
are always contextualised.  In any particular polity, the question is whether democracy 
can be broadly recognised, or continue to be recognised, as a force for the good or the 
right by different groups, given all the circumstances subsisting.  Ultimately, arguments 
about democracy are always in the context of the different assessments of good and right 
by those living in a state.  In left-leaning accounts of the prelude to the Spanish Civil 
War, the fascists and monarchists are often condemned for failing to abide by the 
outcome of the February 1936 general election but that is, by itself, an inadequate 
charge.
4
  That charge will only be recognised, will only draw blood, to the extent that the 
fascists could have been persuaded that the democratic outcome was, after all, legitimate 
in the circumstances (or, perhaps, was an outcome that they had expressly or impliedly 
agreed to accept).  Any such arguments should acknowledge that most comprehensive 
doctrines (including those of the left) would accept that, in extremis, subverting an 
election result is not necessarily an immoral act.  Indeed, from the perspective of a 
particular worldview, there may conceivably be overriding moral imperatives properly 
motivating an act of sedition.  The democratic criticism is really dependent upon, only 
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makes sense in the context of, or is subsumed by, the substantive offence – that the 
fascists and monarchists pursued an agenda which was indifferent to a perpetual 
impoverishment of the urban working classes and to the well-being of a near feudal 
peasantry and that they unleashed a war of aggression against their fellow-countrymen.
5
   
 
A democratic modus vivendi may be secure or it may be fragile contingent upon the mix 
of comprehensive doctrines in a state, the numbers of their adherents and the attitudes of 
those adherents to their own worldviews and their attitude to others.  That security or 
fragility will then feedback influencing the attitudes of political actors to the modus 
vivendi but in complex and sometimes counter-intuitive ways.  If the political settlement 
is fragile, political actors may be more careful to avoid provoking others.  However, as I 
have previously argued in chapters 8 and 9, in a settled and long-standing democratic 
modus vivendi, political actors may be more likely to pursue their political advantage 
with less restraint.  They may consider that there are good reasons to manipulate and 
subvert particular democratic rules and procedures existing in that state and few reasons 
to hold back.  Thus, the very stability of the democratic modus vivendi may encourage 
non-democratic behaviour, political manipulation and subversion. 
 
Like other comprehensive doctrines, liberalism is challenged by democracy.  A 
democratic modus vivendi is likely to produce, from time to time, illiberal particular 
                                                                                                                             
4
 See for instance the Left Book Club’s Harry Gannes & Theodore Repard, Spain in Revolt (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1936) pp.117-118 and Paul Preston, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War (London: 
Fontana, 1996) pp.59-60. 
5
 As in any challenge to those holding to a different worldview, the charge is that such actions were wrong 
according to their own moralities (Catholic?) and, that if they were not so condemned by their own moral 
beliefs, then their own moral compass or theory was lacking. 
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outcomes.  The chances of offence are diminished, but not excluded, if the modus vivendi 
entrenches liberal restraints on democracy.  In conditions of nation-building or of grave 
instability requiring political and institutional reform, liberals may need to decide upon 
the extent to which democracy is accepted.  It is unclear that any liberal account can 
successfully avoid some minimal form of democracy altogether.  One suspects that Rawls 
and others might prefer to dispense with democracy and politics but even Rawls 
envisages some ongoing role for democracy.  In chapter 6, I suggested that a wholly 
juridical form of liberal government was unworkable.  So the liberal might prefer a 
highly restricted form of democracy but other parties to a modus vivendi may insist upon 
a less restricted form of democracy that will lead to outcomes that are more contingent, 
increasing the risk of illiberal outcomes.  The liberal must decide if the political demands 
of expediency and stability are acceptable – if a democratic modus vivendi that is not 
consistently liberal can be accepted.  While, in practice, I am sure that liberals cope fairly 
well with such liberal losses to democracy, it is not clear that liberal theories can 
generally be reconciled to such a retreat from liberal principle.  In chapter 1, I set out the 
difficulties that liberals have in coping with democracy.  Liberals may wish to revisit 
Berlin and his account of value pluralism.  Berlin argued that democracy offered positive 
freedom and liberalism offered negative freedom.  In a value-pluralist world, these 
freedoms are incommensurable.  Berlin claimed that this means that there is always the 
possibility of irremedial loss and that that must be accepted.  For Berlin, it is possible to 
be consistently both a liberal and a democrat, recognising that on occasion something 
approaching a radical choice between conflicting liberal and democratic imperatives 
might need to be made.  While Berlin’s positive/negative taxonomy of freedom and, thus, 
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his association of democracy with positive freedom and liberalism with negative freedom 
are not persuasive, I have argued that democracy exhibits quite different values to liberal 
values.  Democracy does not offer a morally significant freedom to individuals.  Rather, 
democracy offers particular outcome benefits such as protection against tyranny which 
may well facilitate and secure modi vivendi.  If the value-pluralist thesis is accepted, i.e. a 
broader Berlinian approach, then liberal values can be held in tension with quite distinct 
democratic values.  Democracy can be valued by liberals. 
 
It is not just liberals that are challenged by democracy.  Holders of any comprehensive 
doctrine can never be quite at ease with democracy.  Particular democratic outcomes will 
almost always diverge from the imperatives of any specified comprehensive worldview 
from time to time.  That should be no surprise.  Why would we expect democracy to fit 
neatly and tidily with all our own predilections?  Democracy recognises ‘the other’ and 
gives a voice to the other.  Recognition of the other always discomforts and always 
challenges. 
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